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1CHAPTER ONE
The Farm Safety Movement: The History of Transforming Tragedy into a Network of
Collective Action
Darrel and Marilyn Adams’ family expected October 15, 1986 to be a typical fall
day on their farm near Earlham, Iowa; however, it proved to be one that would change
their lives forever. They had decided to allow their son, Keith, to miss school so he could
assist his step-father with the corn harvest. In her book, Rhythm of the Seasons: A
Journey Beyond Loss, Marilyn recalled the incident. She stated that her son had operated
the auger that day, a device which dumps the harvested corn into the grain bin’s top,
while her husband drove the combine and emptied the grain into the wagon. Following
this process, Keith “would shut off the power, and stand on the wagon’s ladder, watching
and waiting for the next load.”1 Tragically while Darrell was harvesting more corn, the
youth fell inside the wagon. Adams described the accident and her husband’s futile
attempt to save their son. She stated, “Darrell had turned into the barnyard and sensed
trouble immediately. Keith wasn’t standing on the ladder rung waiting. The auger was
running but corn was only trickling out of the wagon’s side door. Something was
blocking the flow. Even before he saw Keith’s leg in the side door, Darrell knew.” Keith
had fallen into the wagon and was pulled to the bottom where he suffocated beneath
thousands of pounds of grain.2
During the months that followed, Marilyn was almost overwhelmed by her
despair. This personal trial involved the numbness of the funeral service and the tortuous
1 Marilyn Adams with Mary Kay Shanley, Rhythm of the Seasons: A Journey Beyond Loss, Marshalltown,
Iowa: Sta-Kris, Inc., 1997):12-13.
2 Ibid., 12-13.
2months of mourning with its many agonizing and unpredictable turns. Marilyn’s
depression became so severe that at times she even considered ending her own life as a
way to escape her pain. However, even these feelings brought little relief, resulting in
only more grief. She stated, “I’d stop the car on the railroad tracks and wait for the train.
But what if I only got injured? They’d say I was insane and take my kids away. I’d leave
the car running in the garage. But what if the girls found me? I couldn’t do that to them.”
Adams also summarized that “[i]t would be a long time, many seasons, before the pieces
of my life would come back together, before I would feel whole again.”3 Nevertheless,
she did find the inner strength; sadly, others who have encountered such heartbreak have
been less fortunate. Decades prior to the Adams’ personal loss, Elmer G. Power, an Iowa
farmer, described an incident in which a young man was unable to survive his brother’s
accidental death. In his diary, Power commented, “Another tragedy. Two brothers
working together about their farm work and one accidentally backing a tractor over and
killing the other, then the next day the one who had driven the tractor shot and killed
himself.” Powers prophetically added that, “[t]he greatly increased use of tractors will
result in more injuries I am afraid.”4 Such stories reveal both the farm accident problem’s
seriousness as well as its persistence throughout the twentieth century.
Fortunately, Marilyn was not overtaken by her despair, but eventually
transformed her sadness into a personal crusade to raise farm safety awareness by
establishing the Farm Safety 4 Just Kids organization. By 2003, Marilyn Adams and
thousands of other dedicated individuals had created a national organization with an
3 Ibid., 33.
4 H. Roger Grant and L. Edward Purcell ed., Years of Struggle: The Farm Diary of Elmer G. Powers,
1931-1936, Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1976, 100.
3annual budget of approximately $800,000. The organization’s membership reaches
around 50,000 children annually by conducting a variety of creative educational
programs. Farm Safety 4 Just Kids’ chapters instruct farm youth throughout the nation
about the importance of safety, publish a wide variety of safety materials, and continually
evaluate the effectiveness of their efforts. The rapid rise of this organization represents
one of the more recent developments in a farm safety movement which has existed for
over sixty years. An intra-organizational effort, the movement focused more on education
than legislation or engineering improvements, particularly in its early decades.
Farm Safety 4 Just Kids shares much with the previous efforts of other non-profit
organizations which attempted to prevent farm accidents. Such organizations as the
National Safety Council, 4-H, Future Farmers of America, as well as many other groups
cooperated in mounting a vigorous and cooperative educational effort to inform farm
families about the many dangers of the agricultural lifestyle. Farm safety activists
enthusiastically joined such efforts and passionately labored to improve farm families’
living and working conditions. Similar to Farm Safety 4 Just Kids, its predecessors
depended upon the private sector’s financial contributions to fund their educational effort.
Thus, the organization symbolizes how voluntary education efforts played a crucial role
in meeting the challenge of improving farm safety throughout the twentieth century.5
I will explore this aspect of the story by investigating and analyzing the
educational efforts of safety activists between 1940 and 1970. The nation’s safety leaders
have labored diligently for decades to educate farmers concerning the proper precautions
one should take in a rapidly changing and ever challenging living and working
environment. Thus, I will include considerable discussion of how such educators
5 “Farm Safety 4 Just Kids: 2003 Annual Report,” by Farm Safety 4 Just Kids, Earlham, Iowa 2003, 2, 6.
4informed rural residents regarding such practices. Such precautions included the proper
methods of avoiding tractor rollovers, correct ways of installing electrical equipment, and
the donning of safety gear while applying pesticides and fertilizers. Farm safety
advocates have continually tried to “sell” such safety precautions to the nation’s rural
populations who have routinely engaged in dangerous work practices. I will devote
particular attention to how such educational efforts arose, how safety educators
responded to the introduction of new technologies, and how changing political and social
conditions shaped their efforts.
The work will also explore the unique conditions found in agricultural settings, as
well as how farm families’ technological acquisitions influenced safety conditions.
Farming has consistently ranked as an especially dangerous profession, placing amongst
the most hazardous industries since the late 1950s and into the present. This should not be
surprising as such a categorization has been consistent throughout the last sixty years.
Farms also possess other distinctive characteristics including their rural setting, the
dizzying variety of technologies which have been continually introduced over the last
half-century, as well as its regional diversity, which includes differences in crops,
environmental conditions, and required physical demands. Small operators have also
dominated the industry, making intensive safety legislation, company measures, and state
inspection systems impractical.
Agricultural safety lagged far behind that found in other industries for a variety of
other reasons. These factors included the fact that other sectors of the economy received
greater governmental regulation, farming’s entrepreneurial nature, and the lack of unions
to advocate on their behalf. Such regulatory institutions including the state railroad
commissions, the federal Bureau of Mines, and the Department of Labor provided many
5workers with safety improvements. Unfortunately, farm families were self-employed and
labored outside protection of such bureaucratic entities. Additionally, family farms did
not benefit from workers’ compensation which lawmakers in forty-four states had passed
by 1921. This safety net provided employees and their families with a guaranteed amount
of financial compensation in case of injury or death. Such policies also provided
employers with additional motivation to initiate accident prevention measures. Farm
families were also a non-unionized labor force; therefore, they had few organizations to
work on their behalf to improve working conditions.6
A brief discussion of accident prevention efforts in the railroad, mining,
manufacturing sectors provides a useful comparison for understanding the farm safety
story. Although farmers were not alone in laboring in a potentially dangerous
environment, they were slow to experience accident prevention improvements. Workers
in most other industries experienced reductions in work-related hazards long before
farmers. Governmental regulation, the pressure of organized labor and voluntary
corporate efforts combined to drastically improve workplace safety. Furthermore, larger
numbers of individuals left comparatively dangerous occupations due to dramatic
increases in productivity. Such changes in the American economy contributed to the
funneling of workers into safer occupations. The rural exodus, which accelerated during
the era, provides a particularly vivid example regarding how new technologies meant that
fewer people were needed in agriculture, various extractive industries, and other
relatively dangerous professions. However, those farm families who remained
experienced little improvement in their working conditions.7
6 Price V. Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State: The Origins of Workers’
Compensation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 103-104.
6Railroad laborers were some of the first employees to witness workplace safety
improvements. In the late nineteenth century, railroad workers were exposed to a variety
of hazards, including boiler explosions, crashes, as well as in rail-car coupling accidents.
The collective efforts of the federal and state governments as well as the voluntary efforts
of railroad companies improved the safety record. In fact, railroad workers received
federal protection decades prior to legislative safeguards for farm workers. In 1893,
Congress enacted the Federal Safety Appliance Act which required railroads to install
features such as “air brakes, automatic couplers, and handholds on freight cars.”8
Unfortunately, the severity and frequency of railroad accidents persisted despite
new regulations and technical improvements. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
officials responded by researching the issue, proposing innovative solutions, and
supporting governmental regulation. The Hours of Service Act represented one piece of
legislation aimed to reduce worker fatigue and consequently decrease accidents. In 1908,
Congress also enacted of the Ash Pan Law to improve safety by reducing railroad
worker’s exposure to hot steam engine ash. Furthermore, ICC representatives devoted
more resources to railroad inspections to check for safety law compliance. Industry
leaders also improved rail quality and communication technologies, both of which
reduced derailments and collisions.9
7 Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety
1870-1939, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 262-263, 280.
8 Ibid., 11- 23, 169, 23; a coupling accident refers to the many injuries or deaths resulting when workers
died while attempting to manually attach rail cars to each other, see, Ibid., 22-23; for an older but
nonetheless informative discussion of the railroad accident problem limited to a specific region of the
United States, see, Edward Chase Kirkland, Men, Cities, and Transportation: A Study in New England
History 1820-1900 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948), 235-236, 352-361.
9 Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety 1870-
1939, 178, 184, 181, 188.
7The men who labored to feed the nation’s insatiable appetite for coal were also
injured and killed in a myriad of ways. Some of the more prominent incidents involved
death from explosions, roof cave-ins, or coal-car accidents. A particularly well-known
mine catastrophe occurred at Monongah, West Virginia and left 361 miners dead, which
testifies to mining’s extreme dangers. Furthermore, safety advocates were unable to
reduce mine fatalities to the degree they had been reduced in the railroad and
manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, a combination of governmental intervention, union
activities, and employer contributions eventually improved working conditions. State
governments were some of the first to enact laws requiring basic safety provisions and
hiring individuals who made compliance investigations. Unfortunately, state regulations
were often not sufficiently comprehensive in covering the spectrum of potential hazards
including the widespread issue of roof collapse. Issues such as confused wording of the
laws and uneven enforcement slowed progress further. The effectiveness of state law was
also reduced by the fact that employers often received small fines for lack of
compliance.10
Although the movement to improve mine safety was paltry in comparison to other
industrial sectors, miners benefited from a much greater degree of safety intervention
than farmers. Miners were the benefactors of federal and state institutions, as well as the
efforts the United Mine Workers (UMW) union. Bureau of Mine officials researched
mine accidents, established safety equipment standards, and disseminated safety
information. UMW representatives often alerted state mine inspectors of hazards at
particularly dangerous mines and recommended that their members use safety equipment.
10 Keith Dix, What’s a Miner to Do? The Mechanization of Coal Mining (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania: The
University of Pittsburg Press, 1988), 101-104; William Graebner, Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive
Period (The University of Kentucky Press), 15, 1-10.
8Mine owners also became aware of the advantages of reducing accidents and instituted a
variety of safety measures. Company efforts included restructuring mine layouts with a
greater degree of safety awareness, publishing safety manuals, and reprimanding miners
who worked unsafely.11 Farm families worked throughout the early twentieth century
without the benefit of such corporate safety activities.
Factory laborers also similarly benefited from a mixture of safety legislation,
union activity, and manufacturers’ voluntary efforts. Although the nation’s
manufacturing companies’ greatly expanded their productive capabilities,
industrialization also came at a cost. The factory environment contained a myriad of
potential hazards including pressurized boilers, fast moving belts, and presses, all of
which could potentially kill or maim. Workers nevertheless experienced dramatic
reductions regarding the hazards they faced in the workplace during the twentieth
century’s first decades due to collective efforts of unions, reformers, and factory owners.
Samuel Gompers, legendary leader of the American Federation of Labor, vigorously
supported the enactment of state worker compensation laws. State legislators also created
industrial commissions to investigate work safety issues and establish codes. By 1923,
over half of the nation’s states possessed such commissions which worked to reduce
hazards.12
Furthermore, manufacturers instigated a significant amount of resources to the
effort as well. In 1908, leaders of U.S. steel companies established a safety committee to
plan and implement safety improvement measures. The companies’ leaders instigated
11 Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety 1870-
1939, 216-220, 72, 227, 233-336.
12 Ibid., 80-82, 94, 101.
9activities such as periodic plant inspections, the prompt implementation of safety
measures, and a continued re-evaluation of accident prevention measures. They soon
discovered that improving safety actually enhanced the companies’ profitability.
Moreover, major manufacturers such as Ford Motor Company, John Deere, and Joseph
Bancroft & Sons Textile Mills implemented similarly vigorous safety programs.13
Thus, as a consequence of agriculture’s unique attributes, farm families were ill-
prepared to meet the safety challenges of the mid-twentieth century. As late as the
Second World War’s outbreak, government agencies, non-profit organizations such as the
National Safety Council, and farm equipment manufacturers had done little to improve
agricultural safety. Furthermore, agriculture’s distinctiveness meant that accident
prevention education would take on an even larger role than it had in other sectors of the
economy. Although this work will briefly address such regulatory issues, much greater
attention will be devoted to describing and analyzing the diverse variety of hazards farm
families directly encountered in their daily lives. Thus, I will include a detailed
discussion regarding how accidents involving such diverse agents as livestock,
machinery, and chemicals injured or killed farmers.14
13 Ibid., 123, 91-92, 129.
14 For further discussion and analysis of farm accident statistics, see, John D. Rush, Fatal Accidents in
Farm Work: An analysis of 12,141 Fatal Accidents 1940-1945 in the United States (Washington D.C.
Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA, 1949), 1-12; Conrad F. Fritch, “Occupational and Non-
Occupational Fatalities on U.S. Farms,” Agricultural Economics Report #356 (Agricultural Economics
Research Service, USDA 1976) 2-9; Arnold B. Skromme, “A Farm Safety Program Sponsored By
Farmers,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers,
Chicago, Illinois, 18-21 December 1990), 1-3; many of these preceding studies and others rank farming
near the top of the nation’s most hazardous occupations. Such non-profit organizations and governmental
agencies as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the National Safety Council have
produced a variety of documents which reveal agriculture’s persistently high ranking. Such electronic
documents can be accessed by consulting online resources at www.osha.gov and www.nsc.org.
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Thus, this work analyzes the vibrant story of the farm safety movement in the
United States from the 1930s to the early 1970s. My aim is to fulfill this need of a history
of the farm safety movement which will include such issues as its emergence during the
Second World War, the vigorous safety educational efforts which occurred in subsequent
decades, and the many controversies which arose in the 1970s. The story reveals how
individuals and non-profit organizations involved in the farm safety movement
established a cooperative network to research rural safety issues and hired experts to
improve safety and disseminate the safety message throughout the countryside. An
investigation of the dynamic relationships amongst farm safety specialists, agricultural
educators, and extension workers represents much of the story. Since both the National
Safety Council and the USDA cooperated in a national educational movement to reduce
dangers, their role will be fully examined. The contributions of such groups as state and
local level FFA and 4-H organizations which participated in a multitude of campaigns to
increase safety will also be thoroughly evaluated. I will analyze how these organizations
attempted to reduce the farm hazards on the national, state, and local level which will
provide a composite picture of the movement. The aim is to provide an historical account
of an issue which, until now, has been relegated to the background. The fact that every
individual is dependent on agriculture for his or her sustenance supports the topic’s
importance. In a time when the majority of Americans are disconnected from the origins
of their food, it is important to comprehend the human price which has been paid to
secure a cheap and dependable food supply. The fact that the thousands of adults and
children have died or been maimed in farm accidents also signifies the topic’s
importance. We should also understand the story of the many individuals who have
11
dedicated themselves to reducing agricultural dangers as a case study in how collective
action and volunteerism can address a serious public issue.
Finally, I hope to fill a void in the rural historical literature since scholars have
generally neglected the farm accident problem as well as the story of the dedicated
individuals who labored to prevent such tragedies. This work seeks to remedy scholars’
general neglect of the issue. The lack of an historical perspective of the topic is
immediately apparent upon a brief literary survey. Although authors such as Louis
Hunter, Andrew Prouty, and Roy Lubove have investigated the history of work place
safety by focusing on a single industry or specific piece of legislation, farming is rarely
mentioned. William Graebner’s Coal-Mining Safety in the Progressive Period represents
a particularly noteworthy treatment of a larger industry. Nevertheless, inclusive
treatments which encompass a variety of industries over a long period of time are rare.
Mark Aldrich’s Safety First: Technology, Labor, and Business in the Building of
American Work Safety is the most recent and comprehensive work on occupational
safety. Although his monograph discusses safety concerns in industries such as mining,
the railroad industry, and manufacturing, he completely neglects the agricultural sector.
Aldrich also admits that currently a history of the National Safety Council (NSC) does
not exist, which is particularly surprising since the NSC fulfilled a leading role in
improving occupational safety, including farming. Such recent articles as Jonathan Rees’
“I Did Not Know….Any Danger Was Attached: Safety Consciousness in the Early
American Ice and Refrigeration Industries” reveals that scholars continue to add to our
collective understanding of safety issues across a wide swath of industries. Nevertheless,
although agriculture is an especially hazardous occupation, it represents a crucially
important sector of the economy that has been persistently ignored.
12
CHAPTER TWO
Igniting the Movement: The Farm Safety Network Emerges Amidst the National
Emergency of the Second World War
The farm safety movement relied upon a network of non-profit organizations
which collectively mounted a voluntarily effort to reduce farm accidents. Institutions
such as the National Safety Council (NSC) and the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) contributed farm accident research activities, created and distributed
farm safety information, and assisted in the organization of regional safety programs.
State extension employees and farm safety specialists supported and advised the leaders
of state and local safety campaigns. 4-H chapters, FFA clubs, and a diverse number of
other local groups provided a large pool of youth who participated in and initiated local
safety activities. As the farm safety effort accelerated, new groups and professions
emerged including state farm safety committees, which were instrumental in supporting
ever-diversifying state-level activities. Farm safety specialists also came forward
representing a new cadre of professionals who were uniquely qualified to meet the
various challenges of improving safety in agriculture.15
Although little attention was given to the farm accident problem prior to the early
1940s, the onset of the Second World War witnessed a rapid intensification of farm
safety education activity. A number of trends emerged which favored the movement’s
development. These factors included the maturation of the necessary institutional tools
that could nationally coordinate such an effort, concerns regarding an agricultural labor
15 Despite the importance of the aforementioned organization in delivering safety awareness and
educational programming, the farm safety movement also involved numerous agents, including the Farm
Bureau. For an early example of the safety activities of a Farm Bureau Chapter, in this case, one located in
Olmstead, County, Minnesota, see, “There’s a Prize for Everyone,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1945,
5.
13
shortage, and the trend towards professionalization and bureaucratization of American
life. Although such organizations as the NSC, state extension services, and rural youth
groups were in existence prior to the 1940s, the organizations had gained considerable
influence by the eve of the Second World War. Wartime labor concerns also contributed
to a concerted effort to reduce farm accidents since the nation’s leaders believed that
conserving labor would contribute to victory over the Axis powers. The farm safety
specialist profession also emerged during the era. These professionals, along with
extension workers, sought to establish new realms with which to market their expertise,
which also contributed to the movement’s development.
Finally, some contemporary observers insisted that the switch from horsepower
farming to petroleum-powered machines increased farm-related hazards. In 1983,
Frederick R. Schneider, a retired Farm Security Administration official, indicated that
although “specific data” was not available in the early 1940s, he believed that “there was
a noticeable increase in the number of farm accidents,” particularly those involving
machinery. He indicated that the perception that farm accidents were increasing raised
the concern amongst many leaders of the agricultural community that something needed
to be done.16 Mark Aldrich, an expert on the history of industrial safety recently
concluded that, “manufacturing risks almost certainly declined more than risks in most
sectors, at least after the mid-1920s, while agriculture may have become increasingly
dangerous as it mechanized.” Although there is little statistical support for these claims, it
16 Herb Plambeck, ed., Iowa Farm Safety in the 20th Century: A History of Contributions by Rural Safety
Volunteers, (Des Moines: R.E. Hays & Associates, INC, 1983), 32.
14
is reasonable to assume that the perception that more accidents were occurring helped to
accelerate the farm safety movement.17
A brief review of the history of the major organizations involved in the farm
safety movement provides a useful context regarding the beginnings of the movement,
particularly since the development of such an effort required a vigorous group of rural-
oriented organizations. An observer might have predicted that both the NSC and the
USDA would assume major roles in the farm safety effort. By the 1940s, the leaders of
the NSC had already become leading advocates for conducting accident research,
establishing local safety committees, and promoting efforts to raise the public’s
awareness regarding working and living safely. The USDA, land-grant colleges, and state
extension had become the primary means by which the nation’s policy-makers attempted
to shape agricultural and rural life. In addition, such youth organizations as 4-H and FFA
maintained close ties to these organizations and assumed key educational roles for the
nation’s rural youth by the onset of WWII.
Although little had been done to reduce farm accidents, Americans had already
taken significant measures to reduce accidents in many other economic sectors. The
NSC’s establishment represents one of many actions taken to improve safety in a newly
industrialized nation. Similar to the agriculture field, manufacturing witnessed
tremendous technological changes and as a consequence new safety issues emerged. In
1913, the members of the Association of Iron and Steel Electrical Engineers established
17 Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety,
1870-1939 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 262; although both Mark Aldrich and
contemporary observers believed that the mid-twentieth century witnessed an increase in farm accidents,
there is little farm accident data from the decades prior to the 1940s available to support the contention.
Allan B. Kline, president of the American Farm Bureau Federation, stated that, “the increased
mechanization of the farm operations, plus the speed at which we operate, has vastly increased the hazards
to which all farm people are exposed every day, see, “Agricultural Leaders Endorse Farm Safety Week’s
Objective,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1948, 3.
15
the NSC after recognizing the need for an entity devoted exclusively to industrial safety.
They divided the organization into sections devoted to improving conditions across a
wide swath of industries and occupations. By 1925, the number of the organizations’
divisions had grown steadily, totaling twenty-six separate sections. NSC members
devoted themselves to improving safety in their own particular domain, which included
such diverse realms as refrigeration, cement, and taxicab sections.18
The NSC emphasized a cooperative and inclusive approach to improving safety.
This made the NSC well-suited to fulfilling a crucial role in improving farm safety during
a time when very little legislation mandated a safe working environment. The paucity of
legislative measures in many ways determined the movement’s structure and form.
Individuals, businesses, and organizations, which were involved in the movement,
routinely expressed a cooperative attitude since coercive measures were non-existent.
Thus intra-organizational coordination was crucial to mounting a successful farm safety
program. Agricultural safety advocates often referred to their activities as representing an
effort to “sell safety.” This slogan also symbolizes the reality that farm families had to be
convinced and could not be forced to observe safer work practices. In 1913, the NSC’s
founding members stressed these principles stating their desire “to initiate, promote,
cooperate with, and obtain the assistance of any and all activities or agencies calculated
to conserve human life.” Thus, the NSC expressed this approach a full thirty years prior
to the farm safety movement’s emergence and demonstrated this philosophy in their
cooperation with numerous organizations throughout its history.19
18 Transactions-National Safety Council, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1913), 69, 72; Transactions-
National Safety Council, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1925), 6. For a discussion of the many work
hazards in the nation’s manufacturing sectors during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see,
Mark Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety,
1870-1939, 79-89.
16
The NSC staff fulfilled a variety of roles which were instrumental in addressing
the nation’s safety issues. Such functions included conducting accident surveys,
establishing local safety councils, and publishing and disseminating educational
materials. Royal Meeker, who was the organization’s “first chair of the Council
Committee on accident statistics” in 1914, became the US commissioner of labor
statistics just two years later. By 1914, the council also had established fourteen local
chapters in such cities as Chicago, Detroit, and New York, each of which carried out
safety campaigns on a local level. By the First World War’s conclusion, the number of
local councils rose to forty-seven. The NSC also developed the necessary publication
services to disseminate safety information. Members repeatedly emphasized that
educating both workers and the entire public represented a cornerstone to improving
safety. NSC staff members dispersed information through yearly Congress Transactions,
pamphlets, and periodicals such as the National Safety News. By 1919, the NSC was also
assisting in the development and distribution of industrial and public safety films.20
Historian Mark Aldrich has indicated that its latter role represented one of the
NSC’s more important responsibilities. He stated that throughout much of its history,
“The National Safety Council was most valuable for the service it provided as an
information clearinghouse.” He indicated that during the early twentieth century, it was
difficult for individuals interested in obtaining accident prevention information to collect
19 Transactions-National Safety Council, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1913), 69; in 1944, Ned H.
Dearborn, NSC vice president, stated that a Chicago headquarters’ staff member, “compiles information,
prepares and publishes educational materials, and stimulates and acts as a clearinghouse for the work of
state and community councils and outside agencies,” see, Ned H. Dearborn, “What is the National Safety
Council?,”Farm Safety Review, September/October 1944, 3.
20 Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-
1939, 106; Transactions-National Safety Council , (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1914 ), 18;
Transactions-National Safety Council, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1918), 68; Transactions-
National Safety Council, (Chicago: National Safety Council,1919), 212.
17
reliable statistics. However, the NSC’s leadership acted quickly to fulfill this void by
creating a “Safe Practices Committee” whose members “issued pamphlets on ladders,
scaffolds, and other devices, while a bureau of information provided a blizzard of
bulletins, posters, movies, speakers, and up-to-date information on changing state
regulations.” The NSC would also assume this role in the farm safety movement by
providing the extension staff, farm safety specialists, and youth club leaders with a large
amount of literature, research, and programming ideas.21
During the 1920s and 1930s, the NSC’s prominence and influence continued to
increase. The organization’s annual meeting attracted prominent industrial leaders from a
variety of economic sectors including railroads, mining, and steel. The involvement of
such high-ranking businessmen represented the organization’s national prominence as a
leading safety organization. National leaders in the field of safety also regularly attended
the organization’s annual meeting. Such safety advocates included David Beyer, an early
authority on textile safety, who attended the 1917 Congress. These meetings also
attracted government officials from a variety of agencies including the Bureau of Mines,
state factory inspection departments, and a host of other government agencies. By 1920,
the organization boasted over 4,000 members, representing approximately 6 million
workers and, by the end of the 1930s, also added a significant number of members from
Canada and Great Britain. By the entry of the United States into the Second World War,
the organization had become one of the nation’s chief advocates for both public and
workplace safety.22
21 Aldrich, Safety First: Technology, Labor and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-
1939, 109-110.
22 Ibid., 108-110, 114, 103; Transactions-National Safety Council, (Chicago: National Safety Council,
1938), 9; NSC power and influence would continue to expand throughout the era studied. By 1972, Jack
Burke, editor for the organizations periodical Farm Safety Review, indicated that, “the organization has
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The NSC would not be alone in its effort to meet the challenge of the farm
accident problem. Federal agencies such as the USDA, state institutions such as land-
grant colleges and extension agencies fulfilled key roles in the farm safety movement. All
of these organizations had been in existence decades prior to the emergence of farm
safety efforts; however, by the eve of World War II, they had become even more able to
assist in mounting a farm safety effort. The USDA had developed from its modest
beginning into a potent tool for federal agricultural policy-making. Land-grant colleges,
state extension programs, and rural youth organizations had also evolved from their
embryonic beginnings into powerful tools for state and local level agricultural education.
By the early twentieth century, the USDA had demonstrated that it was the
primary instrument by which the federal government shaped agricultural policy. The
USDA had grown from a small organization during the Civil War to one wielding
considerable power. The legislation which formed the USDA delineated functions that
led to increased involvement in farm safety efforts. Such institutional aims as providing
agricultural education to the American public, conducting and disseminating the results
of crop and animal research, as well as instigating statistical studies increased the
likelihood that the organization would play an important role in the safety movement.
Initially, the USDA limited its responsibilities to increasing farmers’ productive
capacities. However, as the decades progressed, the USDA’s roles extended significantly
including efforts to improve the healthfulness of the American food supply, expanding
grown from small potatoes to one of 400-plus employees and a $11 million budget,” see, Jack Burke,
“NSC’s Sixtieth Year,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1972, 2.
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the nation’s rural transportation infrastructure, and administering a diverse array of farm
subsidy programs 23
By the early 1940s, land-grant colleges had also developed considerably from
their humble nineteenth century origins. Late in the nineteenth century, leaders of these
institutions had initially struggled to establish a set curriculum. However, they had
greatly clarified both their missions and course offerings by the early twentieth century.
By 1940, there were sixty-seven land grant institutions training hundreds of individuals
who would have a profound impact on agriculture. Willard W. Cochrane has indicated
that, “the colleges of agriculture trained the high school vocational teachers and the
extension workers, as well as the research workers who went to work in private and
government research agencies.” These colleges also housed the nation’s agricultural
education training programs as well as expanding agricultural engineering programs.24
These same individuals directed rural youth organizations, filled the ranks of the state
extension services, and consequently assumed leadership positions in the farm safety
movement.25
23 R. Douglas Hurt, American Agriculture: A Brief History, (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1994),
189-192. Hurt reveals that the USDA’s size and scope continued to expand throughout the twentieth
century, indicating that by the 1990s it had become the fourth largest government spender and the sixth
largest government employer with more assets than all but three US corporations, see, Hurt, Brief History,
385.
24 Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (Minneapolis:
The Development of American Agriculture, 1993), 105-107; Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard times:
A Report of the Agribusiness Accountability Project on the Failure of America’s Land Grant College
Complex, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973)152-155.
25 Early pioneers of Iowa Extension such as Ralph Bliss and farm safety specialists such Norval Wardle
were both educated at Iowa State College. Land-grant colleges were instrumental in trainings such
specialists in other states. For a discussion of Ralph Bliss’s background and education, see, Dorothy
Schwieder, “The Iowa State College Cooperative Extension Service through Two World Wars,”
Agricultural History 64, no. 2 (1990): 225.
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Cooperative Extension represented the primary means by which both land-grant
colleges’ expertise and agricultural knowledge were dispersed into the countryside.
Land-grant college staff trained hundreds of extension workers who spent their careers
attempting to address rural problems. By the late 1940s, extension had become an
increasingly popular career option for students attending the nation’s land-grant colleges.
In 1948, faculty members at Kansas State College established the nation’s first “college
extension club west of the Mississippi.” Students could gain further information
regarding the nature of extension work through this organization. An Extension Service
Review writer stated, “Monthly meetings of the club are also held with prominent
professional extension workers invited to speak.” The organization boasted a membership
of 86 students, many of whom expressed an interest in employment within the extension
service upon graduation.26 Such agents, armed with the tools of modern agriculture, were
poised to disseminate its tenets into rural America upon their graduation.
State extension and rural youth organizations had been in existence for decades
prior to the Second World War II. In 1914, state extensions had received federal support
with the passage of the Smith and Lever Act. Agricultural scholar, Willard Cochrane,
grasped extension’s significance stressing that its creation, “institutionalized the outreach
programs of the state agricultural college.” He also emphasized the interconnectedness of
land-grant colleges and extension, stating that extension personnel were basically “off-
campus instructors of the colleges of agriculture.”27 By the early 1940s, the citizens of
almost every county in the nation had access to a county agent, who delivered
educational programming to the residents of the nation’s countryside. Nevertheless, it
26 “Future Agents Train,” Extension Service Review, April 1949, 66.
27 Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis, 6.
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would take several decades before extension would be fully able to convey agricultural
teaching into the nation’s countryside.
Historian Dorothy Schwieder reflected upon the fact that early agents lacked both
an institutional support structure and in some cases faced a skeptical audience.28
Nevertheless, state extension programs continued to expand and gain strength throughout
the early twentieth century. During the First World War, extension’s importance
increased since it was enlisted as the primary institutional tool to mobilize the nation’s
agricultural sector. Extension officials assisted in efforts aimed at meeting labor
shortages, overcoming agricultural supply shortages, and increasing food production.
Historian Wayne Rasmussen indicated that this national emergency represented the first
time extension had been used to meet the needs brought about by a nationwide
emergency.29
The nation’s extension programs expanded markedly between the 1920s and the
1950s. The demands of the Great Depression, environmental stress, and war-time
emergency produced a need for larger staff, expanded publication services, and new
communication tools, including radio.30 Thus, by the onset of the Second World War,
such programs had been transformed from their nascent beginnings into a vigorous rural
education network. State extension leaders recognized the potential power that the
extension service offered and worked to increase its communication capabilities. Ralph
K. Bliss, Iowa’s Director of Extension, stated that with more work “it is possible to
supply information to nearly every resident in Iowa within a week from the time it is
28 Dorothy Schwieder, “The Iowa State College Cooperative Extension Service through Two World
Wars,” 220.
29 Ibid., 221.
30 Ibid., 221.
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started from the administration at Washington.” Bliss’s comments are especially
important since once the communicative and bureaucratic infrastructure of extensions had
developed a myriad of agricultural education efforts and wartime mobilization activities
could be initiated. This observation is also clearly validated by the extension service’s
effectiveness at meeting the wartime agricultural labor shortage.31
The rural educational infrastructure was further enhanced by the expansion of 4-
H. Although the youth organization had modest beginnings as locally-organized youth
agricultural clubs in states such as Ohio, Illinois, and Iowa, the support of both the USDA
and land-grant colleges greatly assisted its growth. The leaders of these institutions
quickly recognized its capacity to disseminate the latest agricultural information to farm
families. Such legislation as the Smith-Lever Act also formalized the close affiliation
between the nation’s extension officials and its 4-H Clubs. The legislation also made
available a continual stream of funds from the national government to support 4-H club
development.32
The continued expansion of 4-H during the inter-war years was due not only to
the organization’s close affiliation with extension, but also growing private sector
support. In 1921, the creation of the National Committee on Boys and Club Work greatly
assisted the organization in obtaining such financial backing. Committee members
included representatives of large food processing companies, various agricultural
31 Ibid., 219. For examples of the many ways Extension employees assisted in the nation’s mobilization
efforts, particularly regarding wartime agricultural labor shortages in states such as Maryland, California,
and Kentucky, see, T.B. Symons, “To Meet Labor Shortage,” Extension Service Review, May 1942, 77;
“Training New Hired Men,” Extension Service Review, May, 1943, 69; B.H. Crocheron, “How Many
Workers,” Extension Service Review, July, 1944, 100; Extension’s influence increased in the following
decade. In 1954, Ezra Taft, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, indicated that, “Extension now reaches about 85
percent of all farm families in the nation, see, Ezra Taft Benson, “The Role of Extension,” Extension
Service Review, January 1954, 3.
32 Hurt, American Agriculture: A Brief History, 258-259.
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concerns, and even department stores. 4-H Historians Thomas Wessel and Marilyn
Wessel stressed the importance of the National Committee on Boys and Club Work,
stating that its development “resulted in the institutionalization of private support, which
helped to expand the project areas that had attracted young people to 4-H clubs.” The
committee not only worked to provide funds for 4-H work, but also established an annual
4-H club congress, which served as a national meeting place for the 4-H leadership and
youths. Youth Club Farm Safety activities would also benefit greatly from such support.33
4-H growth accelerated during the war and continued well beyond the conflict’s
conclusion. The organization’s increasing profile was reflected in the growing numbers
of rural youth enrolled in 4-H club chapters, the diversification of educational
programming, and its interconnectedness with other national organizations. The nation’s
growing 4-H club membership had expanded from approximately 800,000 in 1929 to
1,500,000 by 1940 and approximately 2,000,000 by 1950. Thus, the group reached
thousands of young people providing a variety of educational opportunities. Events such
as 4-H’s annual National Congress and National 4-H Club Week also assisted in
increasing the organization’s prominence. By the mid-1950s, 4-H chapters had expanded
across the United States and were even represented in 45 foreign countries.34
The interest of the nation’s agricultural leaders and sustained governmental
support aided the expansion of the Future Farmers organization. Although state and local
lawmakers expanded vocational agriculture programs in the nation’s high schools, the
federal authorities accelerated their development through legislative means. In 1917, the
33 Thomas Wessel and Marilyn Wessel, 4-H: An American Idea 1900-1980 (Chevy Chase, Maryland:
National 4-H Council, 1982), 36, 37, 76, 88.
34 Gertrude L. Warren, “A Brief Review-The 4-H Story,” Extension Service Review, May 1955, 93.
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Smith-Hughes Act hastened such expansion, devoting federal funds to vocational
agricultural programs. Such financial support consequently assisted local Vo-Ag clubs
due to their connection to vocational agricultural educational programs. In 1926, national
Vo-Ag leaders met in Kansas City, Missouri for a National Congress of Vo-Ag students.
In the fall 1928, leaders of agricultural education, students, and Vo-Ag instructors moved
to establish a national FFA organization at the meeting.35
The Future Farmers of America also achieved greater prominence and influence
prior to the farm safety movement’s emergence. FFA leaders established a national
headquarters, gained advocacy groups, and initiated national publications. In 1939, FFA
leaders instigated the construction a national headquarters on the former grounds of
George Washington’s estate. In 1944, the establishment of the National FFA foundation
represented the organization’s success in gaining the financial support of both corporate
and individual supporters. Such donations were crucial in providing the funds for an
every-growing array of FFA programs including those associated with farm safety.36 In
1979, Ralph E. Bender, a professor of agricultural education at the Ohio State University
reflected upon the importance of the foundation. He stated that it continually served as
“an opportunity for business and industrial concerns and individuals to make
contributions to support the activities of FFA at the national, state or local level.”37 FFA
membership also continually expanded throughout the mid-twentieth century. For
instance, in Iowa alone, FFA membership grew from 3,664 in 1930 to 7,900 in 1940.38
35 Bender, Ralph E, Robert E. Taylor, Chester K. Hansen and L.H. Newcomb, The FFA and You (Danville,
Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 1979), 7; The Iowa FFA: For 50 Years; (Des Moines:
Iowa Association FFA, Career Education Division, Department of Public Instruction, 1978), vi, 1.
36 The Iowa FFA: For 50 Years, vi.
37 Bender, Taylor, Hansen, and Newcomb, The FFA And You, 620.
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Thus, by the early 1940s, groups concerned with both agriculture and safety had
successfully developed an intricate institutional network capable of delivering a diverse
range of educational programming. The strength of the USDA, land-grant college staff,
and extension in administering federal policies had been demonstrated both during the
national emergencies of the First World War and the Great Depression. In the first case,
government agents assisted farmers in meeting food production needs while they
administered the myriad of programs associated with the farm subsidy programs.
Although the USDA, land-grant college faculty, and extension leaders were primarily
concerned with improving farmers’ production capacities, they were nonetheless able to
deliver a wide variety of programming. Thus, extension’s educational efforts would
eventually encompass a myriad of areas, including youth-oriented activities, home
economics, and farm management.39
However, the farm safety movement’s emergence should not only be understood
in terms of the appearance of national organizations capable of launching a collective
movement, but also with an understanding of the political context of the Second World
War. The nation’s political leadership responded to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
by initiating a mobilization effort which involved many areas of American life. Franklin
Roosevelt and others concluded the Axis powers’ considerable military might, dramatic
territorial acquisitions, and totalitarian political systems threatened the nation’s very
38 The Iowa FFA: For 50 Years, vi, 2.
39 Scholars with markedly different viewpoints have collectively demonstrated that the members of
government institutions such as the USDA, land-grant colleges, and the Extension Service have all
possessed the primary aim of increasing the farmer’s productivity and operational efficiency, see, Wayne
D. Rasmussen, Taking the University to the People: Seventy-Five Years of Cooperative Extension (Ames:
Iowa State University Press, 1989), 14, 118-21; Jim Hightower, Hard Tomatoes, Hard Times: A Report of
the Agribusiness Accountability Project on the Failure of America’s Land Grant College Complex
(Cambridge, Mass: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1973), 2, 4 for some notable examples.
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existence. The federal government expressed this zealousness for victory by creating new
organizations, which organized American society and economy to meet the Axis threat.
Congress passed the War Powers Act, providing the president with the tremendous power
and giving rise to such agencies as the War Production Board (WPB), the War Manpower
Commission (WMC), and the Office of Scientific Research and Development (ORSD).
These institutions provided the nation with the bureaucratic apparatus necessary to defeat
the Axis powers.40
The nation’s leaders also recognized the importance of marshalling food
producers to achieve sufficient production to meet the demands of a global conflict. In
January 1943, President Roosevelt emphasized the significance of food production while
delivering a speech to encourage Americans to continue their wartime sacrifices. He
stated that, “food is the life line of the forces that fight for freedom. Free people
everywhere can be grateful to the farm families that are making victory possible.”41 His
Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard also emphasized agriculture’s vital role by
stating, “Food will win the war and write the peace.”42 Both Roosevelt’s and Wickard’s
comments reveal the importance of concerted efforts to increase production to feed
American troops, supply allied armies, and sustain the populations of liberated countries.
These measures included a vigorous publicity campaign to ensure an adequate food
supply. The Office of War Information and the War Food Administration saturated
40 John Morton Blum, V was for Victory, (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 102, 197, 144.
For a brief discussion of wartime mobilization, see, Paul S. Boyer, Promises To Keep: The United States
Since World War II (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005), 7-16.
41 Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, “To the Rescue of the Crops: The Women’s Land Army during
World War II” Prologue 25 (Winter 1993): 347.
42 Dorothy Schwieder, “The Iowa State College Cooperative Extension Service through Two World
Wars,” 220.
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Americans with continual stream of posters, pamphlets, and film clips stressing the need
to meet production goals.43
Americans displayed patriotism and cooperation in many ways including the
effort to increase food production capacities. The president echoed these nationalistic
sentiments when addressing the nation’s 4-H clubs. In 1943, President Roosevelt
congratulated the approximately one and a half million youth who had participated in the
4-H Victory Program. This plan included an entire range of activities aimed at enlisting
rural youth to aid in the mobilization effort. Roosevelt encouraged 4-H members to
continue their efforts in a letter sent to 4-H clubs. He stated “Let your head, heart, hands,
and health, truly be dedicated to your country, which needs them now as never before.”44
In 1943, a United States army representative congratulated Michigan farmers for greatly
increasing bean and sugar beet production. This appreciation culminated in a week-long
event which included various exhibits of military equipment and speeches encouraging
farmers to continue their productivity drive.45
Government officials and agricultural leaders informed farm workers, rural youth,
and even agricultural engineers that their efforts were equally important as those of
soldiers in the military theater. Agricultural officials often stressed the importance of
their responsibilities in winning the production battle. The very names given to rural
mobilization campaigns symbolize the nationalism infused into the agricultural work.
43 Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, “To the Rescue of the Crops: The Women’s Land Army during
World War II,” 348. In the early summer of 1943, Francis Flood, a high-ranking War Food Administration
official, indicated that obtaining enough workers to supply the nation’s agricultural sector was, “One of the
biggest single assignments Extension has ever had in its history of big assignments,” see, Francis Flood,
“The Challenge of the 99 percent,” Extension Service Review, June 1943, 81.
44 “A Letter From the President of the United States: To the 4-H Club members of the United States,”
National 4-H Club News , April 1942, 5.
45 Alan Clive, “The Michigan Farmer in World War II,” Michigan History, 60 (Winter 1976): 296.
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The titles of programs such as the “Women’s Land Army,” “Food for Freedom
Campaign,” and the “4-H Victory Program” all signified the view that food production
represented a battle requiring organization, national loyalty, and cooperation.46 H.B.
Walker, president of the American Society of Agricultural engineers, stated that “one
year ago today a treacherous enemy plunged our nation into a war. We choose now to
call it a global war in which we have two distinct fronts. One is a military front and the
other is a food front.” He went on to say that agricultural engineers would do their
“utmost to hold our lines on the food front.”47
However, the nation’s leaders quickly discovered potentially serious obstacles in
achieving victory in the production battle. These challenges included the problem of
labor scarcity as farm workers migrated to cities and men enlisted into military service. A
Bureau of Agricultural Economics study highlighted the dilemma by indicating that
approximately two million men had been diverted from agricultural work to other
employment or military service. In 1944, a USDA report revealed that approximately
800,000 women and 1.2 million young people would be required to meet food production
goals. The national press, including both Time and the Washington Post, featured articles
which stressed the need to solve this predicament. The awareness also contributed greatly
to the recognition of the need for increased safety since accidents wasted precious human
resources.48
46 “Rural Youth are Aid to Defense in 5 Ways,” Better Iowa, December 15, 1941, 1; “Mobilization Week
FEB. 60-14 Wanted –Two Million or more Rural Boys and Girls to Enroll in the 4-H Victory Program,”
National 4-H Club News , January 1943, 4.
47 H.B. Walker, “Agricultural Engineers on the Food Front,” Agricultural Engineering 24 (January 1943):
5, 7.
48 Judy Barrett Litoff and David C. Smith, “To the Rescue of the Crops: The Women’s Land Army during
World War II,” 349-355.
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The public successfully responded to the problem by participating in a host of
programs including the Victory Farm Volunteers and the Women’s Land Army. During
the war, roughly 2.5 million young people joined the Victory Farm Volunteers and over
1.5 million women participated in the WLA. Nevertheless, solving the labor issue
required persistent effort. John R. Fitzsimons, Iowa supervisor of farm labor, stated that
his state had “scraped the bottom of the hired man field” in order to fill the jobs in such
shortage areas as canning facilities, small grain harvest, and corn de-tasseling.
Nevertheless, during the summer of 1945, Iowa’s farm labor offices had successfully
placed approximately 70,000 workers.49
Agricultural leaders also provided convincing reasons why efforts to reduce farm
accidents should be intensified during the war. Such rationales included the fact that
accidents represented a waste of human resources, labor shortages meant the enlistment
of inexperienced workers in the agricultural workforce, and reducing accidents
represented a moral cause. In the spring of 1944, Maynard Coe, Director of the NSC’s
Farm Division, offered such justifications stating that “an estimated four million extra
farm workers will be needed this year. Many of these workers will be inexperienced in
farming, so they will present an unusual safety problem. Farm labor leaders recognize
this fact and are working hard to provide adequate training, good supervision, and safe
working conditions. They know that the efforts of many workers are nullified by the
property and time lost due to accidents.”50
49 Ibid., 349, 356; “70,000 Workers Placed By Farm Labor Offices,” Better Iowa, October 1, 1945, 1; for
more on the activities of Iowa’s Extension Service to ensure adequate labor supplies, see, “Farmers Can’t
Lose More Labor,” Wallaces’ Farmer and Iowa Homestead, July 3, 1943, 4.
50 “Maynard Coe, “Boom in Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1944, 2. See also Arnold P.
Yerkes, “Engineering in Wartime Agriculture,” Agricultural Engineering 23 (April 1942), 117-125 as an
example of the effort to improve the overall efficiency of the agricultural sector as part of the nation’s aim
for victory.
30
The members of the emerging agricultural safety movement also stressed a sense
of national duty, patriotism, and cooperation, believing that reducing accidents should be
a national priority. A variety of groups including agricultural engineers, members of the
National Safety Council, and a host of other individuals stressed that safety in farm work
was a patriotic duty. E.W. Lehman, a University of Illinois Faculty member, and H.P.
Bateman, member of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers, emphasized the
importance of establishing a safety program as part of the mobilization effort. They
indicated that rural and fire safety programs were essential, citing both the scarcity of
skilled labor and machines. H.L. Miner, chairman of the National Safety Council’s Farm
Safety Committee, stressed that everyone should work to eliminate farm hazards with the
same tenacity with which American soldiers were fighting overseas.51 Some concerned
individuals even considered workplace negligence to be an unpatriotic act. J.E. Long,
superintendent of safety for the Delaware and Hudson railroad, stated that “farmers who
are careless in 1943 will be sabotaging food production.”52 Harold H. Beaty, a member of
the Iowa State College faculty, echoed Long’s comments, stating that “the careless
farmer who gets injured in an accident this year not only hurts himself and his family but
curtails the nation’s food for freedom campaign.”53 However, George M. Gehant, an
extension agent from Yellow Medicine County, Minnesota, articulated this feeling most
effectively. He indicated that the energy and resources lost and used to treat injuries
could be “used to good advantage producing food, fiber and fats and other materials
51 E.W. Lehmann and H.P. Bateman, “Improving Agricultural Efficiency of Farm Labor to Meet Wartime
Demands,” Agricultural Engineering 23 (September, 1942): 280; H.L. Miner “Food is a Weapon of War”
Farm Safety Review, January, 1943, 3.
52 “Don’t Sabotage Food Production Efforts,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1943, 10.
53 Better Iowa, March 23, 1942, 1.
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needed by the boys in our fighting forces. So safety practices on the farm can contribute
materially to the war effort in many ways.”54
The nation’s political leaders and those directly involved with solving the labor
problem emphasized the importance of wartime farm safety efforts, believing thousands
of inexperienced farm workers needed safety education. President Roosevelt expressed
the need for reducing farm hazards while issuing a National Farm Safety Week
proclamation. He indicated that safety was especially important due to the presence of
“many young and inexperienced persons now being employed on farms in all parts of the
country.”55 Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, also indicated that the increase
of urban workers entering the farm labor force represented a potential hazard. Florence L.
Hall, chief of the Women’s Land Army (WLA), noted that thousands of unseasoned
female agricultural workers were entering the ranks of the farm labor force. In the spring
of 1943, the nation’s agricultural leaders had cooperatively created the WLA in an
attempt to remedy labor shortages in the food production sector. However, individuals
responsible for the thousands of untested workers who entered the farm fields quickly
encountered an abundance of farm work hazards from machinery dangers to difficulties
in securing a safe water supply.56
54 George M. Gehant, “A County Agent Discusses Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, September/October
1943, 2; in 1943, WHO radio located in Des Moines, Iowa featured an announcement they had received
from the NSC’s Farm Division staff. The message summarized a key reason why the farm safety movement
had emerged with the narrator proclaiming that safety conscious farmers were “saving farm manpower for
war power,” see, Elmer Lotstrom and Jim Chapman, “Farm Safety on the Air Waves,” Farm Safety Review,
March/April, 1943, 8.
55 “‘D’ Day on the Farm Front,” Farm Safety Review, July/August, 1944, 15.
56 Claude R. Wickard, “Safety in Wartime Farming,” Farm Safety Review, July/August, 1943, 4-5;
“Florence L. Hall, “Safety Tips For Women’s Land Army,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1945, 12;
“Improve Farm Drinking Facilities,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1943, 13.
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Although the nation’s political and agricultural leaders were first recognizing the
need to reduce the numbers of accidents, other organizations had already recognized the
need to improve safety. Agricultural equipment manufacturers and state-level youth
groups had already demonstrated an interest in improving farm safety. In 1934, T.A.
Erickson, Minnesota’s 4-H club leader, believed that farm accidents represented a very
real problem; thus, he successfully encouraged 4-H clubs to integrate safety into their
programming. These activities included “safety contests” and other efforts to promote
safer farm practices.57 In 1938, the members of the Farm Equipment Institute, which was
an association of the nation’s agricultural equipment manufacturers, established a safety
committee to advise its associates regarding the problem. Frank H. Harrison, a high
ranking International Harvester Company official and safety committee member,
summarized the group’s initial activities. He indicated that progress had been made in
developing standards for safety devices, improving equipment instruction handbooks, and
other ways to promote operator safety. Despite such pioneering efforts, concerns
regarding the need for sufficient agricultural laborers coupled with the desire to use these
resources efficiently greatly intensified safety efforts.58
The National Safety Council assumed a leading role in mounting an educational
effort to reduce the number of farm accidents. In 1938, the NSC leadership called for a
meeting of agricultural leaders to discuss and initiate efforts to improve safety on the
farm. C.M. Segreaves, an Illinois Safety Director for the Illinois Agricultural Association,
underlined the importance of the division’s first gathering, believing that the issue had
57 “Minnesota Model for Safety,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1946, 7; for the discussion of
pioneering work regarding farm safety in other states, see, J.H. Mohler, “150 Lives Saved: The Story of the
Famous Kansas Farm Safety Program,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1944, 3.
58 “Farm Equipment Institute Convention,” Farm Implement News, November 3, 1938, 3.
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been ignored for much too long. Segreaves stated that “although material on almost every
conceivable phase of rural life has been carefully compiled by the United States
Department of Agriculture, taught in our agricultural colleges and disseminated to
farmers through the extension service, we find little or nothing on safety. Control of
grasshoppers, clinch bugs, Bangs disease and noxious weeds…yes! Control and
prevention of farm accidents no!59 Segreaves and other initial meeting attendees hoped to
bring attention to the long-neglected problem of farm safety. By 1944, the NSC
leadership had transformed the annual farm safety conference meeting into a separate
division. Members of the division dedicated themselves exclusively to reducing accidents
for farm families and agricultural laborers.60
The division assumed an important coordinating role in assisting the farm safety
movement’s development by helping to unify the efforts of other organizations. The
committee members also disseminated farm safety materials, assisted in the
establishment of state farm safety councils, and engaged in numerous other activities to
increase safety awareness. However, the most important of the NSC’s many contributions
was providing the necessary synchronization of farm safety efforts. This role was crucial
since as late as 1940, individual states conducted much of their farm safety awareness
activities without inter-state cooperation. The NSC leaders recognized this coordinating
role of their organization to enlist the help of a variety of government organizations, rural
youth organizations, and members of the business community. In 1945, C.L. Hamilton,
an NSC agricultural engineer, summarized this role stating that, “the council functions as
59 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1938), 33.
60 Dennis Murphy, “President’s Message to the Summer Meeting of the National Institute For Farm Safety,
INC” (speech given at the Summer Meeting of the National Institute For Farm Safety, Orlando, Florida 16
June 1986), 7, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa.
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a planning, stimulating and coordinating agency. It acts as a clearinghouse for improved
techniques and methods. It assists in the collection, preparation, and distribution of
educational materials such as literature, posters, statistics, exhibits and visual aids.”61
The NSC’s efforts to enlist a network of organizations in the farm safety
movement also received private sector financial support; the organization’s adeptness in
this area is demonstrated in the Farm Safety Review benefactor lists. The numbers of
companies providing monetary support, as well as the diversity of such firms, expanded
throughout the era. In 1946, a Review writer mentioned ten companies and organizations,
primarily agricultural in nature, which provided funding for the NSC’s farm division.
They included John Deere Company, International Harvester Company, and the Illinois
Agricultural Association. During the 1950s, such sponsors continued to grow as
demonstrated by the 196 supporters disclosed in a 1960 Farm Safety Review article.
Thus by the 1960s, a more varied group of businesses were providing funding, including
insurance companies, steel companies, and chemical firms. In 1963, Howard Pyle,
President of the NSC, acknowledged the importance of these private contributions. He
stated, “We salute the individuals and organizations whose direct financial support
provides convincing proof of their interest in the advancement of farm safety efforts.”62
61 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1938), 33; Transactions-
National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1940), 31; C.L. Hamilton, “Agriculture’s
Safety Challenge,” Agricultural Engineering 46 (April 1945):145; Hamilton’s description of the NSC roles
is echoed by other members of the NSC, see, “Farm Safety Horizons,” Farm Safety Review, July/August,
1946, 13; the NSC also labored to remedy the paucity of a statistical understanding of the issue by
mounting their own research projects or cooperating with other agricultural organizations in mounting such
studies, see, “Plan Accident Surveys,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1946, 1 and “Organization Brings
Action,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1948, 6.
62 G.L. Noble, “Agriculture’s Safety Movement,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1946 15;
“We Couldn’t Do It Without Investors,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1960 14-15. For similar listings
of benefactors, see, “Investors in Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1952, 15; “Investors in
Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, July/ August 1953, 15; “Investors in Farm Safety,” Farm Safety
Review, May 1955, 15; Howard Pyle “NSC Salutes You,” Farm Safety Review, September 1963, 3.
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Such support provided the funding necessary for the educational materials development,
research activities, and administrative leadership. The NSC even depended upon private
contributions to fund Farm Safety Review’s publication and distribution. The Review
represented the only periodical, exclusively aimed towards serving a mouthpiece for the
movement.63
A highly competent staff, including individuals who had previously held
respected positions in agricultural organizations, also bolstered NSC activities. Such
institutions included the USDA, the farm press, land-grant colleges, and the state
extension. In the winter of 1944, Maynard Coe’s appointment as director of the division
is representative of the NSC’s wise selection practices. Coe possessed impressive
agricultural credentials, including having been Kansas’s 4-H club state leader. C.L.
Hamilton, the division’s assistant director and editor of the Farm Safety Review,
possessed a master’s degree in Agricultural Engineering from Iowa State College. He had
held a faculty position at the University of Saskatchewan prior to his NSC appointment.
The Soil Conservation Service had also employed him as a “Field Inspector” throughout
the 1930s. Individuals with agricultural engineering backgrounds would continue to
dominate NSC’s farm division leadership and staff positions.64
NSC personnel also worked to encourage the intensification and coordination of
youth group safety activities. Their hosting of an annual youth farm safety sectional
63 “M.S.A. Sponsors Review,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1951, 13; “M.S.A. Renews Review
Sponsorship,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1952, 3; “A.S.A.E. Gets Review,” Farm Safety Review,
July August 1953,” 4; the Review attracted wide readership from those in the agricultural business
community. For instance, as early as 1947 “14,000 implement dealers” and “9,000 extension leaders” were
receiving the periodical, see, “How You Get This Magazine,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1953, 4.
64 “New Farm Safety Leaders,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1944, 2; “Staff Changes,” Farm
Safety Review, July-August 1954, 15, see, “NSC appoints L.H. Hodges Vice President for Farms,” Farm
Safety Review, November/December 1971, 3; “Pfister Heads NSC Farm Conference,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1974, 3.
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meeting demonstrated the organization’s commitment to expanding the involvement of
FFA, 4-H, and other youth-oriented organizations. In 1952, NSC leaders inaugurated the
annual youth meeting as part of the yearly National Safety Congress convention. In 1955,
130 “advisors and delegates” represented organizations such as 4-H, FFA, and the Farm
Bureau Young People.65 The number “young people and adult leaders” present at the
meeting expanded to 200 the following year.66 By 1959, “more than 200 youth and 75
adults attended the Rural Young People and Farm Adult Sessions,” held at Chicago’s
Palmer House Hotel. The conference consistently provided a venue for concerned leaders
and youth involved in safety efforts. Participants gained the latest safety training,
received recognition for their achievements, and met other youth involved in safety
promotion.67
The NSC adopted an inclusive approach both in terms of planning the youth
sectional meeting and encouraging the participation of a diverse group of organizations.
Representatives from 4-H, FFA, the American Farm Bureau Young People, Grange
Young People, as well as many other groups attended the youth sectional meeting. The
national FFA, Farm Bureau, and 4-H adult advisors assisted NSC staff members in
planning the conference activities, with the youth. For instance, NSC employees, several
outstanding youth club members, and their adult leaders planned the 1955 meeting. A
Farm Safety Review writer reflected on preparation for the event. The author stated,
“Plans for this year’s program include presentation of exhibits and demonstrations,
reports on outstanding local youth safety programs and specific safety projects,
65 “Farm Safety at the Congress,” Farm Safety Review, December 1955, 4.
66 “Committee Plans Youth Sessions,” Farm Safety Review, March 1957, 3.
67 “Youth Looks to the 60s,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1959, 3.
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outstanding youth highway safety programs, workshop sessions on power tool safety in
home farm shop, and ‘buzz’ (informal discussion) sessions.”68 Organizers of the event
also adopted a yearly theme; in 1956, they adopted the motif of “Let’s plant, cultivate and
harvest safety;” the following year, organizers of the meeting proclaimed “Youth Backs
the Attack.”69
Rural youth attested to the fact that the annual youth gathering was a real benefit
to the promotion of safety in their communities. Participants indicated that they gained
valuable safety information, received recognition for their achievements, and also
socialized with others concerned about accidents. They benefited from safety speeches
delivered by national 4-H and FFA leaders, tractor safety demonstrations, and a host of
other educational experiences. Attendees also enjoyed formal dinners, dances, and other
entertainments. Speakers included members of prominent safety organizations, corporate
officials, and safety experts. In 1956, sessions titles included “Fire Drills for Farm
Families, Fire Demonstrations, Visual Aids or Gadgets that can Teach Safety, First Aid,
Water Safety, Corn Picker and Tractor, Gun Safety, and Falls.” The annual Farm Safety
Youth Section usually also included award ceremonies and tours of local attractions.70 In
1961, Raymond Powell, an FFA club member from Blairstown, New Jersey reflected
upon his experience at the gathering. He stated, “Using the new ideas that I have brought
back from the Congress, I have already started my work for this year. As I am president
of the Newton Chapter of the Future Farmers of America, it is my duty to impress the
68 “Farm Safety at the Congress,” Farm Safety Review, December 1955, 4.
69 “For 1956 Safety Congress,” Farm Safety Review, March 1956, 15; “Committee Plans Youth Sessions,”
Farm Safety Review, March 1957, 3.
70 “Farm Safety at the Congress,” Farm Safety Review, December 1955, 5; “For 1956 Safety Congress,”
Farm Safety Review, March 1956, 15.
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other chapter members with safety ideas so that they may also go out and teach safety to
the public.”71 This is but one relationship the NSC fostered while creating an
interdependent web of relationships connecting a variety of government agencies, farm
organizations, and other agricultural interests. This network worked cooperatively to
decrease the dangers present on the American farms, but NSC officials also cooperated
extensively with the members of the USDA.
The USDA fulfilled a role similar to the NSC in the farm safety movement by
assuming intra-organizational coordination, information dissemination, and research. In
1944, USDA officials had established their “safety council” whose members initiated
activities to improve both safety of the agency’s own employees and the larger public.
Stanley H. Gaines, an official for the agency’s office of information, stated that the
council was established to “coordinate existing safety programs within the department
and foster closer working relations with other safety organizations.” The council
consisted of numerous smaller committees each dedicated to researching and working to
improve safety in such specific areas as “fire prevention,” “automotive safety” and “farm
work.”72 USDA staff also published farm safety tracts concerning agricultural chemical
safety, machine safety, and various other safety subjects throughout the movement’s
early decades and made them available to the farm public.73
71 Raymond Powell, “My Trip to Congress,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1961, 10-11.
72 Stanley H. Gaines, “The USDA and Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1947, 5-6. For
additional information regarding the origins of the USDA safety activities, see, John H. Wetzel, “Co-
ordination Pays Off,” Farm Safety Review, November/ December 1945, 3-15; Wetzel indicated that much
of the USDA’s early safety work designed to improve the safety of the agency’s own employees; however,
by the early 1940s, the department’s safety council was working to improve safety for families as
evidenced by their employees’ contributions in such national campaigns as “Farm Safety Week,” “National
Fire Prevention Week,” and “Spring Clean-up Week.”
73 “Safe Use of Insecticides Theme of U.S.D.A Bulletin,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1945, 15.
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Although the USDA did not initially play a large role in the farm safety
movement, the agency appears to have intensified its safety-related work in the early
1970s. For instance, in the early 1970s, the organization established a more activist Farm
Safety Committee. The USDA’s Task Force on Safety in Agriculture symbolized a
renewed commitment to reducing farm accidents. The department’s enlarged role was
prompted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act’s enactment, which issued several
standards related to agriculture. In 1971, Lloyd H. Davis, a high-ranking USDA official,
summarized the reasons behind the department’s enlarged role. He indicated that
although USDA employees had studied and provided educational material regarding
safety for decades, new legislation justified an enlarged approach. He stated, “The new
safety law adds to the significance of our role. As new mandatory standards applying to
farmers and agribusiness are adopted, we have the responsibility to help apply the
knowledge and competency of the USDA and land-grant system to the development of
new standards.”74 The USDA also began providing funds to assist state farm safety
programs, including the hiring of farm safety specialists.75
State Extension also played an important part in farm safety by providing another
important constituent in the network of cooperating organizations. Extension leaders, like
those of other agencies involved in the farm safety effort, believed that cooperation was
crucial in the effort. In 1946, M.L. Wilson, the national director of cooperative extension,
74 Lloyd H. Davis, “USDA’s Safety Program,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1971, 5-6.
Davis specified that the task force was publishing material informing the farm public regarding OSHA
standards, intensifying cooperative work with the NSC and other organizations, and improving farm
accident data collection methods; for additional details regarding both the structure and functions of the
task force, see, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary, Safety in American
Agriculture, by Clifford Hardin. Secretary’s Memorandum No. 1723, Washington, D.C, 1971.
75 Herb Plambeck, ed., Iowa Farm Safety in the 20th Century: A History of Contributions by Rural Safety
Volunteers, 156, 140.
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emphasized the need for various state extension workers to assist other organizations in a
common effort to achieve improved rural life. Wilson stated, “We need to work closer
with, not shy away from, farm organizations and other cooperating groups in those
activities directed to attainment of higher living standards and community welfare.”76
This cooperative approach was consistently demonstrated concerning the ways in which
extension agents assisted youth clubs in safety activities, worked with other safety
specialists, and provided leadership for a variety of safety programs.
State extension organizations supported educational efforts to improve safety.
Extension assisted in the development of state and local safety programs, created and
distributed safety tracts, and employed a large number of farm safety specialists.
Extension agents in Kentucky and West Virginia demonstrated how these state agencies
were instrumental in the outset of the movement. In 1943, Kentucky extension
established training programs for farm laborers who had previously not been employed in
an agricultural setting. In 1945, West Virginia’s extension agents mounted a unified
effort to contact the distributors of agricultural chemicals and provided them with the
latest information regarding the proper use of these potentially dangerous chemicals.
Extension’s role in promoting safety was exhibited all across the nation and included the
distribution of safety education materials and farm accident reports. Such tracts as
“Safety in the home,” published by the Alabama extension service, provided rural
Americans with sound accident prevention advice. In addition, extension employees
published papers, which investigated various facets of the problem.77 Finally, state
76 M.L. Wilson, “A New Chapter Begins,” Extension Service Review, January 1946, 1.
77 “Training New Hired Men,” Extension Service Review, May 1943, 69; “West Virginia Contact Dealers
in Fungicides and Insecticides,” Extension Service Review, September 1945; Stella Lou Mitchell and Elta
Majors. Safety in the Home (Auburn, Alabama.: Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1944), 1-8; B.A. Wallace
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extension provided employment opportunities for the growing numbers of farm safety
experts in states such as Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota.78
Home demonstration agents employed by extension also proved to be important
assets for the cause. Such dedicated women instigated a variety of safety programs and
campaigns regarding a variety issues including the rural auto accident problem, farm
home safety, and children’s well being on the farm. They initiated and participated in
farm safety efforts in Indiana, Iowa, and a number of other states. However, by as early
as the 1940s, some had already integrated safety in all their activities. Gladys Kendall, a
home demonstration agent employed in Volusia County, Florida stated, “We emphasize
safety not as a single project but as part of all our programs. For instance, in our work in
good housekeeping and general clean-up, all families are urged to dispose of fire and
accident hazards, to provide simple and necessary equipment and first aid supplies at
home, and to have a place for everything and everything to have its place.”79 Home
demonstration leaders also encouraged agents to integrate safety into their other
activities. In 1959, the National Home Demonstration Council, an association for such
professionals, outlined an effort, which directed its members to reduce accidents in their
communities. The plan called for home demonstration agents to educate themselves
and H.R. Moore. Farm Accidents Costly (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Agricultural Extension
Service, 1943), 1-4.
78 “New State Leaders,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1946, 16; “Farm Safety Roundup,” Farm Safety
Review, November/December, 1949, 14; “Farm Safety Clinics,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1950, 16;
Farm Safety specialists also found employment state Farm Bureau organizations, agricultural associations,
and by a variety of other groups, see, “Illinois Gets Specialist,” Farm Safety Review, September/October
1946, 6; “Ohio Employs Farm Safety Specialist,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1944, 15.
79 “Farm Home gets Safety Treatment,” Extension Service Review, August/September 1947, 104.
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regarding local issues, instigate safety programs, and work with other organizations
already involved in the movement.80
Members of the 4-H and FFA, working closely with local county extension agents
also took up the safety cause. Youth group leaders enlisted thousands of the nation’s
youths into safety activities aimed at reducing accidents of almost every conceivable
type. Representative of these organizations fully articulated their justifications for
working to improve safety and “selling” the idea of safety in the residents of their
communities. In 1953, while speaking at the NSC’s Farm Division meeting, Bill Sorem,
the FFA’s National Vice president stated that “[s]ince we the farmers of tomorrow’s
America, will be intimately concerned with the conditions of our farms, rural safety is of
primary importance to us.”81 In 1955, Buddy Joe Smith, a West Virginia FFA club
member, while speaking at the NSC’s annual meeting, indicated that selling was
important in almost every endeavor including safety.82 In 1959, Gary Noble, an FFA
chapter leader from Newton, New Jersey, affirmed, “We as a chapter feel that this useless
waste of life is unnecessary, that is why we are backing an attack on accidents.” He also
expressed a confidence in the role of education in reducing farm accidents stating,
“Simply put, we believe that where education exists, farm life accidents decrease or cease
to be.”83 Thus, the collective enthusiasm of thousands of such individuals inspired wide-
80 Martha Kohl, “County in Virginia wins Highway Safety Contest,” Farm Safety Review, December 1956,
5; “Hoosier Women Win Lane Award,” Farm Safety Review , March/April 1959, 7; Transactions-National
Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1951), 25; “Women at Work,” Farm Safety Review,
July/August 1959, 13.
81 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 24.
82 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1955), 25.
83 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1959), 17.
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spread youth participation. Such youth involvement proved to be a crucial element in the
farm safety organizational network.
A new group of professionals exclusively dedicated to the rural accident problem
also arose during the era. In 1945, the NSC and USDA also launched the first annual
Institute of Farm Safety meeting, which promoted information exchange and acquisition
among farm safety activists. The institute attracted a small but growing number of farm
safety experts as well as agricultural engineers, USDA officials, and agricultural
implement manufacturers. Representatives from other organizations who possessed an
interest in making farming less dangerous also attended. Attendance at the institute
eventually contributed to the development of a distinct professional identity of the farm
safety specialists by the early 1960s.
The annual meeting provided participants with the latest information regarding an
entire range of rural safety issues. By the mid-50s, it had evolved into a three-day long
event featuring a growing number of informative sessions including fire hazards, proper
use of farm chemicals, and proper electric fence installation. Farm safety leaders also
gained insights regarding methods to improve both safety campaigns and methods of
identifying the accident problem. These included sessions for sharing ideas on increasing
media participation and proper ways of conducting farm accident surveys. Farm safety
specialists also benefited from the opportunity to exchange information and form
relationships with their colleagues. Farm manufacturers discussed design improvements
to improve overall equipment safety. For instance, in 1955, Ford Motor Company’s
tractor division sent a delegation of company employees to lead a panel discussion
regarding technical considerations in manufacturing safer tractors.84
84 “Farm Safety Institute,” Farm Safety Review, August 1955, 5.
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The farm safety institute’s prominence also symbolizes the growing importance of
farm safety experts in the farm safety movement. These professionals provided
administrative leadership by initiating various research programs and assisting state farm
safety councils. The experts specifically aided the growing number of state farm safety
councils by helping to establish them, providing them with technical advice, and offering
their administrative leadership. They also continually emphasized safety’s importance to
both their own institutions and as well as to the larger public. Farm safety experts were
also among the growing ranks of specialists who were employed by land-grant colleges
and extension agencies to provide a variety of services to their state’s agricultural sectors.
In 1958, John J. McEldroy accurately described the role of the extension specialist in the
context of both the USDA and the nation’s land-grant colleges, stating that “the
cooperative extension service is like a highway, running from the U.S. Department of
Agriculture and state land-grant colleges and universities to the nation’s farms and
homes. The traffic consists of extension specialists carrying technological facts from
campuses to counties and returning with information and local reaction which help guide
future programs.” Such a description provides an accurate assessment of the role of the
farm safety specialist during the era.85
As a farm safety expert at Iowa State University, Norval Wardle’s background
experiences are representative of contributions and achievements of a farm safety
85 John J. McElroy, “Specialists-The Connecting Links,” Extension Service Review, April, 1958, 77; the
contributions farm safety specialists made to state farm safety efforts is evident throughout the historical
record. For instance, Norval Wardle, an Iowa state farm safety specialist served the Iowa Farm Safety
Council’s Secretary from 1947 to 1971, assisted in the council research activities and supervised many
farm safety events held to raise the public’s awareness see, Plambeck, ed., Iowa Farm Safety in the 20th
Century: A History of Contributions by Rural Safety Volunteers 16, 20-21; also, by 1951, Farm Safety
Specialists developed safety courses as part of the agricultural engineering curricula in states such as Iowa
and Ohio, see, Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1951), 7.
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specialist. Wardle spent his youth on an Idaho farm, but his outstanding academic
accomplishments provided him with unique opportunities for a person of his humble
origins. Prior to receiving his appointment at Iowa State, he taught vocational agriculture
at an Idaho high school, receiving a master’s degree at the University of Idaho. In 1947,
he was appointed to the newly created position of agricultural safety engineer at Iowa
State University just before completing his doctorate in vocational agricultural education.
He also had a minor in agricultural engineering. During the 1940s and 1950s, he received
various public health awards, published hundreds of farm safety articles, and served as
the Secretary of the Iowa Farm Safety Council. He also assisted other Iowa Farm Safety
Council members with both the creation and implementation of a variety of its programs.
Wardle and his contemporaries did much to assist in the formation of a concerted effort
to address an issue of national importance.86
Wardle’s contemporaries also fulfilled a similar role in other states by providing
leadership, expertise, and encouragement for the inter-organization cooperation in the
realm of safety. In 1949, Paul E. Miller, Minnesota’s Director of Extension, announced
the appointment of Glenn I. Prickett as the state’s extension farm safety specialist. An
anonymous Farm Safety Review writer described the important role that Prickett would
play in improving safety for the state’s farm families. The author stated, “Mr. Prickett
will provide leadership for all state extension activities in safety” and also “work with
county extension agents, farm and civic organizations, and individuals to ‘eliminate
suffering and save lives by bringing more safety into the field of agriculture.’” The
86 Norval Wardle’s resume. Norval Wardle papers. Special Collections, Iowa State University Library,
Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa; Plambeck, ed., Iowa Farm Safety in the 20th Century, 20; for a brief but
useful description revealing how he was representative of the background and contributions of the state’s
other farm safety specialists, see, “News Round-up,” Farm Safety Review, August 1955, 14-15; “News
Round-up,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1955, 13-14.
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Review writer also identified a diverse group of other organizations with whom Prickett
would be cooperating to promote safety in Minnesota. The job descriptions of farm safety
specialists in other states also emphasized their role in fostering intra-organizational
cooperation in their states.87
Although the evidence is not overwhelming, it is also reasonable to assume that
safety careerists contributed to the movement’s expansion. This is supported by their
desire to develop their field and market their expertise. In 1959, Harold M. Pontius, a
private industry safety consultant, stressed that farm safety represented an emerging field
for talented rural youth. Pontius addressed a group of young people attending the NSC
youth sectional meeting. He indicated that the farm safety field was growing, similar to
auto, industrial, and public accident prevention. He also stated that individuals who
possessed an agricultural background might consider it as a possible career choice
stating, “Farm Safety is a broad field of opportunity. Only 18 of our states have farm
safety specialists. This is a growing movement and will offer opportunity for many, both
at the state and national levels.” He also emphasized that “FFA and 4-H boys with an
understanding of farm problems are good prospects for training in this field.”88
Thus, farm safety represented yet another policy domain in which experts could
market their talents. Historian Catherine McNicol Stock has examined the increasing
influence of such individuals on the lives of rural Americans during the Great
Depression. She stated that professionals such as sociologists, engineers, extension
87 “Farm Safety Roundup,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1949, 14; “Illinois Gets Specialist,”
Farm Safety Review, September/October 1946, 6; “Farm Safety Roundup,” Farm Safety Review,
July/August 1949, 14.
88 Harry M. Pontius, “A Career in Safety?,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1959, 3.
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experts, and others represented a “new middle class” with far different backgrounds from
the “old middle class.” She stated, “They owned not a piece of land nor a store of goods
but a body of knowledge and skill; they acted not to produce a product but to reproduce a
set of relationships. They held nothing to pass on to their children but a passion for
education and for certain intangible skills.”89 Historian Roy Lubove has also observed
that experts gained considerable influence in many aspects of American life. Lubove’s
observations regarding social work’s professionalization are equally true of the
differentiation of specialties in other aspects of American life. Lubove commented that
“typical features of urban-industrial society,” such as “idealization of expertise, the
growth of an occupational subculture, and bureaucratization” were powerful trends in
twentieth century America.90 Thus, farm safety experts joined the ranks of other
specialists who arose to address almost every conceivable agricultural problem. Such
professionals included entomologists, agronomists, and agricultural engineers all of
whom labored to improve the efficiency on the nation’s farmsteads.
State farm safety committees were also crucial for the development and
implementation efforts to reduce accidents at the state level. They fulfilled a variety of
purposes including cooperating with other agricultural organizations to raise safety
awareness and hosting meetings, which provided a setting to exchange ideas and
formulate plans. They also tailored programs to suit the unique needs of different
agricultural regions. Thus, they were indispensable in furthering the involvement of state
government agencies, local 4-H clubs, and Farm Bureaus in the safety cause. For
89 Catherine McNicol Stock, Main Street in Crisis: The Great Depression and the Old Middle Class on the
Northern Plains (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 99.
90 Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Career (New York:
Atheneum, 1983), 220.
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instance, in 1983, a long-time member of the Iowa Farm Safety Council listed 49
accomplishments that his committee had achieved over its forty-year existence. These
accomplishments included continually cooperating with both the NSC and the USDA,
enthusiastically participating in Farm Safety Week, and conducting farm accident studies.
Plambeck also listed numerous programs the council had supported in conjunction with
the state farm safety specialist, various extension staff, as well as various youth groups.
Farm safety councils and committees in other states fulfilled a similar role and made
comparable contributions.91
The NSC played an important advisory role in the creation of committees in states
such as Indiana, Oregon, and Washington. For example, in 1942, members of both the
Indianapolis Safety Council and the NSC’s Farm Safety Division cooperated in
organizing a meeting of many of the state’s prominent rural organizations. Individuals
representing such groups as the Grange, Purdue University, and the Indiana Farm Bureau
met to establish a state farm committee. A Farm Safety Review writer stated that all
attendants were “deeply concerned at the appalling loss of life and limb and property as
the nation faced the terrific impact of World War II” and that “there was general
agreement that a coordinated attack on farm accidents in Indiana was long overdue.” The
attendees responded by creating the Indiana Farm Safety committee to provide leadership
and coordinate efforts to reduce the numbers of farm accidents in the state.92 The NSC
provided similar assistance with both Oregon’s and Washington state’s farm safety
committees. In 1960, an anonymous Farm Safety Review writer stated that one of the
91 Herb Plambeck, ed., Iowa Farm Safety in the 20th Century: A History of Contributions by Rural Safety
Volunteers, 26-28. For brief but useful discussion of the activities of farm safety councils and committees
in other states, see, “Illinois Committee Meets,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1944, 13.
92 Maynard Coe, “A Decade of Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1954, 12-15; “State
Organization Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1947, 6.
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major duties of the organization’s farm division was to provide “assistance to the 45
permanently organized State Farm Safety Committees” and continue the work of
“organizing new State Farm Safety Committees.”93
The numbers of farm safety committees expanded quickly during the movement’s
first two decades, from a mere 3 in 1944 to 31 by 1955. By 1960, safety advocates in 45
states had formed such committees.94 Individuals who formed such committees included
members of the farm press, insurance companies, government and agricultural-related
agencies. For instance, in 1943, Iowa farm safety advocates formed one of the nation’s
first farm safety councils. In 1983, while commemorating the accomplishments of his
Iowa’s farm safety council. Herb Plambeck, a long-time agricultural broadcaster for
WHO radio station in Des Moines, stated, “Four men are commonly recognized as the
earliest pioneers in organized farm safety work in Iowa. They are the late Kirk Fox,
editor for Successful Farming; the late J.S. Russell, farm editor for the Des Moines
Register; B.W. Lodwick, a long-time leader in Iowa; the National Farmer’s Home
Administration; and L.J. Long Keeny, president of the Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance
Companies.”95 Agricultural engineers and others employed at the nation’s land-grant
colleges were also heavily represented on these committees. The farm safety committees
in other states were founded by individuals with comparable backgrounds and interests.96
93 “Farm Safety Roundup,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1947 13, “The Farm Safety Story” Farm
Safety Review, May/June 1960, 8.
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By 1960, almost every state in the nation possessed a farm safety committee,
which reveals that the issue was no longer ignored as it had been prior to the Second
World War. In addition, once the members of this network of organizations had
recognized the problem and enlisted a commitment amongst its members, it proved to be
a potent educational force. Safety advocates demonstrated their power to mount safety
education on the national, state, and local level. Farm safety participants exhibited high-
levels of cooperation throughout the era by pooling by their collective resources to raise
safety awareness regarding almost every conceivable farm-related health risk that
threatened the farm family.
Farm Safety Week’s development and persistence is illustrative of the many ways
these organizations were effective in mounting cooperative farm safety programs and
campaigns. In 1944, NSC’s farm division members appointed a five-man board to
develop the first Farm Safety Week. These administrators received advice from USDA
officials who also provided assistance in the program’s implementation. In addition, both
organizations cooperated in the development, distribution, and preparation of safety
educational materials. President Roosevelt underscored its importance both for
experienced farmers and the thousands of new workers engaged in agricultural work.
Farm Safety Week consisted of devoting each day to a particular farm hazard. Farm
safety specialists, extension agents, and rural youth club leaders directed efforts such as
tractor-tipping demonstrations, farm hazard inspections, and a variety of other activities
aimed at increasing safety awareness.97
97 Maynard Coe, “The Reasons for National Farm Safety Week,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1944,
3. The USDA also had expressed the importance of the farm accident issue by creating its own safety
council consisting of representatives from the agency’s many branches. The USDA Safety Council met
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The initial Farm Safety Week’s success represented the communicative powers
inherent in utilizing the farm safety movement’s organizational network. The NSC
appointed a chairman in forty-five states who directed that state’s Farm Safety Week
activities. These state leaders included representatives from the farm press, extension
service directors, and state Farm Bureau leadership. The National Safety Council and the
USDA sent educational materials and program guides to these leaders who then
distributed them to their agricultural organization members. E.W. Lehman, chairman of
the NSC Safety Week Committee, highlighted the event’s intra-organizational
collaboration, indicating that “three hundred organizations had cooperated with the
National Farm Safety Week Campaign” and that the NSC had distributed “6500 news
releases to 450 magazines.” He also revealed that 374 radio stations had featured Farm
Safety Week programming.98 Throughout the late 1940s, the leaders of such
organizations as the NSC, USDA, Farm Bureau, National Farmers’ Union, and the
National Grange repeatedly emphasized the need to assist each other in observing Farm
Safety Week as an expression of the collective will to reduce farm accidents.99
Farm Safety Week continued to be an important tool for raising rural safety
awareness, which gained increased participation and support throughout the era. The
NSC gained even more corporate and media backing for National Farm Safety Week. In
1951, Coca-Cola incorporated the farm safety message in their national advertising
campaigns. Both NBC and ABC addressed safety concerns in their rural-oriented
programming, which included shows such as NBC’s “National Farm and Home Hour”
98 “Lehman Reports on National Farm Safety Week,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1944, 4.
99 “Agricultural Leaders Endorse Farm Safety Week, July 21-27,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1947, 5;
Agricultural Leaders Endorse Farm Safety Week’s Objective, Farm Safety Review, July/August 1948, 3.
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and ABC’s show, “American Farmer.” The NSC also distributed ever-growing amounts
of safety material to rural educators in addition to increasing associated local activities. In
1955, state extension leaders received 10,000 Farm Safety Week information packets and
local safety leaders led 5,000 local safety meetings.100 In 1962, a Farm Safety Review
writer stated that, “More than a million pieces of material will go to every county and to
the rural press and radio this year. Every state and its farm organizations will participate
in farm safety week in an effort to make every farm family safety conscious 52 weeks of
the year.”101 In 1965, Jack Burke indicated that for safety advocates across the nation
farm safety week signifies a “high point” in their yearly calendar of events.102
Thus, the leaders of organizations with both a safety and agricultural focus
devoted themselves to cooperatively providing safety education for the nation’s farm
families. Although a concerted effort began decades after the industrial sector had first
made intensive efforts to improve safety, by the 1950s, a diverse group of organizations
and individuals were pooling their resources to provide safety education to the nation’s
farm families. The fact that leaders of the nation’s agricultural sector were devoting
increased attention as demonstrated by the Farm Safety Week’s success, the
establishment of state farm safety committees, and the emergence of farm safety
professionals all reveals that the movement had fully emerged. The theme of intra-
organizational cooperation was demonstrated at the national, state, and even local level.
For instance, local business such as implement dealers, banks, and newspapers often
supported youth clubs and a variety of other organizations in their safety activities. In
100 “National Farm Safety Week on the Air,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1951, 3; Maynard H. Coe
“Farm Division Meeting,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1955, 12.
101 “The Week for Rural America,” Farm Safety Review, May 1962, 4.
102 Jack Burke, “Farm Safety Week, 1965” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1965, 2.
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1956, Philip Tichener, an extension information specialist from Minnesota, highlighted
the high levels of collaboration that had made a “safety campaign” in Olmsted County,
Minnesota possible. He stated, “County extension workers, in cooperation with 51 local
organizations are leading safety demonstrations, hunting down hazards on individual
farms, putting reflectorized tape on farm machinery and putting up safety posters so that
rural people there won’t lose time, money, limbs and lives from accidents.”103
Therefore, a farm safety movement had fully emerged by the close of the 1940s.
Factors such as the growing influence of expertise in American life, the political context
of the Second World War, as well as the view that farming was becoming increasingly
dangerous all contributed to the movement’s emergence. The efforts of safety advocates
were also bolstered by the generous pocketbooks of corporate benefactors who provided
much of the funding for the movement and helped expand state funding to extension
programs. The enthusiastic participation from a diverse group of organizations aided to
mount a vigorous educational effort. However, despite the emergence of this dynamic
inter-organizational effort, safety advocates and specialists were attempting to solve a
difficult and unique problem.
103 “Benton County’s Success Story,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1959, 8; see, “First Radio
Farm Accident Survey,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1950, 4-5; Transactions-National Safety
Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1952) 14-15; Philip Tichenor, “Olmsted County, Minn.
Organizes A Hazard Hunt,” Extension Service Review, November 1956, 207.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Uniqueness of Farmstead Safety: Old Hazards and New Dangers Converge in the
Countryside
The farm family of the mid-twentieth century existed in an environment that
differed greatly from an urban setting. A particularly significant distinction concerned the
reality that the farmstead functioned both as a home and a workplace. While urbanites
resided in surroundings in which the home and workplace were usually clearly
delineated, farm families existed in an environment in which these domains intersected.
As a result, farm families encountered a dizzying array of hazards that affected rural
individuals regardless of age, meaning that both the very young and the very old were
more exposed to potentially dangerous situations. Many other unique accident agents,
including livestock, affected farm residents.
Although both rural and urban residents sometimes encountered dangers
stemming from the same sources, such as falls, weather, and fires, the rural environment
shaped even these long-standing causes of injuries and deaths. A farmer was more likely
to fall from a wagon or into the moving parts of an agricultural machine than an urbanite.
A barn also presented a more diverse variety of fire hazards than a city dwelling. In
addition, farm families’ outdoor lifestyles and relative isolation also influenced the nature
of weather and recreational related dangers. Similarly, the period’s technologies such as
electricity and automobiles were also influenced by a rural context. Farm families used
electricity for home conveniences, as well as for a variety of other work-related uses, all
without the supervision often experienced in other employment settings. Rural drivers
also encountered distinct dangers related to the nature of rural roadways and the distance
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from emergency services. The isolated nature of the homestead affected the timely arrival
of assistance in an emergency. In 1954, Raymond C. Johnson, a prominent 4-H leader
elaborated on this point stating that fire prevention and reaction efforts were hampered by
countryside’s dispersed population and the impractical nature of installing water
hydrants.104
The farmstead’s dual function as a home and workplace particularly reflected
itself in the unique dangers posed to both the very young and the aged. Unlike urban
areas, both demographic groups in rural locales continued to be exposed to a highly
hazardous working environment. In 1946, Maynard H. Coe, director of the National
Safety Council’s (NSC) Farm Safety Division, recognized the point stressing that this
meant that the farm accident problem differed from safety issues in other occupational
contexts because farming presented dangers to the very young and the very old.105 The
elderly were susceptible to accidents because unlike other work settings many farmers
never fully retired, meaning they continued to encounter agricultural hazards as they
became less able to adapt to them. Children were also exposed to many safety threats
since they both worked and played on the farmstead. The nation’s agricultural leadership
repeatedly acknowledged this dimension to the problem. In 1959, Ezra Taft Benson, the
United States Secretary of Agriculture, encouraged the NSC to continue to focus its farm
safety programs towards the farm family.106
In 1954, Rosemary Schaefer, a home economist for the NSC’s Farm Division,
offered a heartbreaking example that illustrated such complexities. She provided the case
104 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1954), 24.
105 Maynard H. Coe, “Why a Farm Safety Week?” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1946, 14.
106 Maynard H. Coe, “A Family Affair,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1959, 1.
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of a woman whose spouse was forced to go on a trip at the same time that much
fieldwork needed to be completed. She was excited by the prospect of plowing a field for
her husband, which he had wanted to till prior to his departure. Unfortunately, the woman
had never driven the tractor by herself and also had no one to watch her four-year-old
boy, so she took the child with her. While attempting to till the field, she misjudged the
severity of a steep hillside and overturned the tractor. The husband returned home and
immediately began looking for his family. He found them lifeless under the tractor’s
crushing weight.107 The incident powerfully demonstrated how agricultural families
worked together, were often inadequately trained or unsuited for a particular job.
Schaefer’s example also reveals how people of all ages could easily be exposed to unsafe
situations.
Farm children were particularly vulnerable because little legislation had been
introduced to protect them. This was especially the case for those who worked on their
own parents’ farms. The laws enacted during the period prohibited youths under the age
of sixteen from engaging in highly hazardous activities, such as operating agricultural
equipment and applying pesticides or fertilizers. Unfortunately these legal safeguards
applied only to individuals who worked as farm employees and did not protect the
thousands of children who worked on their own families’ farms.108 Thus, parents were
ultimately responsible for the children’s welfare and for assigning them age appropriate
work duties. In 1955, Harold Heldreth, an NSC official, echoed this reality, stating that
“A child’s safety is his parent’s responsibility. If it were possible to purchase an ounce of
107 Rosemary Schaefer, “Safety for Farm Children,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1954, 12.
108 U.S. Department of Labor. Employment Standards Administration. Wage and Labor Division. 1984.
Child Labor Requirements in Agriculture Under The Fair Labor Standards Act, Child Labor Bulletin No.
105. U.S. Department of Labor, 1-5 (Washington, 1984).
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magic guaranteed to protect children from accidents, parents would rush out to buy it, of
course. But there is no such magic formula on the market.” 109 In 1963, Ray Fuson, a
high-ranking official for the Indiana Farm Bureau revealed how farm work’s stressful
demands could easily expose youths to dangerous situations. He stated, “It is real easy for
Dad to pull a 15-year-old boy off a $6,000 self-propelled combine, put him into a $175
truck and send him a few miles into town for supplies. In busy times, a farmer must
depend upon those working with him.”110
A child’s natural inexperience and curiosity combined with the farmstead’s
complexity also posed special problems. In 1955, a Farm Safety Review writer stressed
that a child’s natural inquisitiveness needed to be tempered with safety awareness.
Another safety advocate expanded on the point stating, “Consider your children. Does
your toddler go unwatched as he explores his constantly expanding world? He needs
your constant attention except when he is in a play pen or fenced area where his activities
are limited.”111 In 1954, Rosemary Schaefer, an NSC home economist, offered safety
advice, which illustrated the challenge of keeping farm kids safe. She suggested the
implementation of practices such as establishing specific play areas, giving children age
appropriate work, and consistently instructing kids in safety.112 Although such advice was
clearly warranted, adults probably found it difficult to implement such recommendations,
considering farming’s hectic and demanding responsibilities.
109 Harold Heldreth, “Safety for Farm Children,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1955, 12.
110 Transactions- National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1963), 25.
111 “Could This Be Your Child?,” Farm Safety Review, September 1955, 8.
112 Schaefer, “Safety for Farm Children,” 13.
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Children’s innate inquisitiveness made them especially susceptible to livestock
mishaps. Rosemary Schaefer stated, “Children, with their natural love of animals, are
often victims of these accidents. If there are draft horses or riding horses on the farm,
keep small children away from them unless the child is with an adult.”113 Harold Heldreth
also emphasized the special concerns related to children and animals, particularly horses,
by writing “thousands of farm boys and girls are in the saddle daily to carry out certain
farm chores more quickly. Many young people ride horse for recreation.”114 He suggested
that interactions with animals should be supervised, age appropriate, and that all farm
youth should be trained in proper livestock handling.115
Both the diversity and severity of childhood farm accidents suggest that parents
were sometimes unable to keep their children safe. Youths became accident victims as a
consequence of exposure to a wide variety of hazards. Fatalities and injuries from farm
machinery, electric fences, and even from blasting caps used for stump removal
illustrated the great number of health risks. The fact that farm children had access to
blasting caps confirmed the challenge that parents faced in keeping their kids safe. In
1944, a Farm Safety Review writer stated, “Children hammer or pick at them, throw them
in bonfires or against walls, and the resulting explosion throws particles of metal in all
directions. Fingers are blown off, hands are often crippled, eyes destroyed.”116 Although
blasting caps represented a rather serious and less common hazard, the example
113 Ibid., 13.
114 Harold Heldreth, “Safety for Children,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1955, 11.
115 Ibid., 11.
116 “Practice Safety with Machinery,” Hoard’s Dairyman, August 10, 1943, 7. C.L. Hamilton, “Is Your
Electric Fence Safe?,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1945, 7; “Move to Curtail Accidents with Blasting
Caps,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1944, 14.
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nonetheless signified the great diversity of farm dangers. Agricultural literature contains
numerous examples of the children who were injured or killed in more common types of
accidents, such as those involving machines. In 1955, Harold Heldreth, an NSC writer,
indicated that farm accident researchers in 1952 discovered that out of 45 youths injured
in mechanical accidents, 35 of them were involved in tractor mishaps. He also specified
that the greatest proportion of fatal accidents involved children between the ages of one
and four. Youths between the years of fifteen to nineteen years old were close behind.117
Exposure to potentially dangerous technologies and parental negligence
contributed to the problem of childhood fatalities involving tractors. Children were most
usually killed as a result of being a second rider, getting caught in a tractor’s power take-
off shaft or playing around a moving tractor. In 1962, the FFA members of Ellsworth,
Kansas spoke at the National Safety Congress, and stressed how unwise it was to give
children tractor rides. The Ellsworth FFA speakers indicated that a farmer who allowed a
second rider “doesn’t value the life of his children very much, or he wouldn’t let them
ride on the tractor.” Although such comments may have been harsh, having a second
rider was indeed very hazardous. A small bump in the road could throw a child from a
tractor and result in serious consequences.118
Safety writers also elaborated upon the growing problem farm dangers posed to
elderly. In 1953, Harold Heldredth, an NSC agricultural representative, stated, “Being
self employed or a member of the farm family, there is no question of out-and-out
retirement at any specific age.” Heldreth also pointed to the reality that the nation’s
agricultural production would be increasingly dependent upon older workers. He also
117 Harold Heldreth, “Safety for Farm Children,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1955, 10.
118 Transactions- National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 2.
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commented that “ today, 50 percent of our workers are over 30 years old and 22 percent
are over 50 years old.” He correctly ascertained that this meant the nation’s food needs
would be increasingly met by aged farmers. The aged also possessed characteristics that
made them particularly vulnerable, including decreasing physical abilities and much
slower recovery from injuries. Heldreth indicated that there were certain jobs and
practices that venerable farm workers should avoid. His suggestions included not over-
working themselves, avoiding the use of equipment in difficult conditions, or engaging in
other highly strenuous activities. Despite Heldreth’s prudent advice, it is easy to imagine
that many farmers might ignore such counsel.119
Farm families, like their urban counterparts, also faced the risk of being injured in
falls; however, the unique nature of the farm as both a workplace and home also affected
this hazard. An individual could suffer a fall in a variety of contexts including in the
home, on the farmstead’s grounds, or while using farm equipment. In 1961, 18,400
Americans perished in falls, a majority of which occurred in the home. In 1973, the
results an NSC farm accident survey provided more specific information regarding falls
on the farm. The study revealed that falls represented a third of all farm accidents,
signifying a serious problem. The investigation also showed that factors such as
emotional state, improper footwear, or adverse weather conditions contributed to falls.120
Safety writers also revealed that older people, due to their physical frailty, and
children, owing to their inexperience, were especially inclined to serious falls. Elderly
Americans were particularly prone to death or serious injury in a fall since they suffered
119 Harold Heldreth, “Providing Safe Farms for the Older People in Agriculture,” Farm Safety Review,
January/February 1953, 12-14.
120 “Facts about Falls,” Farm Safety Review, September 1962, 4-5. “Falls…leading causes of farm
accidents,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1973, 3-5.
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from poor balance. In 1954, Rosemary Schaefer, a home economist for the NSC’s Farm
Division, insisted that farm children were particularly susceptible to falling into open
wells because of their inattentiveness. In a Farm Safety Review piece, Schaefer told the
story of a Colorado toddler who inadvertently came across a well and fell 40 feet to its
bottom. Despite the valiant efforts of a man who bravely recovered her from three feet of
water, the child was tragically brought to the surface lifeless.121
People also suffered painful plunges in their farm homes because of careless
storage practices, improper step construction, or poor lighting. Gladys T. Olson, an NSC
Home Economist, identified the problem of basement steps being used as shelves for
boots, fruit jars, and mops. Olson recommended that organizational aids such as wood
storage boxes, baskets, or other appropriate containers be used as safe alternatives. Other
safety writers stressed factors such as poor step design involving improper step width, an
absence of hand rails, or a lack of tread also contributed to falls. The author also stressed
that appropriate levels of light represented another preventative measure. Safety
advocates disclosed a variety of other causes including loose area rugs, neglecting to
promptly clean up spills, and attempting to carry overly heavy objects up stairs.122
Farm families also differed from their metropolitan counterparts since it was
much more likely that animals would harm them. Although cities were inhabited by pets,
exposing urbanites to dangers such as dog attacks, those residing in rural areas faced
much more substantial animal-related hazards. In 1945, Marvin Nichol, an NSC farm
121 “Facts about Falls,” 5. Rosemary Schaefer, “Safety for Farm Children,” Farm Safety Review,
July/August 1954, 12.
122 Gladys T. Olson, “One Step at a Time,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1944, 4-5. “Good Design:
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Review, September 1962, 6.
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safety expert, emphasized the problem’s significant magnitude. He stated, “Second in
number only to accidents from machinery are the farm fatalities caused by animals.”123
Horses could inflict injury by unexpectedly biting, bolting, kicking, or stomping.
Although cattle did not bite, they might kick with their back legs, gore with their horns,
or step on their owners’ feet. Pigs could inflict wounds with their tusks and even a male
sheep could ram with its horns. In 1956, Harold Heldreth commented on the problem
stating, “In recent years, accidents involving farm animals decreased, reaching the lowest
total on record in 1950, but they were still the second most important source of farm
work accidents, and stockman who deviate from proven safe methods of handling farm
animals have the most accidents.” Although farm accident statistics confirm Heldreth’s
observations regarding the declining numbers of livestock related injury, the issue
nevertheless persisted.124
Although the numbers of horses were decreasing, rural families continued use
them for fieldwork and leisure. Harold Heldreth commented on this dual, multi-
generational use stating, “Thousands of farm people—boys, girls and adults—are in the
saddle daily, carrying out farm jobs that can be done more efficiently on a mount. Many
farm people also seek recreation in the saddle.”125 Unfortunately, rural Americans
continued to experience substantial numbers of horse-related accidents. For example, in
Kansas between 1930 and 1945 over ninety people had been killed in runaway horse
accidents. In 1944, 20 people died in horse-related mishaps in Wisconsin.126
123 Marvin J. Nichol, “How’s Your Horse Sense?,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1945, 8.
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Such unfortunate events occurred for a variety of reasons including runaway
horse incidents, incorrect use of equipment, and lack of training. Runaway horses were
particular dangers because they created chaotic circumstances, which often resulted in
grave personal wounds, wrecked equipment, and an injured horse. Some of the more
serious or fatal accidents occurred when the rider was thrown from a mount. Farm Safety
Review writer Marvin Nichol emphasized the importance of properly securing “stirrups,
cinches, and saddles” and indicated that many accidents were caused by faulty or
improperly used equipment. Nichols also highlighted the importance of proper training,
stressing that all newcomers should be given knowledgeable instruction. He emphasized
that skills such as “mounting, sitting in the saddle, handling reins, and riding in regard to
speed, rest periods and walking” should all be included in the training.127
Although bovines warranted caution regardless of their temperament, bulls
demanded special respect. Harold Heldreth pointed to milking hazards associated with
cows, stressing that such mishaps were often disregarded because they were rarely
deadly. Yet a startled dairy cow might stomp a person’s foot, causing both suffering and
lost work time. Bulls presented the greatest hazards due to their large size, strength,
instinctual protectiveness, and aggressiveness. They also possessed horns, which could
inflict serious injury. Safety advocates believed bulls to be one of the most dangerous of
all farm animals since they could cause wounds by “goring, butting, hooking with horns,
and trampling.”128 In 1944, prominent veterinarian C.F. Schlotthauer stated, “The most
127 Marvin J. Nicol, “Safe in the Saddle,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1947, 12-13.
128 Harold E. Heldreth, “Safe Practices Can Mean Bigger Profits,” Farm Safety Review, August 1956, 8.
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severe injuries received from cattle are due to being bumped or gored by bulls. Only the
automobile kills more farm people than bulls.”129
Although Schlotthauer’s comments were probably overstated, these big and
aggressive beasts were undoubtedly hazardous. In 1943, E.S. Bayard, editor of the
Pennsylvania Farmer, revealed that the twenty years he had been studying the issue had
revealed a problem of significant scope. He had recorded 579 bull attacks, of which 214
had resulted in death. He emphasized that often bull injuries were never disclosed and
sometimes even local newspapers did not cover them. Bayard concluded, “The total for
the whole country must be much larger than most of us suspect, justifying the statement
that the bull is the most dangerous animal on earth. Not that it is the most vicious but that
it has the most opportunities to kill.”130 In 1944, Randall Swanson, a Wisconsin farm
safety specialist, revealed that in the first half of that year alone, a half dozen farmer were
killed and another 25 severely injured in accidents involving bulls in his home state.131
Bulls were highly unpredictable and even seemingly docile bulls could present
significant danger since farmers were sometimes more careless in handling them. In
1944, C.F. Schlotthauer articulated this point stressing that those bulls that were known to
be aggressive were treated with great caution, but even bulls that appeared compliant
could turn on their owners. Randall Swanson supported this view stating that “farmers are
crippled and lives are lost because suddenly the quiet dairy bull changes and his
disposition suddenly becomes a ferocious, roaring killer.”132
129 C.F. Schlotthauer, “No Kick Coming,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1944, 5.
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The literature confirmed such warnings since it contained many harrowing bull
accident stories involving family members being attacked while another attempted a
rescue. In 1943, a Farm Safety Review writer related the case of a farm wife who had
bravely protected her husband from a rampaging bull. In this particular case, Mr. Kuntz
of East Hickory, Pennsylvania, had been inside a pen with a pitchfork believing it was
sufficient to ward of an attack. Unfortunately, the bull had “disarmed him” and his wife
“seized a pole or club and beat the bull over the head, so distracting him that the victim
had a chance to escape.” Her quick thinking probably had saved her husband’s life.
Unfortunately, other attacks resulted in tragic consequences. The death of Richard Fehr, a
thirteen-year-old youth from Algona, Iowa illustrates such a fatal encounter. The boy
drove a group of cattle from a meadow and was putting them into a fenced enclosure,
when the bull turned on him. Despite his mother’s valiant efforts to dissuade the angry
bull by beating it with a club, the bull trampled her son to death. The author described the
attack’s tragic consequences stating, “The mother beat off the animal and carried Richard
into the house but he had been injured fatally. He was able to speak to his mother before
dying. A doctor said the boy’s chest and back had been crushed.”133
Safety writers advocated a number of proper handling suggestions aimed at
preventing attacks. In 1944, Randall Swanson stressed that careless management
techniques represented one of the leading causes of bull accidents. He also disclosed that
most bull assaults occurred in open settings such as farm fields and the barnyards where
little control could be exercised. Swanson also indicated that some had occurred while the
farmers were making bull pen repairs with the bull still inside the enclosure. He also
stressed that this was a dangerous practice because the bull could easily attack and
133 “Two Lucky Accidents,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1943, 3.
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surprise the farmer. He also revealed that many encounters occurred while the farmer
attempted to herd the bull back into a stall, place a rope through the bull’s “nose ring,” or
attempt to use a “rope halter.” Swanson also suggested that livestock owners should herd
the bulls a “with leading staffs at all times.”134 Further, Bayard cautioned farmers against
using rope to handle bulls, stating “the most common careless act is to lead the bull by
rope or strap.” Bayard stated that accidents often occurred when “the bull ‘turns on’ its
leader and kills him or cripples him before he can escape or anybody can rescue him.”135
Farm accident specialists also suggested that building “safety bull pens”
represented an effective method of preventing such violent encounters. A “safety bull
pen” usually included a shelter, a breeding stall, and a large exercise enclosure
surrounded by a sturdy, high fence. This bull-handling system was highly beneficial to
the entire family’s safety since it greatly reduced any contact with a bull. In 1944, C.L.
Hamilton, a prominent agricultural engineer, expressed this point, stating that the
enclosure allowed farmers to conduct many necessary interactions with the bull while
lessening vulnerability to attack. E.S. Bayard also believed that the “safety bull pen” was
the best protection against bull accidents. Despite such praise, it appears that few farmers
erected such structures. In 1944, Randall Swanson stated, “We can’t talk too much about
the safety bull pen since we still have to recognize that 95% of Wisconsin farmers do not
have these facilities for handling bulls.”136
Nevertheless, farmers’ exposure to bulls was also reduced due to other
innovations. By the mid-1950s, scientists had discovered new solutions for bull hazards
134 Swanson, “The Dairy Bull—Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde,” 598.
135 Bayard, “Put the Bull in His Place,” 9.
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since some farmers no longer required a bull’s reproductive services. In 1956, Harold E.
Heldreth stressed that farmers’ growing interest in artificial insemination and the
possibility that this reproductive method would enjoy increasing popularity might mean
that fewer farmers needed bulls. He emphasized its benefits stating, “Besides eliminating
a serious farm accident hazard and the expense of keeping individual bulls, the plan also
extends or multiplies the services from valuable bulls many fold.”137
Farm families’ greater contact with livestock also potentially exposed them to
diseases which could be transferred from animals to humans, especially such rather
common maladies such as Rabies and Brucellosis (Bangs Disease). Rabies probably
presented the most significant threat. Although cattle and cats were capable of spreading
the sickness, dog bites presented the most common transmission method. Brucellosis,
which also garnered attention, could be transferred to humans through consumption of
infected milk, an open wound, or the air. People suffering from the disease might
experience fever, fatigue, and weight loss.138 W.A. Aitken, a veterinarian and member of
the American Veterinary Association, stated that agriculturalists “are more exposed to
these diseases than other groups because they are in closer contact with animals; they
consume more animal products in the raw state; and it is they who must first give first aid
and serve as nurses to ailing animals.” He also indicated that farm families faced health
risks from as many as nine diseases that were commonly present on farmsteads. Safety
writers advised precautions such as having livestock tested, wearing rubber gloves while
handling animals, and thoroughly cooking meat.139
137 Harold E. Heldreth, “Safe Practices Can Mean Bigger Profits,” Farm Safety Review, August 1956, 9.
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Health officials also warned farm families about less common illnesses including
as Leptospirosis, Trichinosis, and Turlaremia. Leptospirosis affected a variety of animals
including cattle, pigs, and even dogs and could be transferred through a diverse number
of mediums including soil, urine, and water. An individual became infected while
swimming in a pond which contained infected animal wastes. Symptoms include yellow
skin, fever, and diarrhea. People usually caught Trichinosis by consuming insufficiently
cooked and infected pork. The animals themselves usually acquired the disease from the
unwise practice of feeding garbage to pigs. The parasite that caused the disease resided in
the infected animal’s tissues and entered the human digestive system upon consumption.
An individual suffered symptoms such as severe stomach ache, fever, and coughing upon
contracting Trichinosis. Tularemia, a bacterial infection, also included symptoms such as
stomach ache, fever, and cough. However, wild game, not domestic pigs, were usually
the culprit for those who consumed infected animals or insufficiently cooked meat. In
1965, a Farm Safety Review contributor stated that, “Tularemia is a preventable disease if
people would avoid all contact with wild rabbits, 90 percent of the disease would be
eliminated.140
Although all Americans faced dangers such as fires, weather, and various
recreational hazards, even these universal safety issues were also deeply shaped by the
rural context. In 1944, Burton Williams, a Farm Safety Review contributor, emphasized
the fire problem’s magnitude indicating that approximately 3,500 people died annually in
such accidents and that financial losses amounted yearly to almost $1,000,000,000. He
stated that the money lost due to such conflagrations was sufficient to provide housing for
the entire population of Kansas City, Kansas. Writers also continually reminded farm
140 “Animal Disease and Human Health,” 15.
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families of the threat they faced. In 1962, annual farm property losses amounted to
approximately $165 million. In 1948, North Carolina’s State College agricultural
engineering staff members estimated that almost six of every thousand of the state’s
tobacco barns were ruined by conflagrations. Fires often shared many of the same causes
regardless of location, including highly flammable construction materials, poor chimney
design, and careless smoking habits. All Americans were encouraged to adopt many of
the same fire prevention practices including identifying two emergency exits, continually
rehearsing drills, and purchasing fire extinguishers.141
Nevertheless, farm families also faced fire challenges distinctive to the farm. In
1944, Burton Williams highlighted unique hazards associated with the barn including
improper straw and manure storage, which could combust spontaneously. He also
stressed that ever-growing amounts of petroleum products presented dangers, making the
careless disposal of cigarette butts or matches especially hazardous. Burton’s
identification of petroleum products as a culprit for many fires reveals farmers’
increasing dependence on it as a fuel and machinery lubricant. Farmers could easily
multiply hazards if they did not store gasoline in suitable containers, which featured
flexible spouts, flash arresting screens, and seal-tight caps. In 1949, A.M. Sowder,
Chairman of the USDA’s Fire Prevention committee also warned farmers to properly
dispose of “oily rags” since they could easily ignite. Safety advocates advised farmers to
place them into “self-closing metal containers” instead of leaving such material strewn on
floors. Such containers could be opened by the foot and closed automatically.142
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Farm Safety Review, July 1962, 10-11.
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Liquefied Petroleum, one of the era’s emergent energy source innovations, also
presented fire hazards if proper safety practices were ignored. By 1951, more than 7.5
million Americans had acquired butane gas tanks. However, farm families were
especially inclined to use L.P. gas since many did not have access to “gas mains” and
consequently used it for heating homes, food refrigeration, and clothes drying. The
farmstead applications of L.P. included warming livestock buildings, heating water tanks,
and running pumps. In 1955, Art Henderson, Director of Safety for the Illinois
Agricultural Association, alerted farm families to L.P. dangers, stating that building
codes required that the tank should be positioned no less than five feet from the closest
basement windowpane. He said that “the gas is heavier than air, and, if it should escape,
it goes down and creeps around the house. If the window should be open to the basement,
it creeps into the basement. If the mixture becomes right for that particular mixture of gas
to air, a very small spark can cause a terrific explosion.” Farmers were also warned
against installing their own L.P. gas systems, making repairs, or modifying tanks for new
purposes. Rural Americans were advised to mount butane tanks away from buildings,
promptly repair leaks, and keep flammable materials away from the tank. Farmers were
also advised to keep all gas conduits properly protected and all L.P. tanks on concrete
slabs.143
Farm families also encountered potential fire hazards from the growing repertoire
of heating equipment. Raymond C. Johnson, a prominent 4-H leader, revealed the
dangers associated with heating equipment including grain dryers used to treat moist
142 Williams, “Going to Blazes,” 8-9; Farm Safety Review, May/June 1959, 9; A.M. Sowder, “Clean for
Safety’s Sake,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1949, 4; “Safe Cans,” Farm Safety Review, May/June
1953, 9.
143 “Tank Gas Farms,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1951, 8-9; Transactions- National Safety
Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 30; “Tank Gas Farms,” 8.
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crops and heat lamps to keep animals warm. If used improperly, such devices could
easily ignite a farm’s gamut of highly combustible materials. Such a precarious mixture
sometimes occurred in Southern tobacco barns where drying was employed during the
harvest. Midwestern farmers also had to be aware of such dangers when drying their
grain. In 1962, a Farm Safety Review writer suggested that a farmer’s grain dryer should
have a “thermostatic control to shut off the blower or the dampers when the temperature
in the heat transfer chamber gets too high.” The author also warned that the dryer should
be vented ensuring that “all gases and smoke is directed outdoors.”144
Farmers also needed to operate their machinery with an attitude of fire prevention
awareness. Observers suggested that fire extinguishers should be within easy reach of an
operator of tractors, corn-pickers, and combines. In the mid 1960s, David T. McFarland,
an NSC staff member, advised that farmers should always turn off their equipment prior
to replenishing their gas tanks, clear debris from the components of a hot engine, and
promptly fix leaks. In the early 1970s, Joseph Gerling warned farmers that the
combination of a combine, a desiccated field, and hot weather could create the dangerous
conditions. He advised farmers to “periodically check for overheated bearings that could
burn or start a fire in dry chaff. Be particularly careful to keep the exhaust manifold and
other parts of the exhaust system clean and free of dirt and chaff. Be alert for constantly
slipping belts which could heat up and catch fire.”145
144 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1954), 24; Ellis and Teter,
Smoking Tobacco Barns,” 4; “Fires: Why They Happen,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1962, 9.
145 David McFarland, “Eight Steps to Combine Safety,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1965, 4; Joseph
Gerling, Extension Facts: Safe Combine Operation (Stillwater, Oklahoma: Oklahoma State University,
1974), 4. Farm safety experts also provided additional suggestions to avoid a machinery-related fire,
including never smoke while pumping fuel and check consistently for gas or diesel leaks on the machines.
These specific suggestions and others can be found in National Safety Council, Bulletin: Grain Harvest
Safety (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1979), 3.
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Farm families’ outdoor lifestyle also exposed them to severe climatic conditions
including oppressive summer heat, lightning, and freezing temperatures. A farm family’s
work had to be completed regardless of seasonal extremes. Thus, they were probably
more prone to suffer from weather-related illness such as heat stroke or hypothermia.
Climate-related dangers such as tornadoes and lightning hazards were also shaped by the
countryside’s special conditions. Farmers often worked very hard in some of the hottest
weather, which exposed them to heat-related injuries. The rural context also influenced
their exposure to lightning hazards. In 1960, a Farm Safety Review writer stated that
“sprawling farms, unprotected by high city buildings, are excellent lightning targets; the
loss in farm property from lightning fires is estimated at $56 million.”146
Although farm families often faced some of the most extreme weather, they
were prone to ignore proper preventative weather-related measures since completing farm
work took priority. In 1960, Purdue researchers stressed that farmers could avoid heat-
related injury by slowly acclimating themselves to hot weather, taking short but frequent
work breaks, and wearing loose-fitting and brightly colored clothing. Farmers were also
advised to adequately hydrate themselves. An NSC staff writer provided similar advice
while adding that taking salt tablets compensated for the minerals lost through
perspiration. Although such advice was prudent, overburdened farmers sometimes did not
fully implement such precautions. Winter not only increased the discomfort associated
with farm chores, but icy conditions could also contribute to falls. In 1973, a National
Safety Council investigation of falls determined that almost 25 percent of the falls
146 “Beware: It’s Lightning Season,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1960, 11. Farm families had long
known the dangers posed by lightning hazards. For an account of the tragic death by lightning of one
Minnesota farmer in the late nineteenth century, see, Steven R. Hoffbeck, The Haymakers: A Chronicle of
Five Farm Families (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press), 79.
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investigated involved a “slippery substance” which often was ice. The researchers’ report
provided an example of an older farmwoman who, after milking her cows, slipped on an
icy porch. She then fell through a glass doorway, which resulted in severe lacerating
injuries. Safety advocates advised that such incidents could be reduced if farm residents
used treaded footwear and promptly removed ice from porches and paths.147
Tornadoes represented one of the most ominous weather-related threats and were
particularly frequent in the nation’s agricultural heartland. These whirling funnel-shaped
clouds wrought devastation upon farmsteads and small town residences alike. Although
cyclones still presented dangers to farm families, by the late 1960s, early warning
systems were being established throughout rural America. Wisconsin residents enjoyed
the benefits of such a system due to the cooperative efforts of the United States Weather
Bureau, the State Motor Vehicle Department, and the State Bureau of Civil Defense. In
1969, Jack Burke praised its advantages by stating “weather information has greatly
improved in the last few years. Conditions favorable for tornadoes are carefully watched,
and, if something develops, the information is quickly relayed to concerned areas by
phone, teletype, radio and television.”148
In 1952, C.L. Hamilton, an NSC agricultural engineer, revealed that of the
lightning strikes that claimed the lives of 400 individuals yearly and injured another
1,000, only ten percent occurred in urban locales. He revealed that “lightning is also a
major cause of farm fires, destroying about $20,000,000 worth of property annually.”149
147 “Heat: Hard on the Heart,” Farm Safety Review May/June 1960, 12; “Falls..Leading Causes of Farm
Accidents,” 4.
148 Jack Burke, “Spring Clean-up and Tornado Tips,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1969, 15.
149 C.L. Hamilton, “Lightning Protection,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1952, 4.
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In 1960, a Lightning Protection Institute researcher further highlighted the problem’s
scale revealing that “lightning this year will kill more than 600 Americans (including
those who die in fires kindled by lightning), injure 1,500, and damage property at a cost
of $130 million.”150
Safety advocates encouraged farmers to seek professional advice to reduce
dangers from lightning. Harry L. Garver, a USDA agricultural engineer, stressed that
preventing lightning damage required much more than the attachment of a lightning rod.
He stated that “many farmers live under a false sense of security as they look with
confidence to their roof tops and see rods pointing towards the sky, thinking that makes
up the entire lightning protection system; they fail to check their conductors and ground
connections.” He emphasized that the problem required considerable electrical
understanding since protection equipment not only included rods, but also a system of
conductors, fasteners and air terminals.151 Hamilton also stressed that farmers procure
professionally installed lightning protection equipment. He stated that “when installing a
lightning rod system, secure the counsel and assistance of an experienced lightning-
protection man. Get bids and deal with a well-established, reputable firm. Poorly installed
or maintained systems lead to a sense of false security.”152 In 1960, a Farm Safety Review
writer echoed such sentiments stating that “be sure to get a reliable company to install
your lightning protection system. It is no ‘do it yourself’ job.”153
150 “Beware: It’s Lightning Season,” 11.
151 Harry L. Garver, “When Lightning Strikes…Let Rods Take the Job,” Farm Safety Review, July/August
1949, 6.
152 Hamilton, “Lightning Protection,” 5.
153 “Beware: It’s Lightning Season,” 12.
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Farm families also faced a variety of recreational hazards including most notably
those associated with swimming and hunting. In 1959, a Farm Safety Review piece
indicated that leisure pursuits were responsible for a significant number of rural fatalities;
thus, fourteen percent of accidental fatalities were caused by drowning and twelve
percent occurred due to unintentional gunshot wounds. The dangers associated with
leisure water use not only included drowning but also other hazards such as the
possibility of boating accidents or even getting hurt with fishing hooks. Rural Americans
were exposed to water-related risks largely due to numerous farm ponds that dotted the
nation’s countryside. The USDA had encouraged the construction of these small bodies
of water as part of their soil conservation efforts. However, farmers used ponds for a
variety of uses including watering livestock, irrigation, and as a fire fighting resource.
Farm ponds also provided recreational opportunities such as swimming, fishing, and
boating. The dangers of drowning represented the most serious safety issue regarding
farm ponds, particularly among youth. In 1966, a study provided a composite picture
regarding the various factors contributing to rural drowning accidents. Jack Burke
commented on one of the most distinguishing features of these small bodies of water,
stating that they were “unsupervised and usually have no lifesaving devices available.
The ‘old swimming hole’ may be fun for the kids, but it can be mighty dangerous too.”
The investigation also confirmed that pond-drowning deaths were a leading cause of
accidental farm fatalities involving young people. The occurrence of such deaths should
not be a surprise since farm ponds sometimes contained rusting farm implements, cables,
or barbed wire all of which created unsafe conditions.154
154 “Recreation: Facts,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1959, 10; “Farm Pond and Irrigation
Safety,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1960, 2; Jack Burke, “How to Make Your Farm Pond Safe,”
Farm Safety Review, July/August 1966, 11.
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Although there were clear differences relating to the farmstead environment,
some of the same technologies were transforming both urban and rural life. The farm
home was undergoing tremendous change as rural Americans adopted the same
technologies as their urban counterparts, including electricity. In 1938, less than half of
the nation’s farms were electrified; however, in the following two decades a majority of
rural families adopted it. These conveniences included hot running water, lighting,
refrigeration, and a variety of other amenities. During the 1950s, the greater availability
of phones also represented the shrinking of the technological gulf between the city and
the countryside In 1962, Judy Styles, a member of a South Dakota 4-H, celebrated the
consequences of the electrical access stating that “If we were living in the days when our
grandparents were our age, we probably wouldn’t be here today. We might be possibly
taking our turn the family washboard or some other laborsome device and wouldn’t have
so much time to do the things we enjoy. What made this possible? Electricity!”155 In
1964, D.E. Lindstrom, a rural sociology professor, from the University of Illinois echoed
such remarks indicating that most farm families enjoyed “a good modern home with
electricity, hot and cold running water, television, radio, telephone and many of the labor
saving-devices such as a sewing machine, refrigerator, deep freeze, and other home
conveniences.”156
Electricity also improved safety since better lighting helped farmers navigate their
crowded environments. In 1944, Myrtle Fahsbender, Director of Residential Lighting for
155 R. Douglas Hurt, American Agriculture: A Brief History (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1994),
326; for both a more complete and recent discussion of the rate of dissemination and effect of electricity in
the countryside, see, Bruce L. Gardner, American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century: How it Flourished
and What it Cost (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 2002), 15; Transactions- National
Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 22.
156 Transactions- National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1964), 22.
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Westinghouse, credited electrical lighting for reducing instances of tripping, falling, or
running into hidden objects. He encouraged farmers to adopt electrical lighting quickly
since it improved visibility during periods of low light such as evening or early morning.
In 1952, Earl L. Arnold, of the Rural Electrification Administration, also believed that “a
well-lighted farm had reduced common night time and early morning accidents such as
banging one’s shin into farm equipment, twisting ankles in holes, and a host of other
mishaps partially caused by darkness.”157 In addition, electric lighting was probably safer
than earlier sources of illumination.158
Despite such benefits, careless electrical practices still produced serious
consequences. In a speech given at the 1962 National Safety Conference, South Dakota
4-H club member Judy Styles cautioned her listeners against irresponsible habits. She
told the story of a rural Tacoma, Washington, couple who lost seven children in a blaze
caused by an over-heated refrigerator motor. Styles stressed that electrical mishaps had
become a leading cause of house fires. In 1975, William J. Fletcher, a Farm Safety
Specialist, also emphasized the dangers associated with careless electrical use, stated that
[e]lectricity has become one of our most essential services to our farms and ranches, but
few things we use from day to day in our homes and in agricultural work have greater
potential to do us harm than electricity.” He also indicated that approximately 100
farmstead electrocutions occurred annually and electrical mishaps were the principal
cause of farm fires.159
157 Myrtle Fahsbender, “Light: For Greater Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1944,
7; Earl L. Arnold, “Lighting for Safety,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1952, 6.
158 Evidence exists supporting the contention that electric lights were safer than earlier sources of light; for
example, Burton Williams, a farm safety advocate, stated, “Electric lights reduce the farm fire hazards
because they replace hazardous lamps and candles.” The preceding quote can be found in Williams, “Going
to Blazes,” 9.
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In addition, the rural setting also shaped electrical dangers. Because farms
represented both a residence and a workplace, the rural electrical users utilized the
technology more diversely and often in greater amounts. Farm families not only lighted
their homes but many other buildings including barns, livestock sheds, as well as storage
facilities. In 1956, William Peterson, a South Dakota Extension electrification specialist,
recognized the farmer’s ever-growing electrical dependence. He stated that “[e]very
winter, traditionally in December, the Great Plains farmer hooks on a record electrical
load to his farm wiring system. This extra load increases from 10 to 20 percent each
year.” Peterson’s observation confirms electricity’s many uses for lighting, heating,
pumping water, and a host of other purposes.160
Observers also believed that increasing electrical use could strain outdated wiring
systems. Judy Styles stated that, “our real trouble is not with short circuits but with
overloaded circuits. The basic problem is this: We have quadrupled our home
consumption of electricity in the last 25 years, largely on wiring designed to handle
1933’s load.” She continued, “A generation ago, there were only about 15 types of
electrical appliances in use. Now there are more than 50.”161 In 1956, William H.
Peterson recognized this problem and recommended that farmers update their electrical
systems just as they replaced worn-out and obsolete agricultural equipment. Another
Farm Safety Review author commented that, “older installations often are not up to
159 Transactions: National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 22; William
Fletcher, Rural Accident Bulletin: Electrical Safety on the Farm and Ranch (Chicago: National Safety
Council, 1975), 1.
160 William Peterson, “Farmstead Wiring: A Production Tool,” Farm Safety Review, January 1956, 1;
William H. Knight and Owen K. Brown, “Wire Your Farm for Tomorrow’s Load,” Farm Safety Review,
July/August 1949, 13.
161 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962) 22-23;
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present power demands. Wires get hot circuits and are over loaded. Age and weathering
increase the possibility of failure.”162 In 1975, William J. Fletcher also stressed the
problem of outmoded electrical systems revealing that the problem continued well into
the 1970s. Farmers faced dangers not only from overloaded systems, but from the
expanding repertoire of devices that utilized the new power source including heat lamps,
electrical fences, and even the electric lines which delivered power to their farmsteads.163
Both the heat lamp and electrical fence could be dangerous if used or installed
improperly. The heat lamp, unlike traditional incandescent lights, provided the benefit of
“radiant heat rays” which could keep brooding chickens warm, prevent drinking water
from freezing, and dry newly birthed livestock. However, careless use could result in
destructive fires that could kill livestock and destroy buildings. In 1954, a Farm Safety
Review writer stressed such proper installation practices as using moisture resistant cords,
securely suspending the lights, and placing the lights at a proper distance from the animal
bedding. An improperly installed electric fence was also hazardous for adults, children,
and even livestock. C.L. Hamilton cautioned farmers against using “home-made
installations, direct hook-ups, make-shift current regulators, or unsafe commercial
products when installing electric fences.” He also warned that electric fences could
present dangers if the fence was placed “near stock tanks, ponds, irrigation ditches or
damp ground.” He provided a particularly heart-breaking example illustrating both points
stating that, “[i]n the fall of 1944, the merriment of three little boys sailing sticks and
splashing water from a farm stock tank in Northern Illinois was suddenly stopped when
162 Peterson, “Farmstead Wiring: A Production Tool,” 1; Jack Burke, “Farmstead Fix-up,” Farm Safety
Review, May/June 1968, 5.
163 Fletcher, Electrical Safety on the Farm and Ranch, 2.
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one of them was electrocuted by an unsafe electric fence which ran by the tank.” He
added that, “this fence was connected directly to a 115 volt lighting circuit with nothing
but an ordinary fuse to limit the current.” Electric fences were also involved in livestock
deaths as supported by the experience of employees at a single corn-belt rendering plant
which annually collected over 40 farm animals killed from fatal electric fence
encounters.164
The increasing scale of farming, expanded electrical use, and the introduction of
new communication equipment combined to produce a rather unexpected hazard. In
1977, the members of the North Dakota extension staff authored a pamphlet entitled
“Look Up” which revealed the problem’s dimensions. They stressed that the growing size
of farm buildings, the increased height of equipment, combined with more elaborate and
powerful electrical systems increased farmers’ odds of accidentally contacting electrical
cables. Although safety leaders had been warning farmers for decades, the problem
appears to have become more acute by the 1970s. The growing dimensions of auger-
elevators, disking equipment with fold up wings, haymaking machines, and other
agricultural implements could all potentially contact overhead electrical wires. The
increasing size of farm buildings, the growing use of antennas for CB radios, and
television along with the presence of over-head wires introduced additional hazardous
elements. In addition, Ohio safety leaders had long identified the dangers of overhead
power lines cautioning farmers to reduce the elevator’s height prior to moving and
looking for obstructions prior to raising your elevator.165
164 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1952), 20-21; “Heat Lamp
Safety,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1954, 20; C.L. Hamilton, “Electric Fence Problems,” Farm
Safety Review, November/ December 1953, 6; C.L. Hamilton, “Is Your Electric Fence Safe?,” Farm Safety
Review, March/April 1945, 7.
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The circumstances by which farm dwellers could contact overhead wires were
numerous. Even if equipment normally made clearance, a rut might cause the machinery
to bounce and then contact a wire. Although tractor cabs protected farmers from
rollovers, they also might isolate a driver from the outside environment making the
operator unaware of overhead hazards. The North Dakota Extension writers warned
individuals against standing on haystacks since people easily contacted overhead
electrical wires. The addition of CB and radio antennas increased the likelihood of
becoming entangled in an electrical cable. If a farmer did become caught in a wire they
were advised that “if you must leave the equipment, jump. If you step down and touch the
ground while touching the equipment you may be burned or killed, so jump clear! Shut
off the power if you can or call the power supplier.” They also cautioned against building
grain bins and placing hay or stationary antennas under wires since all could pose dangers
from falling electrical cords. An individual who carelessly used a ladder could also
contact a wire and cause an electrocution. Safety advocates stressed that even children
should be taught how to shut off electrical power in case their parent became involved in
an accident. They ought to also be instructed of the dangers of flying kites and model
airplanes into overhead wires.166
Farmers not only faced safety challenges from various electrical devices but also
used electricity in conditions that differed greatly from urban settings. In 1975, William J.
Fletcher remarked that, “corrosion from manure in livestock pens will make quick work
165 Harvey Hirning, Robert Woell and David Swenson, Electric Farm Power: Look Up! (Fargo, North
Dakota: prepared cooperatively by the North Dakota State Agricultural Engineering Department,
Cooperative Extension Service and the North Dakota Power Use Council, 1977), 1; for a discussion of the
problem in a much earlier era, see, C.L. Hamilton, “Shocking Conditions,” Farm Safety Review
November/December 1949, 8-9. W.E. Stuckey and B.J. Stamp, Bulletin: 367: Live Longer with Portable
Elevators (Columbus, Ohio State University: Agricultural Extension Service, 1957), 3.
166 Ohio State Extension Service, Electric Farm Power: Look Up, 2-3.
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of thin wall galvanized conduit. In such areas coating the conduit or otherwise protecting
it from manure is a must. Plastic conduit might be used if not subjected to extra physical
abuse.” He also stressed that a spark originating from a switch or broken light bulb might
be benign in most settings, but could prove disastrous on the farm. He advised that safety
devices such as “explosion proof switches” and “fixture guards” should be installed since
farm buildings contained fuel, hay, and livestock feed, all of which were highly
flammable. Fletcher contended that such devices kept sparks from reaching combustible
materials and prevented fires.167
Electricity also posed dangers when users lacked the knowledge of its basic
properties. In 1949, a Farm Safety Review contributor emphasized just how little power
was required to cause a fatal accident. The author stated that, “few people realize how
small an electric current is needed to cause death. The ordinary 115-volt lighting circuit
can be as deadly as 40,000 volts. It is current amperage that kills, not voltage.”168 C.L.
Hamilton, an agricultural engineer, expressed alarm at the public’s ignorance of the
power source since its dissemination necessitated the need for people to know the basics
of electrical safety. He provided examples illustrating hasty behaviors rooted in electrical
carelessness, including improperly installing electrical motors, placing appliances near
water, and hitting highline wires with farm equipment.169
Farmers’ electrical dependence also required that they perform regular electrical
maintenance by repairing worn and frayed cords, as well as other broken components to
prevent fires. Safety advocates alerted farmers to a lengthy list of repair that needed to be
167 Fletcher, Rural Accident Bulletin: Electrical Safety on the Farm and Ranch, 2-3.
168 “It’s the Current that Kills: Electricity can be deadly-when safety is neglected,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1949, 10.
169 Hamilton, “Shocking Conditions,” 8-9.
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performed regularly. In 1968, Jack Burke indicated that such upkeep included problems
such as “worn-out or malfunctioning equipment, electrical materials that have
deteriorated from years of service or unusual stresses (flexing, weathering etc), short
circuited wires or equipment, loose electrical connections, no grounds or poor grounds,
overloaded motors, equipment, poor placement of equipment that creates fire, shock, or
tripping hazards.”170 In 1968, Jack Burke indicated that electrical components sometimes
needed to be replaced since time and continued use increased the chances of a
malfunction. Such comments reveal that the problem of farmers neglecting such
responsibilities appears to have persisted throughout the era. 171
As early as the late 1940s, observers were realizing that the sophisticated nature
of electric wiring might exceed the farmer’s skill level; this concern became heightened
as rural electrification expanded. Farmers were also required to upkeep electrical systems
that were larger in scale and more complicated than those in residential areas. H.H.
Beaty, an Iowa State College agricultural engineer, encouraged farmers to utilize
professionals, stating that, “wiring installed by trained electricians helps prevent fires.”
He also recommended using products that conformed to industry standards, while
warning against the use of “homemade or unimproved transformers on electrified
fences.”172 Almost a quarter century later, William J. Fletcher, revealed that some farmers
were still maintaining their own electrical systems. He cautioned farmers against
allowing novices to perform maintenance and instead advised that qualified individuals
170 “Trained Electrician Should Do All Wiring,” Better Iowa, 23 July 1945, 2; Farm Safety Review,
May/June 1968, 5.
171 Burke, “Farmstead Fix-up,” 5.
172 “Electricity Can Be Fire Hazard,” Better Iowa, 24 July 1944, 2; “Trained Electrician,” Better Iowa, 23
July 1945, 2.
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be consulted. Regardless of income level, farmers hesitated to take such advice since
most valued saving money.173
Farm dwellers were also willing to expose themselves unnecessarily to electrical
dangers. In 1952, G.E. Henderson of the Southern Association of Agricultural and
Vocational Engineering stated that, “most farmers have been quick to see that electricity
saves labor and cuts production costs. It is much harder for them to realize that proper
wiring also cuts costs and saves lives.” He went on to indicate that farmers often did not
possess sufficient knowledge and were overzealous in their attempts to save money at the
expense of safety. He also related a story regarding one Mississippi farmer who installed
a pump by using a damaged lamp cord to attach a socket. The author indicated that the
Mississippi man expressed great satisfaction when the pump functioned without him
having to consult professional advice. Unfortunately the farmer’s solution presented
serious safety hazards for both himself and family members.174
Rural Americans, like the greater population, were also vulnerable to automobile
collisions; however, just as in the case of electricity, the rural automobile accident
problem contained its own unique features. By the end of the 1960s, automobile
accidents were a leading cause of fatalities, resulting in over 50,000 annual deaths
nationally and representing one of the twentieth century’s most serious accident
problems. This is not surprising, since farm families, like their urban counterparts, had
enthusiastically purchased autos. Historian Hal S. Barron has commented upon how rural
Americans’ initial dislike of the automobile had turned into widespread enthusiasm early
173 Fletcher, Rural Accident Bulletin: Electrical Safety on the Farm and Ranch, 2; see, Richard Rhodes,
Farm: A Year in the Life of an American Farmer, (New York: Simon and Schuster), 1-336. Rhodes’
investigation of farmers in northern Missouri in the late 1980s provides many examples in which farmers
adopted an economical approach to their agricultural operations.
174 G.E. Henderson, “Explaining Electrical Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1952, 4-5.
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in the century. He stated that antagonism vanished, “After the development of the Model
T in 1908, rural inhabitants embraced the new technology in record numbers. The
number of automobiles on U.S farms shot up from 85,000 in 1911 to 2,146,512 in 1920.
In 1930, 58 percent of American farms had at least one car.” Following the Second
World War, both urban and rural Americans continued to fervently acquire cars. This
trend is evidenced by the fact that vehicle registrations had doubled just ten years after
the conflict’s conclusion.175
Despite such enthusiastic car purchases, by the mid 1950s, the rural auto accident
problem was growing in severity. Vehicle-related deaths represented approximately one-
half of all non-urban accident fatalities. In 1956, Ray Ashworth, director of Northwestern
University’s Traffic Institute, stated that while urban fatality rates were decreasing, rural
accidents were increasing. Auto accident statistics appear to confirm his dismal appraisal.
In 1962, a Farm Safety Review piece indicated that, “three out of four traffic deaths occur
on rural roads and highways.”176 Ashworth believed that traffic problems were persisting
in urban centers, but rural areas were being neglected. He stated that, “the rural accident
and congestion problem is fast growing out of reach of current attempts to check it.
Present trends point to an even more acute problem in the future, as vehicle registration
and mileage rates keep rising.”177
175 Jack Burke, “DDC: A New Way To Drive,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1969, 4; Hal S. Barron,
Mixed Harvest: The Second Great Transformation in the Rural North, 1870-1930 (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 195. Transactions- National Safety Congress (Chicago: National
Safety Council, 1956), 10.
176 Ibid., 11; “Your Programming Aids in Rural Highway Safety: Emphasis Guide-1962,” Farm Safety
Review, January 1962, 5. For more complete information regarding the disproportionately large number of
rural auto accidents, see, Jim Messerschmitt, “Our Rural Road Challenge,” Farm Safety Review, March
1963, 2, and “Safety’s Silent Guides” Farm Safety Review, July 1962, 2.
177 Transactions- National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1956), 10-11. Ashworth’s
appraisal of the rural car accident problem would prove prophetic. In 1996, after analyzing car accident
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Although all drivers faced such dangers as poor weather conditions, intoxicated
travelers, as well as their own careless driving habits, rural drivers faced distinct
challenges. These included more excessive driving speeds and trains that also tended to
travel across railroad crossings at higher speeds in the country. In 1970, Jack Burke
speculated that problems associated with alcohol consumption might also be different.
He stated that, “[f]arm people who visit taverns, dance halls, and other establishments
usually must drive to and from these places because of the distances and the lack of
public transportation.” He also stressed that farmers worked without supervision, making
it easier to drink while working.178 Although winter driving posed special hazards for
everyone, country roads often deteriorated more rapidly in poor weather conditions and
were cleared from snow and ice less often the town roads.179
Other features of the automobile problem including extra risks associated with
railroad crossings and the antiquated condition of many farmstead entrances. Although
specialists in the early 1960s believed that police officers should be responsible for no
more than 50 miles, daily research indicated that 120 miles were standard. In 1966, while
data from 1975 to 1993, Joseph M. Tessmer summarized, “There are approximately 40 percent more
crashes, vehicles involved, and deaths in rural areas than in urban areas.” For further discussion of
Tessmer’s findings, see, U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Rural and Urban Crashes: A Comparative Analysis, by Joseph Tessmer, (Washington,
D.C., 1996), ES-1.
178 Harry Porter and Harold Heldreth, “Safe Farm Driveways,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1951, 14.
Jack Burke, “Wreck on the Highway,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1970, 7; for additional
comments regarding the distinctiveness of the rural accident problem, see Jack Burke, “More and Better
Traffic Safety Now,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1966, 14. He mentions other distinctions, such as
rural roads are much more challenging to drive than urban streets or major highways.
179 “Safe Winter Driving,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1946, 4-5; “Rural Driving Hazards,”
Hoard’s Dairyman, 10 December 1943, 691. Evidence suggests that extreme speed contributed to rural
accidents more than those in cities. A Farm Safety Review writer stated, “Speed violations were a factor in
38 percent of the fatal accidents. City accidents summary showed only 21 percent of the drivers in fatal
accidents violating speed laws compared with rural summaries which showed 38 percent; see, “Rural
Traffic Facts,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1958, 10.
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speaking at the National Conference for Rural Health in Colorado, Julian A. Waller, MD,
an official for California Bureau of Occupational Health, stated that “that there were four
times as many deaths for every hundred people injured in rural traffic accidents as in
urban accidents.” He stressed that the meager level of emergency response resources in
rural areas explained the higher fatality levels. The increased time it took family or
friends to begin their search for victims, as well as the greater distance to emergency
facilities, contributed to higher death rates. He supported his point by stating that “rural
accident victims may be dying of less complicated injuries than those in the city, where
first aid is more often readily available.”180
Railroad crossings might also have presented distinct safety considerations in the
countryside. Railroad warning signs in rural areas were sometimes not posted or they
could be blocked by dense vegetation. However, Jim Trimble, who served as the NSC
Secretary for the Committee on Motor Vehicle Traffic Safety at Railroad Grade
Crossings, downplayed the view that rural Americans were more susceptible to rail-road
crossing accidents. He supported this view by stressing that many rural train-crossing
accidents also involved urban dwellers; it is also reasonable to assume that the larger
number of crossings in rural areas also produced higher numbers. Thus, although such
accidents were twice as likely to occur in the countryside, both urban and rural residents
were vulnerable.181
180 Transactions- National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1956), 12; “Enforcement
for Safety,” Farm Safety Review, January 1962, 10; “Research Probes Frequency, Severity of Rural Motor
Vehicle Accidents,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1966, 9-11; the Tessmer study substantiates Waller’s
view regarding the problem of belated medical treatment. Although the research covers a later period, it
still strengthens Waller’s point. For a more complete discussion, see, U.S. Department of Transportation
1996, ES-1.
181 Jack Trimble, “Anytime is Train Time,” Farm Safety Review, March 1963, 5.
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Observers also stressed that rural driveways and gated entrances were sometimes
either obscured by vegetation or not suited for automobile traffic. In 1944, Harry Porter,
Jr., a NSC traffic engineer, stressed that rural driveway were particularly unsafe because
all types of foliage could obscure a driver’s vision. Antiquated design features also could
compound the problem. In 1962, a Farm Safety Review writer stated that, “Many farm
driveways, laid out in the more leisurely horse and buggy day’s era” presented significant
dangers.182 Ray Fuson, a Farm Bureau official, also stressed that many farm gates were
constructed for horse-drawn implements and were poorly suited for tractors. He estimated
that “probably 60 to 70 percent of all mechanized equipment had to pull across the center
of the road to make turns into or out of obsolete gateways.”183
The fact that farmers also drove slow-moving tractors with a variety of
implements attached also posed special hazards. In 1958, officials for the United States
Bureau of Roads believed that farmers might have possessed has as much as “37,000,000
pieces of insufficiently lighted farm equipment.”184 The lack of proper visibility devices
presented hazards both for the farmer and oncoming motorists. In 1961, a Farm Safety
Review writer stressed that farmers needed to take extra precautions including the use of
flags, night lighting, or proper safety procedures, such as staying on the shoulder of the
road in order to avoid accidents. In 1969, Norval Wardle, an Iowa farm safety expert,
provided a more complete picture of the tractor accident problem. His study confirmed
that the vast majority of highway tractor accidents involved automobile collisions. He
182 Harry Porter, “Planning a Safe Farm Driveway Entrance,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1944, 5; for
further discussion of the problem of vegetation which lessened visibility, see “Safety’s Silent Guides,”
Farm Safety Review, July 1962, 6. Ibid., 7.
183 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1963), 25.
184 “Rural Traffic Facts,” 10.
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stressed that farmers were often unaware of approaching cars since tractors usually
lacked rear-view mirrors. Operators were also vulnerable since many tractors had not yet
been fitted with protective rollover structures.185
The preceding discussion reveals that farm families existed in a complex and, in
many ways, distinctive work and living environment. Although such age-old hazards as
livestock handling and the potential for fires have always presented dangers, new
technologies such as electricity and automobiles were deeply altering both the lifestyles
and possible risks associated with farm living. The farm’s dual functionality as both a
home and a workplace was particularly significant in exposing people of diverse age and
skill levels to an entire host of potentially dangerous situations with agricultural
machinery and livestock. The farm’s relative isolation in comparison to urban residences
and worksites also hampered the speed with which agricultural worker or rural accident
victim could receive treatment. Such aspects of the farm safety problem both deeply
shaped the farm safety educational movement, as well as contributed to the problem’s
persistence. Although the aforementioned dangers represented a significant challenge for
farm safety advocates, the dramatic mid-twentieth century revolution in farm machinery
also deeply altered the nature of farm hazards.
185 “The Man Behind the Wheel,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1961, 7; Norval J. Wardle, “Half Blind
or Full Vision,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1969, 12-13. The Wardle piece also indicated that other
factors contributed to the occurrence and severity of highway tractor accidents including the tractor
engine’s considerable noise, poorly designed rural roads, and lack of reflective or lighting equipment.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Safety and Mechanization: New Machines, New Buildings, and New Hazards
During the mid-twentieth century, farmers adopted a dizzying variety of
technological improvements that transformed their work. This mechanical revolution
arrived in the form of more powerful tractors, more efficient planting implements, as well
as more effective harvesting equipment. In 1964, D.E. Lindstrom, a rural sociologist, said
that mechanization had increased farmers’ comfort, added to their prosperity, and
liberated them from many burdensome tasks. Jack Burke, editor of the Farm Safety
Review believed technology held the potential to free farmers from barriers, such as
worn-out soil, insect pests, and even poor weather conditions. He stated that “a modern
farmer seldom experiences production failures because he can plan for success. He has
tools—chemicals, horsepower, and productive crop varieties—to triumph over scarcity.
He has access to information and technical knowledge, and he can now stretch his
management skills even further by use of the computer. Very little is left to luck or
fate.”186 Although Burke and Lindstrom’s wholehearted endorsements of new agricultural
technologies do not universally reflect the views of everyone in the agricultural
community; farmers’ rapid acquisition of new technologies in the era suggest their
recognition of their potential to save them both time and labor costs.187
Despite such benefits, changes had greatly transformed the farmer’s work
environment into an unfamiliar place. Farmers of an earlier era depended mostly on
186 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1964), 22; Jack Burke, “Go
Modern-Think Safety!,” Farm Safety Review, March/April, 1968, 1.
187 For an impressively researched and exhaustive discussion regarding farmers’ acquisition of agricultural
technology in the Midwest, see, Joseph Leslie Anderson, “Industrializing the Corn Belt: Iowa Farmers,
Technology and the Midwestern Landscape, 1945-1972,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State
University, 2005), 1-352.
91
animal power for their work, grain for their fuel, and manure for fertilizer; however, such
farming methods changed dramatically by the mid-twentieth century. In 1953, L.E.
Shingledecker, a Farm Bureau official, commented on the transformation stating that “the
farm used to be known as a dwelling classification. This consisted of a house, a barn, and
a chicken house. Today if you visit a modern farm you would have to classify it as a
small industry. Because of need you find 500 gallons of gasoline stored on the property,
heating units using propane and butane gas, welding installations, machine shops,
machine storage building, large electrical motors, and large electrical installations.”
Shingledecker’s comments illustrate the fact that the farmer-occupied work setting had
been altered considerably since the turn of the century. Although the farmer who
purchased these new technologies enjoyed a reduction in drudgery, using such equipment
unwisely could result in devastating consequences.188
The tractor’s introduction illustrates how mechanical innovations, while
possessing benefits, also entailed health risks. The tractor’s greater horsepower allowed it
to pull larger implements, tire improvements enhanced efficiency, and the power take-off
provided the flexibility to run a wide array of implements. Between 1940 and 1950, the
number of tractors on farms rose from 1.6 million to 3.4 million, signaling the decline of
the horse and mule as a power source. In 1919, American farms boasted 26 million
horses and mules. This number fell to 4 million approximately twenty years later.189 The
rapid dissemination of tractors into the countryside also freed land, which previously had
been used to raise forage crops for horses. All of these factors contributed to rising levels
188 Transactions- National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 8.
189 Don Paarlberg and Phillip Paarlberg, The Agricultural Revolution of the Twentieth Century (Ames:
Iowa State University Press, 2000), 24.
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of productivity in the mid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, tractor accidents proved to be
one of the leading causes of deaths and injuries on the farmstead.190 Rural people died or
were seriously injured in tractor roll-overs, highway collisions, and power take-off
accidents. In 1962, FFA delegates from Ellsworth, Kansas speaking at the National
Safety Council Congress alerted attendees to the magnitude of the problem in their state.
They indicated that “[d]uring 1961 there were 27 persons who were careless in Kansas,
and were killed. Tractors caused over half of the 47 farm fatalities in our state last
year.”191
Unfortunately, the tractors were just one of the many types of farm machinery
which warranted a healthy respect from their operators. An Extension Service Author
conducted an Iowa Cooperative Extension Service study from 1947 to 1971 which helps
place new technologies and farm injuries into a broader perspective. The Iowa extension
writer concluded that “the rapid rise in the use of machinery on farms has increased the
exposure of farm persons to hazards of machine operation. The problem of exposure is
compounded because the total farm population was decreasing while the number of
machines per farm has been increasing. The result is that fewer persons were operating
more machinery.” The author revealed the machinery farm fatality toll stating that “a
total of 1,773 Iowans have died as a result of accidents with tractors and farm-related
machinery.” The researcher also indicated that “over two-thirds of the total accidents
have taken place on the farm, with an additional 25 percent occurring on highways and
roads”192
190 Willard W. Cochrane, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 108-109.
191 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council 1962), 27.
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Safety advocates also believed that many farmers lacked the proper safety
awareness to accompany this increasingly mechanized environment. Jack Burke indicated
that “many farmers are still ‘old timers’ when it comes to safety. They trust in luck or
don’t plan ahead to stop accidents that could wipe them out. They’ll lie awake nights
thinking of how to wring that last bushel out of the ground, but they’re too rushed or
impatient or preoccupied to try a safer way of working or to outwit a simple hazard that
might kill, injure, or destroy all they had hoped for.”193 Joe Slaymaker, an Illinois farmer,
also revealed that many farmers were much more preoccupied with getting the job done
than working carefully. Instead, he stated that many farmers are “thinking about
something else. Get that job done-its going to rain-hurry- pressure- pressure- pressure.”194
Such attitudes could result in death or severe injury since a machine could be unforgiving
if a farmer did not observe prudent safety practices.
Farmers were also exposed to risks for long periods of time, resulting in fatigue.
In 1946, a Farm Safety Review writer recognized this tendency highlighting farmers’
propensity to decrease their alertness since “on the farm that is especially bad, for the
farmer lives on his place of work, so is exposed hazards of his occupation for longer
periods than most workers—even in normal times for 12 hours a day and 7 days a
week.”195 Robert Westpfahl, an Illinois farmer, commented that some farmers were
192 Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Fatal Accidents of Iowa Farm People, 1947-
1971 (Ames: Cooperative Extension Service, 1971), 8-9.
193 Burke, “Go Modern-Think Safety!,” 1.
194 Joe Slaymaker, “One Farmer’s View of Safety” (speech given at the National Institute of Farm Safety
meeting in Rock Island, Illinois on June 17, 1981), Norval Wardle Collection, Iowa State University
Archives, Iowa State University, Ames.
195 Arthur W. Turner, “Let’s be Sensible about Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November/December
1946, 9.
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willing to work incredibly long hours during the harvest. He stated that, “[s]ome farmers
just run these machines into the ground and there is no machine safer than the man
running it. If a man has been running the machine for 16 or 18 hours a day for seven days
a week, he is getting dangerous.” Westpfahl’s comments reveal that farmers experienced
operator fatigue to a degree that was probably unusual in other professions.196
Thus, safety advocates recognized that farmers’ adoption of new machines
required a greater commitment to safety. In 1942, Bob Clark, a Successful Farming
contributor from Illinois, stated that “[w]ith knowledge and common sense directing
them, the tank and the airplane can win battles, and the tractor, the combine, and the
dozens of other farm machines can win the battle for food. But the tractor can kill, too”.
He then identified some common pieces of machinery that were involved in accidents
including the tractor, corn pickers, and elevators.197 The following year, Wellington
Brink, a member of the USDA’s Committee on Agricultural Safety, stressed that the
farmer’s increasingly mechanized environment should be accompanied by a greater
attention to safety. He stressed that “tractors, specialized plows, new implements and
tools, a varied assortment of gadgets and instruments” all combined to create the need for
heightened safety awareness.198
Safety advocates and some farmers believed that there were a variety of
challenges that needed to be surmounted in order for farmers to use new agricultural
196 Robert Westpfahl, “Another Farmer’s View of Safety,” (speech given at the National Institute of Farm
Safety meeting in Rock Island, Illinois on June 17, 1981), Norval Wardle Collection, Iowa State University
Archives, Iowa State University, Ames.
197 Bob Clark, “Are You a Shut-Eye Farmer?,” December 1942, 23, 31.
198 United States Department of Agriculture, The Committee on Agricultural Safety, 1942. Watch Your
Step: Farm Safety for National Defense, by Wellington Brink, 5. Washington: United States Government
Printing Office.
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machines in a safer manner. Such obstacles included the rapid rate of mechanization, the
great number and types of machines, and the lack of formal training opportunities. Bruce
L. Gardner, a prominent agricultural economist employed at the University of Maryland,
revealed the rapidity of farm mechanization stating, “In the forty-five year period from
1915 to 1960 the transition from animal to mechanical power was completed.” Farm
families who lived during this period of change were required to quickly adapt to new
types of mechanical innovations. The diversity of such equipment was also impressive
including new types of tractors, harvesting equipment, hay baling equipment and a host
of other machines that transformed almost every conceivable aspect of farm work.199
Some farmers who lived through this transitional era found it challenging,
especially those who previously had used horses. In 1981, Robert Westpfahl, an Illinois
farmer, reflected on the difficult transition his family had experienced going from horse-
powered machinery to tractor-powered implements. He stated that farmers of an earlier
era, “ had been walking behind horses for 40 years and all of a sudden they give him this
machine, and he knew that before all he had to was tell the horse to stop and the machine
stopped whatever he was working. Well, after he got the tractor, he would stop the
tractor, but sometimes the machine wouldn’t stop. Well, that is just plain suicide because
those guys have never been around a machine and mechanical things.”200
Some safety writers believed that the rate of mechanical innovations out-paced
farmers’ capacity to adapt to new machines. Other observers also commented on the
rapid rate of change. In 1953, Robert Howey, a vocational agriculture instructor at
199 Gardner, American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century, 13. For a brief but useful summary of major
mechanical innovations that were instrumental in farming, see, Gardner, American Agriculture in the
Twentieth Century, 9.
200 Westpfahl, “Another Farmer’s View of Safety,” Ames, 1.
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Sycamore High School, indicated that agriculture’s rapid mechanization demanded that
farmers be trained to run their machinery efficiently and safely. He stressed that farmers
had enthusiastically embraced new technologies, but they had been less excited about
adopting proper safety practices. He stated, “They are working with machines which are
new to them as well as their sons. They do not have the knowledge to teach their sons
rules of safety that apply to this machine age.”201
The problems associated with switching from tractors to horses provide a useful
example of the demands such rapid change had engendered. In 1952, a Wallace’s Farmer
author stated that “[s]ome farmers drive tractors the same way they drove horses. The
horses did the part of the thinking for the driver. Tractors don’t think for you. It doesn’t
make any difference to a tractor whether it plows up the corn or the weeds. Tractors
depend on you to make the right decisions. You can tell a tractor ‘whoa,’ but it won’t
stop unless you take it out of gear and put on the brakes.”202 Robert Westpfahl reflected
upon his grandfather’s experience one day when he was pulling a harrow behind a
tractor. He stated, “One time when he was out harrowing with a tractor, the harrow came
unhooked from the tractor and he didn’t know it came unhooked until he drove it
completely around the field and ran over it the next time. And that is the truth. He was to
me one of the smartest and most intelligent men that I have ever met. I mean I really
respected him. But he never grew up with anything that was behind him or running
around him. He had always been around a horse.”203
201 Transactions: National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 32.
202 “Gear Your Farm for Safe Living,” Wallace’s Farmer and Homestead, July 19, 1952, 10.
203 Westpfahl, “Another Farmer’s View of Safety,” Ames, 1.
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The sheer diversity of farm equipment also posed challenges since in-depth
knowledge was often required for proper operation and maintenance. Farmers were often
not experts regarding any individual piece of equipment. Instead, they were generalists
who operated and maintained many different kinds of machinery. Farmers had to master
many mechanical devices in order to complete their daily chores. Some writers
emphasized that farmers existed in more mechanically diverse environment than many
other occupations. Instead of the repetitive and limited number of skills required of
factory workers, farmers and their families were called upon to learn to use a variety of
kinds of equipment. This meant that they often never developed the level of proficiency
for their larger number of machines that a factory worker acquired from laboring with a
fewer number of devices.204
Agricultural writers also commented on the lack of training opportunities and how
this amplified safety risks. In 1942, Frank Zink, the Director of the Farm Equipment
Institute’s Research Department, pondered, “Who trains the operator of a machine? Who
trains the new or young operator of a farm machine? The probable answers to these two
questions are—the older persons, either fathers or farm hands, neither class of which may
have had any safety training. In some cases, dealers instruct new operators in safety
precautions; however, during the life of a farm machine, it may have had many operators
and the dealer has only been able to instruct the first one of them.”205 In 1968, NSC Staff
204 “Practice Safety with Machinery,” Hoard’s Dairyman, August 10 1943, 466; “Farm Accidents are
Made,” Hoard’s Dairyman, July 20 1943, 412.
205 Frank J. Zink, “Farm Equipment can be Operated Safely,” (paper presented at the Nebraska Conference
on Home and Farm Safety, Lincoln, Nebraska, 2 October 1942), 5. Zink also revealed the war had only
exacerbated the problem, indicating that millions of inexperienced laborers were entering the agricultural
workforce with insufficient training, particularly large numbers of women and children who were replacing
many males serving in the armed services. For a detailed discussion, see, Zink, “Farm Equipment Can Be
Operated Safely,” 6.
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Member Jack Burke in an article entitled “The Lonesome Plowman,” writes that unlike
many other workers farmers were exclusively responsible for their safety. He stressed
that airline pilots, cab drivers, and a host of others individuals were forced to take formal
training prior to flying a plane or driving a car or truck. However, most farmers enjoyed
very little training before using their equipment. He indicated that most farmers had very
little tractor training except for that given by older family members, implement dealers,
or another farmer. Burke stated, “What help does he have? He needs neither license nor
physical exam. He may be almost any age, from a green fledging eight year old straining
to reach controls to a doddering, half blind octogenarian with reaction time approaching
that of a drowsy mule.”206
Farmers also were burdened with significant maintenance responsibilities, which
if neglected, could also influence the chance of an accident. This aspect of farm life
appeared to be accelerating as agricultural equipment became more sophisticated.
Maynard Coe, director of the National Safety Council’s Farm Division, also recognized
this issues stating that their “mechanic” role alone might involve welding, electrical
wiring, and even proper lightning rod installation. He also stated that “[t]oday’s
successful farmer must also be mechanic, accountant, chemist, scientist, and
veterinarian.”207 In September of 1970, Charlie Nettles’ article, entitled “Farmers Tell
Machinery Gripes” appeared in the Des Moines Register. Nettles’ piece revealed farmers’
frustrations with machinery, particularly when it malfunctioned during planting and
harvesting. The item also revealed that farmers frequently made equipment
“modifications,” such as adding gas tanks and balancing weights to combines. Such
206 Jack Burke, “The Lonesome Plowman,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1968, 14.
207 Maynard Coe, “Why Farm Safety Week?,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1946, 14.
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alterations reveal the independence farmers exerted in their workplace and how much
their safety depended upon their own mechanical proficiency.208
A farmer’s maintenance role was particularly crucial in regards to proper
machinery upkeep. Farmers were advised to read operation instructions since installing
the wrong parts for a machine could be dangerous. In 1943, a writer for Hoard’s
Dairyman also cautioned farmers about being too zealous in their improvisation, stressing
that only approved parts should be used for equipment and that hasty ‘bailing wire
repairs’ could result in dangerous mishaps. In 1952, Charles Scranton warned farmers
against operating their corn pickers without thoroughly consulting their equipment
manuals since the booklet contained a wealth of information essential for proper
operation.209
Such activities were not only necessary in order to maintain the machinery’s
operational efficiency, but neglecting them could also affect one’s well being. Safety
advocates cautioned farmers to check their tractor brakes regularly since brake failure
could result in accidents. Even comparatively simple machines such as wagons required
regular maintenance since hauling equipment evolved into complicated machinery as the
decades progressed. This meant that farmers needed to check wagons to make sure they
could withstand heavy loads, guard moving parts with shielding, and perform regular
lubrication, all of which assisted in proper functioning as well as overall safety.210
208 Charlie Nettles, “Farmers Tell Machinery Gripes,” Des Moines Sunday Register, 27 September 1970,
sec. F, 2.
209 “Practice Safety with Machinery,” 466; Charles J. Scranton, “Safety and the Mechanical Corn Picker,”
Agricultural Engineering 33, no. 3 (1952): 140.
210 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 27; National Safety
Council, Farm Department, Rural Accident Bulletin: Wagon Safety (Chicago: National Safety Council,
1978), 3.
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A farmer’s maintenance role was also evident in regards to proper barn upkeep. In
1946, C.L. Hamilton, a National Safety Council agricultural engineer, indicated that
many of the nation’s barns were in desperate need of repair. He indicated that farmers
should always include safety in planning barn improvements since such buildings
represented a central location for farm work and neglecting safety only multiplied the
chances of accidents. He stressed that improper barn maintenance could result in
accidents such as falls, as well as injuries from falling objects and fires. Another Farm
Safety Review piece stressed a variety of poor practices including: “unprotected light
bulbs near hay, no safety hooks for lanterns and broken grounding for lightning rods,” all
which could result in barn fires.211
Farmers and those who worked to reduce the hazards associated with agricultural
machines had to learn about the dangers associated with many different types of
equipment used to perform a variety of farm tasks. The mid-twentieth century
industrialization of agriculture brought with it the possibility of death and serious injury
in a myriad of forms. A farmer could be trapped under a tractor as a result of a roll over, a
child could be caught in a power-take-off or fall and be crushed underneath a tractor’s
wheel. During the harvesting of grain, agricultural laborers needed to aware of a corn
picker’s swiftly moving parts. Processing square bales of hay was also hazardous because
the bales could ignite in haylofts. Large round bales of hay could easily tip over a tractor.
Farmers also adopted new material handling and storage devices for both moving and
storing grain. However, devices such as elevators and augers also possessed quickly
moving parts and could even collapse if improperly transported. Farmers who procured
211 C.L. Hamilton, “Make Barn Chores Easy,” January/February 1946,” 8-9; “How Many of These are in
Your House and in Your Barn?,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1952, 9.
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grain bins or incorporated new waste management systems needed to be aware of
dangerous gases that could damage lungs or cause asphyxiation.
Tractor operators needed to be aware of a variety of potentially dangerous
situations, such as excessive speeds, going up severe slopes, or pulling heavy loads
downhill, all of which could result in close calls, severe injury, or even death in
turnovers. Tractor capsizes were particularly dangerous prior to the widespread use of
roll-over protective structures which protected the driver. In April 1952, Paul Murphy, a
Marion County, Iowa farmer, experienced a frightful incident. His tractor overturned on a
hill while working his fields, but fortunately he was able to quickly leap off his tractor
and escape without injury. Murphy stated, “No doubt about it, I was lucky…I have
always tried to be careful with a tractor, but this accident really scared me.” He also
added that the accident clearly showed him how quickly a situation could deteriorate.212
In 1955, Jeff Bouma, a Michigan FFA youth, identified a particularly widespread
problem stressing the farmers’ practice of driving their tractors on highways resulted in
many accidents. An Iowa Farm Safety committee study confirmed Bouma’s findings.
The researchers discovered that despite the fact that tractors spent less than five percent
of their total operational time on roadways, approximately half of the accidents in a
single year occurred on the state’s highways. In 1955, Daniel Kitchen, an NSC
agricultural engineer, indicated that “one third of all fatal tractor accidents occur on
public roads.” He also stressed the importance of lights and reflective equipment as aids
in preventing such tragedies. He warned that farmers who neglected to stay on highway
shoulders, watch for other drivers, or reduce their speed were courting disaster.213
212 “Next Time…This Might be You!,” Wallace’s Farmer and Iowa Homestead, June 7, 1952, 8.
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The tractor’s power take-off represented another aspect of the tractor that
benefited farmers, but disaster could result from careless use. At the 1962 National Safety
Congress, an FFA delegate from Ellsworth, Kansas stressed the dangers associated with
the power take-off, acknowledging that it had greatly contributed to agricultural
efficiency but that it had become a leading agent in farm accidents. Farmers could
become entangled in a power take-off by accidentally falling on the whirling shaft,
hastily stepping over it, or wearing loose clothing that could be caught in it. All of these
unwise practices could result in a serious injury or even death. A farmer’s removal of the
PTO guard also multiplied hazards. In 1950, E.W. Tanquary, Chairman of the Farm
Equipment Institute’s Advisory Engineering Committee, stressed the importance of
farmers using such shields, stating that “[t]he best designed and most expensive shield
ever provided is worthless if left in the implement shed and the implement operated
without it, yet accidents are reported where ample shields were provided with the
implement and left off through carelessness.”214
A farmer could suffer severe burns or even death if he unwisely smoked while
refueling, started their tractors around a large gasoline spill, or carelessly opened a
radiator cap. Some situations revealed that farmers lacked basic knowledge regarding
basic tractor mechanics. For instance, something as simple as removing a radiator cap
could result in a terrible injury due to the high temperature and pressure of water which
could spew hot liquid over the operator and cause serious burns. In 1946, C.L. Hamilton
213 Jeff Bouma, “Safety on the American Farm,” Farm Safety Review, July 1955, 9; “Next Time This
Might Be You,” 8; Daniel A. Kitchen, “Avoid Tractor Upsets,” Farm Safety Review, August 1955, 7.
214 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 27; E.W. Tanquary,
“Safe Guarding Power Driven Farm Machinery,” a paper prepared for the members of the Farm Equipment
Institute’s Advisory Engineering Committee, Chicago, Illinois 1950, Norval Wardle Collection, Special
Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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revealed how one farmer had paid an extraordinarily high price for careless tractor
operation. Hamilton stated John Cummings, a thirty-four year-old farmer who had
unwisely continued driving a tractor with a leaky gas line, which exploded in flames and
burned him to death as he attempted to contain the fire. He stated the careless act had
“robbed a home of a father and the community of a model farm citizen. The farm is now
being abandoned.”215
The introduction of the era’s new harvesting technologies also illustrates farm
technology’s benefits and hazards. Midwestern corn-belt farmers witnessed rapid
harvesting improvements, first with the mechanical corn-picker and later with the
combine fitted corn-head. Farmers adopted both devices rapidly once these machines
became reliable and economically feasible. In the decade between 1941 and 1951, the
number of corn pickers farmers were using grew from approximately 120,000 to 502,000.
The majority of these machines could be found in Midwestern states such as Iowa,
Illinois, and Indiana. By 1951, Iowa farmers led the nation in their use of corn pickers
having procured 95,000 machines, followed by their Indiana and Illinois counterparts
who had purchased 48,000 and 80,000 machines respectively. The introduction of the
combine corn-head resulted in a similarly rapid adoption by farmers who sought greater
ease and efficiency in the corn-harvest.216
The corn picker relieved farmers of the physically demanding task of hand
harvesting. Charles Scranton, an agricultural engineer, celebrated their introduction
stating, “These pickers have ended the backbreaking and time consuming job of hand
215 “Steel-Cored Tractor Radiator,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1943, 10; C.L. Hamilton, “Accidents
Can Happen,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1946, 9.
216 Scranton, “Safety and the Mechanical Corn Picker,” 140.
104
harvesting, and the day of the horse and wagon in corn picking is pretty well on the way
out.” Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that, “with the growth in the number of
mechanical pickers has come an unwholesome record of farm accidents.”217 In 1952, C.L.
Hamilton concurred with Scranton’s assessment stating, “[e]ach year’s corn harvest
brings with it hundreds of horribly mangled fingers, hands, arms and legs—not to
mention deaths.”218 Lee Thompson, a Wallace’s Farmer contributor, highlighted the corn
picker accident problem, believing it to be one the most potentially hazardous pieces of
agricultural equipment. Such assessments were amplified by gruesome stories that
included disturbing accounts of farmers who were forced to cut through their own fingers
or arm in order to free themselves from a corn-picker.219
Researchers who studied the corn picker situation revealed the magnitude of
problem and identified factors which contributed to such accidents. In the1940s, the
Illinois Agricultural Association conducted a study, which revealed that in Illinois there
were approximately two hundred corn-picking accidents per year in the early to mid
1940s. Another Wallace’s Farmer piece authored by Ray Franklin revealed that Iowa
farmers had paid a gruesome price. In 1951, the grisly toll included “299 fingers, 32
thumbs and 32 hands.”220 In 1951, Norval Wardle, an Iowa State farm safety specialist,
made a systematic investigation of 418 corn picker accidents in his state. He believed that
the accidents could be attributed to factors including operator fatigue, employing careless
217 Ibid., 140.
218 C.L. Hamilton, “Adjust Corn Picker: For Safety and Efficiency,” Farm Safety Review,
September/October 1952, 8.
219 Lee Thompson, “Haste Costs Arms,” Wallace’s Farmer and Iowa Homestead, 6 October 1951, 5; C.L.
Hamilton, “Live to Pick another Year,” September/October 1948, 4.
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work practices, and not using safety shields. The parts involved in corn picker accidents
were listed in the following order according to their frequency: “Husker rolls, snapper
rolls, chains, elevators, and stalk ejectors.”221
Farmers were particularly vulnerable if they attempted to unclog a picker or
make repairs with the power on while in a rush to complete the harvest. In 1952, the wife
of a Wapello County farmer commented on this aspect of the problem stating that “I
think that the men just try to get in a hurry when they are tired.”222 An exhausted farmer
could get caught in the picker’s rollers or chains in a variety of ways. In 1955, Daniel
Kitchen stated, “Many accident victims have dismounted with the power take-off running
with no intention of approaching the picker. Then they saw an ear crossway in the
elevator, saw a stalk of corn laying across the picker points—or they stumbled or lost
balance. And another hand was added to the list. More victims, of course, were entrapped
while deliberately trying to clean, adjust, or lubricate the picker with the rolls running.”
Regardless of the situation, Kitchen reinforced the idea that farmers could prevent many
accidents by turning off machines prior to fixing them.223
A farmer could also prevent accidents and experience a more efficient harvest if
he attended to the maintenance needs of their corn pickers. Owners needed to be aware of
a number of considerations if a corn picker was to be used properly. Such upkeep
included duties such as repeatedly checking for damaged components, making
adjustments, and avoiding excessive speeds. These procedures also included greasing the
221 Franklin, “Don’t Lose an Arm,” 8.
222 “Pick More Corn-Safely,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1958, 8-9; Franklin, “Don’t Lose an
Arm,” 8.
223 Dan Kitchen, “Stop That Picker…Before you Leave the Tractor Seat,” Farm Safety Review, September
1955, 5.
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machine’s parts and making clutch modifications. Safety advocates recommended that
such practices should be continued even after the harvest. In 1958 a Farm Safety Review
writer stated that “[a]t the end of the picking season check your machinery over for worn
parts. Fix it now! Next year you may be too late. The dealer will be busy. Use paint,
grease, and oil, for proper storage and protection of your investment.”224 In 1955, Dan
Kitchen, an NSC agricultural engineer stressed the importance of safety practices stating
that, “[a] well-adjusted machine in good repair gives less trouble, is less likely to tempt
the operator to take chances.”225
Farmers also needed to be attentive to adjusting speed, the rollers, and other
operational variables for the specific field conditions. A Farm Safety Review writer
indicated that “[a]s a general rule, the tougher the ear is to snap off the stock, the closer
the setting of the snapping rolls required; the drier the corn, the wider the roll setting.”226
Proper maintenance practices were particularly important due to the diverse and
sometimes harsh cornfield conditions. Charles J. Scranton stressed that even in a single
field corn plants could present much diversity due to variances in moisture and soil. He
said that the plant height and density alone could present much variety, indicating that
some corn plants stood over 12 feet tall while others might not be much more than half
that size, and one field could have both sparse and thick patches. A weedy field could
also affect the corn picker’s likelihood of being clogged and hence require that a farmer
adjust his picker to compensate. Daniel Kitchen, an NSC agricultural engineer, stressed
one aspect of proper corn picker maintenance, stating that, “[l]ast and most important, the
224 Hamilton, “Adjust Corn Picker: For Safety and Efficiency,” 8-9; “Pick More Corn Safely,” 10.
225 “Stop that Picker…Before you Leave the Tractor Seat!,” 6.
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most effective way to reduce corn losses and plugging of snapping rolls is careful driving
at reasonable speeds. Being off the row an inch or two will increase substantially both
corn losses and chances of plugging the snapping rolls.”227
The invention of the combine increased both the safety and speed of harvesting
since they clogged less and gathered corn more quickly than corn pickers. In the mid-
1960s, an Implement and Tractor contributor praised the continued improvement of the
machine, stating that they “have more horsepower, larger grain tanks, more efficient
drives, more hydraulic applications, larger fuel tanks, more diesel engines, bigger
elevators and unloading augers, improved operator platforms, and larger headers—they
are bigger and better than ever.”228 New safety features also augmented such performance
improvements. In 1965, Daniel McFarland, an NSC staff writer, indicated that a number
of modifications made harvesting safer, including better shielding over moving parts and
headers that congested less frequently while harvesting corn more quickly.229
Nevertheless, safety advocates reminded farmers that healthy respect was still
required. In 1979, an NSC writer stated that, “National Safety Council surveys indicate
that combines rank fourth in the total number of disabling injuries involving farm
machinery. Although combines are used for considerably fewer hours each year than
tractors, they have twice the number of reportable injuries per thousand units.”230 Farm
safety specialists professed similar advice as they had previously with the corn pickers
advising farmers to read and follow the owner’s manual instructions, perform regular
227 Scranton, “Safety and the Mechanical Corn-Picker,” 140; “Pick More Corn-Safely,” 10; Kitchen, “Stop
That Picker: Before you Leave the Tractor Seat! 6.
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maintenance, and always turn their combines off prior to performing repairs. In 1965,
Daniel McFarland instructed farmers to “[k]eep machinery in good operation condition.”
He also suggested that they should “operate equipment as specified in the operator’s
manual. Shut off power before cleaning, adjusting, or servicing.” In addition, McFarland
emphasized the importance of keeping safety guards in place.231
Safety writers also pointed to field conditions as a factor in preventing combine
related accidents. In the early 1970s, Joseph F. Gering, an Oklahoma extension safety
specialist, stated that “[g]ood weed control is an important factor in safe combine
operation. Heavy weed infestations in the mature crop can result in machine plugging and
problems with weed entanglement around rotating drives.” He suggested that prior to
harvesting farmers should inspect their fields for stones and other debris that could
damage equipment. Gerling also advised that heavy spring rains could result in hazardous
ditches.232
The combine’s new hydraulic systems presented a safety concern that had been
absent with the corn picker. Farmers who unwisely accorded too much trust in the
machine by working under them put themselves in jeopardy. Gerling cautioned farmers,
“Whenever you are required to work on the header or parts beneath it or behind it, be sure
to block it securely. Never rely solely on the hydraulic system, as they have been known
to fail.” Instead, he suggested that a “stand” or other “blocking” device be used to avoid a
crushing injury as a result of a failing hydraulic system. He also warned operators of the
dangers associated with the high pressure oil which flowed through the system. He
231 McFarland, “Eight Steps to Combine Safety,” 3-4.
232 Joseph Gerling, “Extension Facts: Safe Combine Operation” (Stillwater, Oklahoma: Oklahoma State
University, 1974, 2.
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indicated that an examination for hydraulic leaks could be hazardous with bare hands
since oil within the systems is under high pressure and if released could pierce the skin
and result in poisoning.233
The physically demanding task of haymaking also became easier due to
mechanical advances in the form of mowers, rakes, and baling equipment; nevertheless,
dangers surfaced. During the 1940s, the safety literature revealed a plethora of injuries
that could ensue during haymaking, including cuts from mowers, crushing injuries from
rakes, as well as the possibility of becoming entangled in the moving parts of a baler. By
the 1960s, safety writers offered a variety of suggestions which could prevent such
misfortunes, including keeping PTO guards in place for moving parts in mowers, balers,
and forage choppers. Farmers were also directed to turn off their tractor while removing
debris from a clogged rake or balers or while performing any maintenance. Such
miscellaneous jobs might include extracting twine from a baler or performing
maintenance on a forage harvester.234
Although haymaking continued to advance, as evidenced by the introduction of
improved equipment, one of the more revolutionary changes in haymaking was the
advent of the “big round baler.” By the mid-1970s, such devices produced hay bales as
large as 1000 to 1,500 pounds. Sam Brungardt, an Implement and Tractor contributor,
stressed that farmers were sometimes unwisely adapting older front-end loaders for
moving large round bales. He stressed that the considerable weight of the bales could
create great instability in the farmer’s efforts to transport them. He stated that, “[a]
233 Ibid., 2.
234 “Haytime Hazards,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1944, 6; “Safe Hay Harvest,” Farm Safety Review,
March/April, 1967, 4.
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Kentucky man was fatally crushed when a round bale rolled down the arms of his
tractor’s modified front end loader to its upper limit.”235
Although safe large bale-handling equipment was rapidly entering the
marketplace, it did not mean that farmers would immediately purchase safer
transportation devices. Dr. Richard L. Jepsen, a farm safety specialist from Kansas State
University, believed the “three-point-hitch bale handling devices to be safer than the
modified front end loaders.” He also thought farmers would persist in using adapted
front-end loaders even though they offered less stability.236 Rollin Schnieder, a farm
safety expert employed at the University of Nebraska, echoed Jepsen’s opinions.
Schnieder stated “that some of the front end loaders which are modified in farm shops
may be poorly engineered and put excess stress on a tractor’s hydraulic system.”237 Such
comments confirm that farm innovations did not proceed uniformly and that the
willingness of agriculturalists to modify old equipment for new uses often multiplied
risks.
Farmers faced hazards associated with hay harvesting that were not directly
related to operating gasoline-powered hay equipment. Workers could also injure
themselves by falling off a hayrack while bringing the bales to the barn. Even after the
hay was ready for storage, laborers had to still be cautious. In 1944, a Farm Safety
Review author indicated that, “[t]he man who attaches the slings or sets the fork must not
stand under the load while it is being hoisted into the barn. If the rope should break he
would be crushed. The same rule applies to the man working in the mow. He must stand
235 Sam Brungardt, “Safe Handling of Big Bales,” Implement and Tractor, March 1976, 12.
236 Ibid., 13.
237 Ibid., 13.
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clear when a load is tripped.”238 The fact that haymaking was often done in very hot
weather also meant that an overworked farmer was susceptible to heat stroke or
exhaustion. Thus, farmers were also advised to include work breaks especially during
periods of excessive heat and to lift in a safe manner to avoid back injuries.239
The most basic tool involved in hay processing, the pitchfork, could inflict severe
damage if used unwisely. Such injuries were often ghastly and revealed the many ways a
pitchfork user could become injured. In 1943, Claire Swisher, editor of the Hammermill
Bond, indicated that although the pitchfork was indispensable for farm work, they were
sometimes involved in fatal accidents. He stressed that its sharp points could easily
puncture the flesh and that some farmers had inadvertently fallen of their hayrack and
impaled themselves on their pitchforks. Such accidents usually resulted in grotesque
deaths. In 1943, a Farm Safety Review writer stated that Mr. Hedge, a farmer from
Leavenworth, Kansas, “climbed onto the hay loft, threw food down for the cattle, and
tossed the fork into it. As he started down the ladder, he missed the top rung. The
additional impact broke the second rung and he fell. The fork handle pierced deeply into
his abdomen, and he died a few days later.”240 Safety writers provided abundant advice
regarding how to avoid pitchfork accidents. Such suggestions included owning several of
them and locating them in convenient places, limiting the need to carry them. They also
238 “Haytime Hazards,” 6-7.
239 Ibid., 7; “Heat: Hard on the Heart,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1960, 13-14; “Safe Hay Harvest,” 6.
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advised that under no circumstances should a pitchfork be tossed, and to always place it
firmly in the earth instead of placing it flat on the ground.241
Farmers also had to be aware that hay with too much moisture might combust. In
1953, C.L. Hamilton, an agricultural engineer employed by the NSC, warned farmers to
avoid placing hay in the mow with a moisture above 25 percent. He suggested that
farmers should use hay probes and thermometers to ensure that unsafe temperatures had
not been reached and to keep such devices in the hay for at least 15 minutes to obtain an
accurate reading. Hamilton stressed that danger was present when temperatures of the
hay reached 160 degrees Fahrenheit, while 180 degrees represented a situation for
emergency action. He also suggested that fans could be installed to decrease the hay’s
temperature. However, such fans needed to be installed properly, especially concerning
guards on the fan’s blades and also on any belts or pulley that powered them.242
Farmers also acquired more efficient tools in the form of augers and elevators for
moving their hay, grain, and other materials. In 1959, Benson J. Lamp and Kenneth A.
Harkness, Ohio State University agricultural engineers, commented on the elevator’s
widespread adoption indicating that between the beginning of the 1940s and the close of
the 1950s their numbers had increased twofold for each two-year interval for the entire
period. William J. Fletcher, a Farm Safety Review contributor, summarized their benefits
stating that “[t]hey quickly move material into bins, cribs, mows or other storage
facilities, relegating the scoop shovel to the museum and saving long hours of back-
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breaking labor.”243 By the end of the 1960s, approximately one and half million elevators
on the nation’s farmsteads testified to the farmers’ acceptance of such machines.244
Farmers enthusiastically purchased such equipment and consequently benefited
from the automation of their material handling work. In 1972, Norval Wardle stressed
that such transport devices (auger-conveyors) had become so popular that some farmers
might possess as many as “one, two, four or more on his farm, saving time, labor and
drudgery every day.”245 Farmers could also combine augers, metal grain bins, and
connected tubing to mechanize much of their material handling tasks. In 1968, a
Hutchison Royal product brochure celebrated such possibilities. The authors emphasized
advantages in regards to their livestock feeding system, stressing such benefits as a more
economical use of time, feed, and ease of maintenance. The Hutchison salesman also
stressed that farmers would also benefit from his company’s excellent customer service
record.246
Despite such advantages, augers and elevators were involved in a large number of
accidents. Farmers could hurt themselves if the device collapsed while attempting to
243 Benson J. Lamp and Kenneth A. Harkness, “Recommendations and Improved Design of Portable
Elevators” (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Agricultural Engineers,
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move them. They could also be seriously injured if they caught themselves in the
machines moving parts, which included the PTO in some elevators, v-belts responsible
for moving the track, and the conveyor itself, which carried material up the trough. Fires
could also result from a combination of a hot engine and an abundance of dry matter. In
1959, Benson J. Lamp and Kenneth A. Harkness commented that fourteen people had
died in elevator accidents in Iowa between 1947 and 1953. Tractors were the only farm
machines involved in more accidents. They also mentioned that in 1956, six people in
Ohio had died in such mishaps. A decade later, two NSC engineers David McFarland and
William J. Fletcher conducted a study revealing that such devices were near the top of
Ohio’s and Michigan’s farm accident list. Although augers and elevators were implicated
in many accidents, farm safety writers devoted little attention toward alerting the rural
public about the problem.247
The McFarland and Fletcher investigation also provided a comprehensive picture
of the accident victims, types of accidents as well as the overall context of specific
incidents. They discovered that the majority of the victims were males, between 30 and
69 years old who hurt themselves while operating the machine. Such mishaps usually
occurred in the late afternoon during the harvest season. The researchers also confirmed
that the major cause of injuries or fatalities involved getting a body part caught in moving
parts. They provided one common scenario in which an operator could become ensnared
stating that, “picking up spilled grain exposes the worker to drives and PTO shafts.
Routine unloading brings the operator in contact with flight chains and the drive
247 Lamp and Harkness, “Recommendations for Improved Design of Portable Farm Elevators,” 2;
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sprocket.” They also emphasized that farmers had insufficient reaction time in
comparison to the augers’ and elevators’ fast moving parts, meaning that once a person
became entangled they had a slim hope of freeing themselves.248
Farmers could also suffer serious injury or even death by being crushed under a
collapsing elevator or auger. In late 1950s and early 1960s, Ohio State University safety
specialists emphasized such dangers. They stressed that over-turns occurred for a variety
of reasons including simply losing control during transportation or unintentionally
upending the device while attempting to clear debris from the elevator’s trough. The
prospect of accidentally running into another object represented a common hazard. They
provided an example for this scenario stating that, “[t]he accidental hitting of the
undercarriage by a tractor or other object can quickly topples an elevator which has been
set on sloping terrain.”249 Farmers also often further exposed themselves to serious injury
in attempting to stop a falling elevator. They stated that all of these situations could result
in becoming pinned under the machine causing serious injury or death.250
They also stressed that instability problems could be corrected by installing, “a
safety track,” indicating that, “such a track will not permit separation of the trough from
the rollers on the upper member of the undercarriage. Also, it can serve to limit travel of
the rollers along the trough—restricting discharge height to a safe level, and stopping the
248 McFarland and Fletcher, “Analysis of Portable Farm Elevator and Auger Accidents to Determine
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trough at a desirable height as it is lowered.”251 However, by the end of the 1960s, the
dangers associated with collapses appear to have lessened because manufacturers added
stabilizing features to their elevators. In 1969, McFarland and Fletcher discussed how
Ohio State University researchers had long since identified the problem of failing
elevator transport carriages and that manufacturers had responded by installing
preventative devices into their latest products. Although this was generally true, such
safety features were not universal. McFarland and Fletcher stated that “[s]ome makers of
portable elevators and augers are still not providing carriage stops to prevent collapse
during moving.”252
Although fire represented a much less common threat, elevator engines were
sometimes located near the machine’s hopper, which meant that dry material sometimes
contacted the machine’s hot engine representing a fire risk. In addition, hazards were
multiplied if a muffler was absent which meant that heated “carbon particles” could make
contact with hay bales, greatly increasing the potential for accidental combustion. Such a
scenario was particularly frightening if a smoldering bale entered the haymow, causing a
destructive barn fire. Farmers also faced fire hazards if hot exhaust was allowed to blow
on straw, dry leaves, or other desiccated matter.253
Elevators were also involved in accidents when spinning cranks injured machine
operators or bystanders. Although such levers provided a means of adjusting the
discharge height, if the user prematurely let go, it could easily rotate swiftly and cause
physical harm. Ohio State University safety specialists stated, “The natural tendency may
251 Stuckey, Lamp, and Harkness, Bulletin: 367, The Portable Farm Elevator… Make it a Helper Only, 4.
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be to try to stop the crank- if it hasn’t hit you already. Many severe injuries result from
freely spinning hoist cranks.” In addition, they indicated that children who had been
allowed to stand close to the device or who had been playing with it had sometimes
received disfiguring injuries.254 The problem could be reduced by such additions as
“worm gears, friction brakes and automatic locks,” all of which were sufficient in
stopping cranks.255
Children’s natural curiosity and playfulness could also lead to elevator tragedies.
Ohio State University farm safety specialists stated that kids in Ohio had been seriously
injured or killed in such elevator accidents. They also informed readers of two boys who
had fallen to their death from an elevator. One had been running up an elevator when he
stumbled, plummeted to the ground, and subsequently died; the other youth had climbed
up hoping to enter a barn’s hay mow but he also fell to his death. Ohio safety specialists
warned adults “to always use the elevator properly. If not in use, remove and lower it to
the transport position, so the dangers of falls can be eliminated.”256 In a 1973, an article
by B.J.S. Grogono, a surgeon from Halifax, Novia Scotia, revealed a rather gruesome
aspect of auger accidents involving children. He indicated that when a child’s limb
became caught in an auger the damage could be greater since their extremities were
smaller. Thus, their arms and legs were consequently pulled farther into the machine and
suffered more damage.257
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Dr. Grogono provided many illustrations of such catastrophic injuries, which
resulted from contact with moving parts. Although the victims’ identities remained
anonymous, he effectively conveyed the appalling nature of the accidents. He described
one incident in which a farmer caught his foot in a grain auger’s hopper; the terrified man
intentionally put his other foot into the hopper in an effort to prevent the machine from
pulling his legs into the machine’s shaft. Although he successfully held himself with his
hands, the injuries to both of his feet were so severe they warranted amputation. Although
similar accidents sometimes did not result removal of the limb, they often produced an
incurable handicap. For instance, a young man of eighteen caught his arm in an auger and
suffered severe injuries to both his hand and his forearm. Although, the doctors were able
to save the arm, he suffered permanent lack of movement.258
By the late 1960s, researchers agreed that such incidents represented the most
persistent elevator hazard. The fact that manufacturers were slow to install shields on the
elevator’s moving parts appears to have exacerbated the problem. In 1959, Lamp and
Harkness believed that the absence of guards might have been related to the perception
that the machine’s moving parts rotated slower than those of other farm equipment.
However, they argued against this rationalization stating that “contact with an unshielded
power shaft rotating at slow speeds definitely is a hazard and can result in severe
accidents, as elevator accident reports verify. There is no justification for elevators to be
manufactured and sold without properly shielded shafts and gears.”259
The lack of guards and augers appears to have continued into the late 1960s and
early 1970s. In 1969, McFarland and Fletcher supported this view stating that, “[a]n
258 Ibid., 250-251.
259 Lamp and Harkness, “Recommendations for Improved Design of Portable Farm Elevators,” 3.
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informal survey of machines on dealer’s lots, at agricultural shows, and in sales literature
was conducted to measure the ‘state of machine’ guarding on US Machines. Most V-belt
drives were unshielded, even on machines of recent vintage. Auger intake guarding
varied from none to the provision of several rods running parallel to the auger shaft at the
base end. Most PTO shafts on new machines are shielded, but on many units the stub
shaft shield, where the shaft connects to the elevator, is in need of improvement.”260 In
1972, Norval Wardle also confirmed such observations after reviewing a number
manufacturing brochures; he surmised that such machines were on the whole
insufficiently guarded. He believed that the lack of such protection represented a
significant threat to farm families and symbolized a lack of safety concern by companies
that produced such machines. He further illustrated his point by disclosing that some
farmers had crafted guards themselves following accidents. A particularly powerful
example involved a Kentucky farmer who added shields to his auger after a girl had lost a
foot in the machine. Another situation involved Horace Neu, a farmer from Nevada,
Iowa, who after catching his hand in an auger, fashioned a “lattice type guard over the
auger’s intake.”261
Nevertheless, some material handling technologies appeared to have reduced the
possibility of farm accidents. For instance, the advent of “self-feeding silos” might have
lessened the dangers associated with feeding livestock. Dave D. Merrill, an official for
the Republic Steel Corporation, stated that farmers now could avoid the potentially
dangerous practice of “climbing conventional silo chutes and lugging silage to feed
260 McFarland and Fletcher, “Analysis of Portable Farm Elevator and Auger Accidents to Determine
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bunks.” Such machines did much to automate the process of feeding silage to livestock.
Merrill indicated that researchers had been searching for ways to decrease the work
associated with feeding livestock silage. He stated, “Mechanical unloaders in the top or
bottom of silos looked promising, but they did not deliver the silage to livestock. Silo
structural and management adjustments to permit the animals to feed directly from the
silos now seem to offer the most promising solution.”262
Rural families also faced dangers while moving grains, hay, and other materials in
their wagons. In 1968, an NSC safety publication entitled “How to Get Your Wagon
Rolling Safely” indicated that although wagon-related deaths were rare, injuries were
fairly common. Farm accident studies conducted in Michigan and Ohio placed wagons
behind tractors and elevators as leading accident agents. Although individuals could be
harmed in such mishaps in a number of ways, falls appeared to be a leading reason. The
NSC authors indicated that, “falls accounted for about 60 percent of wagon injuries. The
remainder resulted from being run over or being caught between the wagon and a
building or tool.”263 In the late 1970s, NSC farm accident researchers confirmed this view
of the prevalence of wagon related falls through more comprehensive farm accident
studies.264
A person could tumble from a wagon for a variety of reasons including “standing
on its tongue, unwisely riding on a wagon, or losing one’s footing on grain or other
slippery materials. People who carelessly rode atop wagons were especially susceptible to
262 Earl D. Merrill, “Self-Feeding Silos Aid Safety,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1953, 3.
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falls. The likelihood of such an accident increased if the tractor operator started
unexpectedly, stopped suddenly, or behaved in other unpredictable ways.” NSC
researchers stated that “[m]any injuries happen to wagon riders during loading operations
because they fall on or off the wagon.” Children who rode as second tractor riders were
sometimes seriously hurt or even killed if they fell off a tractor and then were crushed by
wagon wheels.265
Farmers were especially advised to practice safe operations on rural roadways in
order to avoid traffic accidents. Farmers needed to use the right kind of tires for their
particular wagon, check them regularly for correct pressure or damage, and avoid
overloading their wagons. All of these measures helped prevent tire failure and assisted in
avoiding roadway collisions. One NSC writer also indicated that over-filling wagon tires
placed undue stress on the wagon and multiplied the possibility of “tire or structural
failure.” Farmers were also told to correctly place the load inside the wagon to prevent
the contents from accidentally being released on the highway.266 Safety writers also
advised farmers to adopt preventative measures such as augmenting hitches with
“safety chains” to prevent an absconded wagon from colliding with other vehicles.267
The nature of wagon hazards was also connected to agriculture’s ever-increasing
scale. In the late 1970s, an NSC writer indicated that wagons had much larger carrying
capacities than their predecessors. The author stated that “[l]oad and speed was
previously limited to how much a team could pull and how fast they could walk. But
today’s high horsepower tractors can move huge loads much faster than horses or earlier
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tractors.” Such developments meant that modern farmers pulled much heavier loads at
much higher speeds than was previously possible, meaning they required more time to
stop and that their wagons were under much greater strain. The NSC staff writer vividly
explained the problem stating that “[l]arge tractors can pull one or two fully loaded
wagons, each with a 400 bushel capacity, at transport speeds. But the operator must be
able to stop the rig within safety limits. If the wagon has no brakes, the whole stopping
burden falls on the tractor.” Safety writers advised farmers to purchase wagons with
brakes since the job fell entirely upon the tractor if they were absent. A number of
problems could ensue if a wagon was not fitted with brakes, including losing control on
downhills or rolling backwards on uphills, both of which could result in crashing into
other objects or running off into a ditch.268
Farmers also used much more complex wagons than their early twentieth century
forerunners, including features such as ensilage, side dump, and stack wagons. In 1978,
an NSC author stated that, “farm wagons have come a long way from the simple carts
and high-wheeled rack and box conveyance of 50 years ago. No longer are wagons just
boxes or flat beads mounted on wheels. They come in many shapes and sizes, often with
specialized features, making them suitable for numerous farm hauling and materials-
handling jobs.” Although wagons with devices such as power take-offs, hydraulic lifts,
and augers added flexibility to a wagon’s usefulness, they also presented additional
hazards. The writer indicated that, “[w]agons with unloading and lifting mechanisms
using power- take-off (PTO or hydraulic power from a tractor) have contributed to labor
efficiency and productivity goals, but they have made this originally “simple device”
complex, and have added new safety problems with their power drives and moving
268 National Safety Council, Farm Department, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Wagon Safety, 1-2.
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parts.” Devices such as “augers” or “beaters” also increased the hazards associated with
falls because if an individual fell on them an accident which might have previously
resulted in a mild injury could instead result in a catastrophic one. Wagons which could
be raised hydraulically also posed their own dangers since if it was lowered accidentally
while someone was working on the wagon it could also prove to be fatal. 269
Farmers also began storing their agricultural commodities differently by replacing
structures such as corn cribs with metal grain bins. These changes represented yet another
dimension of mechanization since metal bins were easily adapted to other labor-saving
devices such as augers and elevators. Gerald Gutkunst, an engineer for Butler
Manufacturing Company, a business which supplied construction materials to bin
builders, stressed that bins were a crucial component of the farmer’s total grain handling
system. While discussing the process of erecting grain bins, he emphasized their
interconnectedness to other conveying machines. He stated that bins needed to be well-
built since “a bin not only serves as a container. It must also support overhead augers in
many cases. In some installations, it supports spreaders, stirring machines and other
handling equipment.”270
Although modern grain handling and storage were both convenient and cost
saving, they nevertheless presented hazards. The possibility that farmers might slip off
the grain bin created the potential for serious falling injuries. However, the greatest
dangers associated with the bin including the possibility of sinking into and drowning
under tons of grain, suffering from mold-induced breathing ailments, and encountering
269 National Safety Council, Farm Department, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Wagon Safety, 1-2.
270 For a brief discussion regarding the change in farmers’ grain storage practices particularly in regard to
the corncrib’s zenith, see, Roe, Corncribs: In History, Folklife, and Architecture, 64-90; Gerald Gutekunst,
“Safety-Design and Erection of Grain Storage,” (Paper presented at the winter meeting of the American
Society of Agricultural Engineers, Chicago, Illinois, 11-15 December), 5.
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dangerous gases. The farm accident literature contains instances in which a person fell
into a grain bin during the unloading process. The unfortunate individual would often
then be pulled to the bottom of the bin with the grain with the possibility being suffocated
unless rescuers reached the victim in time. Safety writers warned farmers that if someone
was required to be within the bin during the bin’s emptying then they should be firmly
secured by a rope to avoid a grain bin tragedy.271
However, silos presented some of the most serious gas dangers, particularly soon
after farmers filled them. Once the fermentation process commenced, the silo could
produce surprisingly high levels of noxious gas including carbon dioxide and nitrogen
dioxide. Both these gases presented dangers since carbon dioxide acted as a asphyxiant
which could “exclude oxygen from the lungs,” while nitrogen dioxide severely irritated
the lining of the lung. Unfortunately, damage from nitrogen dioxide sometimes was not
immediately apparent. Bill Billderback, a Canadian farmer and silo gas authority, pointed
out that a farmer could inhale such vapors during the day without experiencing any
symptoms. Some farmers died in their sleep during the night due the accumulation of
fluid in their lungs.272 In 1960, Gerald W. Isaacs, a Purdue University professor,
emphasized the dangers stating that “[m]easurements of gas in successful air-tight silos
storing high-moisture corn have shown less than 1% oxygen and up to 90% carbon
dioxide. A few whiffs of NO2, produced in ensiling crops high in nitrates, may cause
permanent lung injury. A few minutes of exposure may cause instant death.” He also
271 Ibid., 5-6; William D Hanford, “Grain Bins Can be Dangerous,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1970,
3-4. Although grain bin dangers persisted, government regulations reduced fall hazards. The passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act also resulted in legal provisions that regulated the specifications of
grain bins. Gerald Gutkunst commented that, “ladders, safety cages and rails are covered in the 1970
Occupational Safety and Health Act,” see, Gerald Gutekunst, “Safety-Design and Erection of Grain
Storage,” 4.
272 Bill Bilderback, Killer Gas Inside (Guelph, Ontario: Farm Safety Association Incorporated, 1976), 6.
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stressed that the most hazardous period usually occurred a couple of weeks after filling
the silo.273
As early as the late 1940s, safety specialists became keenly aware of the problem
and they also alerted farmers to the threat by using accident victim stories. In 1956,
Edmund G. Zimmerer, Commissioner of the Iowa State Department of Health,
acknowledged the risks associated with the disease that had become known as “Silo
Filler’s Disease.” He indicated that by the late 1940s many agricultural workers began
remarking about a gas, which was usually brown or yellow in tint that sometimes “killed
livestock and small animals in vicinity of the silo.” Zimmerer also related a number of
stories regarding gas-related deaths. In one instance, a Missouri farmer had entered a silo
and had been overwhelmed with gas. Although he regained consciousness after being
rescued, he died seventeen hours later.274 Delayed fatalities were not unusual; for
instance, five silo gas deaths occurred in Iowa from 1959 to 1966. The majority occurred
at least three months after inhaling the noxious fumes. However, this was not always the
case. In 1966, a pair of Iowa farmers had used rope to lower themselves into a silo.
Unfortunately, the rope snapped leaving the two men entrapped in a gas filled silo. They
were soon overcome by carbon dioxide and died. 275
Farmers could avoid a carbon-dioxide-induced death by employing a variety of
preventative measures. They could familiarize themselves with warning signs and using
aeration equipment. Safety advocates also suggested that farmers be observant for the
273 Gerald W. Isaacs, “Your Silo—a Potential Killer,” Successful Farming (September 1960): 92.
274 Edmund G. Zimmerer, “Silage Gas Poisoning” (Paper prepared as a result of scientific inquiries
regarding the silage gas problem, Institute of Agricultural Medicine, University of Iowa College of
Medicine, Iowa City, Iowa, 4 August 1956), 1.
275 Norval Wardle, “Gives Warning on Silo Gas Danger,” Des Moines Register, 16 March 1966, 1.
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“reddish color” which signaled nitrogen dioxide’s presence. In addition, farmers were
instructed to run their blowers, which provided clean air into the silo. Gerald W. Isaacs
advised that the blower continue to be run while one man worked inside and another held
a rope attached to the person inside the silo. Farm safety experts also suggested that
farmers should avoid entering an “air-tight” silo after it had been filled and to never enter
if they detected a suspicious odor. Isaacs also stressed that farmers might need to acquire
professional assistance. He suggested that farmers call upon silo professionals
particularly shortly after the filling of the silo or if the contents were almost to the top the
building.276
However, if farmers decided to do such work themselves, they were initially
advised to procure breathing protection. In 1956, Wardle elaborated on the importance of
such breathing devices, stating that if “you have to go into silo without making sure of
the oxygen supply or presence of poisonous nitrogen dioxide, it is a good idea to wear an
oxygen mask.” He suggested that farmers might get such devices from their local county
extension agent or even use scuba equipment.277 In 1960, Gerald W. Isaacs provided
more specific advice emphasizing that farmers should purchase breathing protection
equipment from “industrial equipment suppliers.” Isaacs warned farmers not to use
military gas masks since they were unsuitable for agricultural use.278 In the mid-1970s,
safety advocates continued to stress the importance of proper respiratory protection.
Bilderback stated, “A self-contained breathing apparatus is the only device that will
protect you from these gases, a simple particle respirator is not.”279 Farmers also were
276 Isaacs, “Your Silo—a Potential Killer, 92.
277 Wardle, “Gives Warning on Silo Gas Danger,” 1
278 Isaacs, “Your Silo—a Potential Killer, 92
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warned to wear such equipment if their crops had been chemically treated since they
could be heavily exposed while depositing their harvest in the silo.280
Despite their abundant advice, farm safety specialists were still trying to fully
understand the silo gas problem. In 1961, C.K. Otis and J.H. Pomeroy, agricultural
engineers and authorities on the proper construction of silos, admitted that, “Silage does
not act like a liquid or like granular particles. It is a unique material and its properties,
some of which are unknown, depend on many factors.”281 In 1967, Norval Wardle
composed a letter to Beverly P. Miracle, a General Electric executive, in an attempt to
acquire more research regarding silo hazards. Wardle listed a variety of gaps regarding
the agricultural community’s understanding of the silo conditions that governed the
amount of carbon dioxide present. Such areas included the need for a deeper
understanding of the effect of temperature and the influence of fertilizer application.
Wardle’s letter reveals that as with many farm hazards, farmers were being faced with
dangers that the experts had yet to thoroughly understand.282
Farmers could also encounter hazardous gas as a result of new methods of storing
and disposing of animal waste. In 1969, W.J. Fletcher, an NSC writer, revealed that
farmers had done away with pitchforks and wagons to move manure. Such drudgery had
been reduced with the aid of tractor-mounted manure loaders, automated cleaners, and
279 Bilderback, Killer Gas Inside, 6.
280 “Nine Rules for Safety When Filling a Silo,” Hoard’s Dairyman (Summer, 1965): 111; the advice
offered by safety leaders changed little throughout the period, principally involving proper ventilation
procedures, staying out of the silo during the fermentation process, and leaving the silo immediately if high
levels of gas are detected.
281 C.K. Otis and J.H. Pomroy, “Tower Silo Design,” Agricultural Engineering, (July 1961): 1.
282 Norval J. Wardle to Beverly P. Miracle, 28 March 1967, Special Collections, Iowa State University
Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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other equipment that mechanized fecal processing. He also pointed to new storage
techniques that had arisen as a result of greater population densities, labor shortages, and
mechanical improvements. He also commented that farmers were procuring underground
tanks to store animal wastes. Fletcher stated that storage advancements such as “slotted
floors or scraping directly into submerged tanks has cut labor drastically, but the new
methods have also generated new hazards.”283 These new threats included the presence of
dangerous gases such as ammonia, carbon dioxide, methane, and hydrogen sulfide, which
could all build up from high waste concentrations. In 1981, James A. Merkel, an
authority on livestock waste management, succinctly summarized the waste disposal
situation that had emerged since the Second World War. He indicated the ever-growing
numbers of livestock along with other “factors taken together, resulted in large
concentrations of animals on small land areas which in turn created large quantities of
animal wastes.”284
Such gases and the tanks themselves presented a variety of health risks including
suffocation, explosion, and injuries associated from falling into the tank. In the late
1970s, Dave Williams, an Iowa State Extension official, indicated that a few of the state’s
farmers fell victim to noxious gases while they attempted to wash livestock stalls or drain
waste tanks. He also emphasized that “[t]his problem isn’t confined to Iowa—individuals
from many other agricultural states have also fallen victim to manure gases.”285
Agricultural writers warned that farmers should always work on tanks in pairs, observe
283 W.J. Fletcher, “Work Safely Around Manure Pits,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1969, 3.
284 James A. Merkel, Managing Livestock Waste (Westport , Connecticut: A.V.I. Publishing, 1981), 8; for
additional insights regarding the increasing numbers of animals involved in livestock operations as well as
the public’s growing concern regarding the problem, see, Merkel, Managing Livestock Waste, 3-17.
285 “Manure Gases Can Be Lethal,” Agri-Safety News, Fall 1978, 4.
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proper aeration procedures, and use safety equipment. Such gear might include gas-
testing equipment, approved breathing devices, and rope to safely lower anyone working
within the tank. W.J. Fletcher also suggested that farmers get the appropriate professional
assistance in implementing their waste management systems, including their smallest
details. He stated that they should “[g]et the help of an engineer in designing a pit or tank
cover so that it will strong enough to support equipment that will be driven over the top”
since failure of the cover could result in a serious accident.
The mechanical dangers related to the dramatic technological changes that
occurred during the mid-twentieth century reveal that the tremendous benefits brought
about by such machines was not without a cost in human suffering. Although agricultural
historians have discussed the social and environmental consequences of these changes,
few have addressed the toll exacted upon the bodies of the agricultural labor force.
Diverse technologies such as tractors, wagons, elevators and a host of other devices that
emerged during the period presented very real dangers to their operators. Such hazards
were amplified by many factors including the farm family’s diverse working environment
and relative independence, as well as the dizzying rate of change. The historical evidence
also suggests farmers also placed a greater priority on getting their work done promptly
than on working safely. The lack of safety features such as adequate guarding and tractor
roll bars, for example, appeared to have also amplified the dangers. Thus, the miracle of
increasing levels of agricultural productivity owed much to mechanical improvements.
Farmers’ mishaps with these machines also resulted in a harvest of human misery, which
has largely been ignored by both the urban public and historians.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Chemical Revolution and Safety: Fertilizers, Pesticides, Livestock Treatments, and
Herbicides
Farmers were forced to adapt to numerous changes in machinery, as well as to an
ever-expanding repertoire of chemicals. Following the Second World War, farmers used
pesticides such as DDT, new forms of fertilizers including anhydrous ammonia, and new
herbicides, the most notable one being 2, 4-D. Agricultural chemical researchers believed
that DDT represented the universal remedy in the ancient battle between humans and
insects since it killed an impressively large group of pests. Anhydrous ammonia and other
fertilizer innovations became major tools in the skyrocketing increases in crop yields.286
Farmers also enjoyed the weed-killing benefits of 2, 4-D, which essentially caused weeds
“to grow themselves to death.” Chemicals augmented the effects of agricultural
machinery in that both improved agricultural efficiency and productivity.
Unfortunately, farm chemicals also shared with machines the potential to harm a
farm family’s well being if used incorrectly. The combination of factors such as the rapid
dissemination of chemicals, farmers’ lack of knowledge, and the unsupervised, isolated
nature of rural life could prove disastrous. Additionally, federal and state regulations
governing the registration and use of agricultural chemicals were rather lenient
throughout the mid-twentieth century. An individual’s uniformed or improper use of
chemicals could result in serious consequences, including the injury of themselves or
family members, hurting neighbors, or even poisoning the nation’s food supply. Despite
the reality that people could be injured with chemicals in a variety of situations, the main
286 David B. Danbom, Born in the Country: A History of Rural America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), 237.
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poisoning avenues included breathing in the substances, exposure through the skin, and
swallowing the chemicals.287 As with other safety issues, safety advocates believed that
farmers required education regarding the potential impact of their chemical use on
themselves, their neighbors, and their environment.
The latter two points are demonstrated by the fact that chemicals could also
pollute water sources or harm the crops of others. In 1963, Arthur A. Muka, a New York
state extension entomologist commented on the latter problem. He stated, “Constant
attention is being paid to the unique problems created when suburban housing
developments build to the edges of farm fields.” He also emphasized that in such cases
appropriate types of chemicals and application methods needed to be employed. Such
instances not only threatened the human population, and potentially could harm useful
organisms and water supplies.288 In 1966, a USDA writer commented on the need to
spray during times that would diminish a chemicals’ effect on bees and other helpful
insects. 289 Farmers were also warned about the dangers of poisoning well water while
mixing chemicals. In 1963, Iowa State Extension writers warned farmers that if
chemicals were inadvertently released into a well it might make the water source
completely unusable even if farmers employed decontamination techniques.
287 N.B. Akesson, J.B. Bailey, W.F. Serat, and W.E. Yates, “Health Hazards to Workers From Application
of Pesticides” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Agricultural Engineers, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 23-
26 June 1974), 1; for a detailed discussion regarding the largely ineffective and lax regulatory structure
following World War II, see, Pete Daniel, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in the Post-World War II
South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 1-209.
288 Arthur A. Muka, “Improving Public Understanding of Pesticides,” Extension Service Review 34, no. 7
(July 1963): 123
289 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Use Chemicals Safely in the Production of Beef Cattle, Swine, and
Sheep, (Washington, D.C., June 1966), 4.
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The post-war chemical revolution was much more expansive in scope than the
introduction of the significant triad of DDT, 2, 4-D, and anhydrous ammonia. In 1946, a
Farm Safety Review writer indicated that farmers had earlier possessed relatively few
chemical alternatives. However, he stated that “[t]he picture is changing. In addition to
the insecticides and fungicides, there are hormone sprays, weed killers, larvacides,
cleanup ground sprays, seed treatment materials, soil disinfectant, livestock sprays, dusts,
and defoliants.”290 In 1963, an official for the U.S Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare indicated that pre-war era farmers could only chemically treat a handful of
insects. However, the author also indicated that chemicals were now being utilized to kill
insects, suppress weed growth, treat plant diseases, and even assist in coaxing seedlings
from the ground.291 Agricultural chemical companies also employed clever advertising
campaigns enticing farmers to use their products more intensively. The nation’s extension
agents and other government officials also encouraged them to increase their use of such
substances as the preferred method of controlling insects and weeds.292
The growth of livestock pest treatments illustrated the expanding uses of
agricultural compounds as well as the risks associated with them. Farmers had always
struggled with pests that annoyed beef cattle, dairy cows, and other farm animals. Horn
flies were a particularly significant nuisance to cattle since they continually bit them and
drained their blood. A USDA writer also indicated that struggling against horn flies
interfered with beef cattle’s weight gain and milk production in dairy cows. Dairyman
290 “Spray Safe,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1946, 5.
291 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Facts for Consumers: Pesticide Residues
(Washington, D.C., October 1963), 1.
292 Pete Daniel, Pesticides and Health In The Post World War II South, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 2005), 7.
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also needed kill these flying pests since they contributed to unsanitary conditions. The
cattle grub was also a threat since it damaged the animal’s hide, inhibited weight
increase, and forced packers to remove the pock marked portions of a carcass. An Iowa
State University official revealed that purchasers representing grocery stores rejected
meat which displayed grub damage. Harold J. Stockdale indicated that little was known
regarding how much these pests lessened milk production in dairy cows, but that they
should be eliminated in those operations as well.293
Farmers adopted a growing array of chemical tools to control these invasive pests.
Agricultural writers applauded the expanding chemical options to address the horn fly
problem. In 1955, an author of a USDA horn fly pamphlet specified that farmers could
chose from “DDT, methoxychlor, TDE or toxaphene” to combat the horn flies.294 The
writer indicated that horn fly treatments included sprays, dusts, dips, as well as
“insecticide-treated rubbing” devices. The latter technique consisted of employing either
a pole covered with a chemically treated cloth or using two poles connected by a wire
covered in treated fabric.295 In the mid-1960s, Harold J. Stockdale, an Iowa State
Extension Entomologist, identified a total of nine chemicals and seven application
methods that could be used to control a variety of fly species. Stockdale also indicated
that “electrical misters or foggers” represented yet another treatment option.296 Another
Iowa Extension tract revealed the emergence of “dust bags” as an additional alternative.
293 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Horn Flies on Cattle…How to Control Them (Washington D.C., July
1955), 2; Harold Stockdale, Dairy Cattle Insects and their Control (Ames, Iowa State University:
Cooperative Extension Service, 1966), 1; Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Pest
Control (Ames, Iowa, June 1965), 2,1; Stockdale, Dairy Cattle Insects and their Control, 3.
294 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Horn Flies on Cattle…How to Control Them, 4.
295 Ibid., 5.
296 Harold Stockdale, Dairy Cattle Insects and their Control, 1-7.
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The writer indicated that such sacks could be situated on livestock building entrances and
were especially effective in treating horn flies.297 The methods to chemically treat cattle
grubs also expanded. A USDA writer stated that until the late 1950s, farmers could only
employ rotenone during the wintertime as a spray to control the pest. However, by the
mid-1960s, farmers had a variety of other application methods including “pour-ons and
feed additives.”298 Although new treatments added flexibility and reduced the effects of
such pests, they also greatly complicated the farmers’ working environment.
The use of livestock pest treatments, like the utilization of labor saving
machinery, warranted a cautionary approach, particularly for preventing accidental
livestock deaths. In the late 1960s, William B. Buck, a professor of veterinary medicine
employed at Iowa State University, documented the destructive consequences of careless
use. While treating 600 pigs with a mixture of Toxaphene and Malathion, one Iowa
farmer accidentally tainted some the animals’ water and feed. Dr. Buck indicated soon
after spraying, four hogs died, and others were found to have suffered from fatal chemical
poisoning. He also recounted another incident in which some feedlot cows opened a
back-rubber canister filled with a blend of “fuel oil” and “taxaphene.” The cows
consumed the mixture, resulting in the death of eighteen cattle while another five
experienced serious illness. He stated that an examination of the animals revealed
significant amounts of the material in both the rumen and the lungs.299 Such situations
297 Beef Cattle Insects and their Control (Ames, Iowa State University: Cooperative Extension, 1972), 6.
298 Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service, Pest Control, 2.
299 William B. Buck, Unpublished report regarding livestock poisoning episodes in Iowa during 1969,
Special Collections, Iowa State University, Ames, 1-2.
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caused extension specialists to continually warn farmers regarding the importance of
keeping feed and water covered while applying such chemicals.300
However, the dangers associated with livestock pest treatments extended beyond
the farmstead. In 1955, a USDA official warned that beef cattle could be sprayed with
DDT, TDE, or Taxophene, but not dairy cattle. The author stated, “Do not use DDT,
TDE, or Taxophene on dairy cows that are being milked, if the milk is to be consumed by
human beings.” This advice was crucial since such substances could contaminate milk
supplies and threaten consumer health. Instead, USDA writers suggested that one should
“use a 0.5 percent methoxychlor spray, an activated pyrethrum spray, or a pyrethrum-oil
spray.”301 In 1966, the author of a USDA pamphlet provided cautionary advice in regards
to the danger of meat contamination. The writer indicated that chemicals could
potentially collect in animal flesh, making it unfit and illegal for human consumption.
The government employee indicated that such tainting of meat could be avoided by
applying the chemical within the advised period of time prior to the cow’s processing.302
The growing number of chemicals used in cultivating crops posed an even larger
number of health risks. If farmers incorrectly used herbicides, they could inadvertently
harm their crop. Researchers also eventually discovered that pesticides such as DDT
could accumulate in living organisms and consequently pose hazards to both animals and
people.303 When farmers accidentally released anhydrous ammonia, it could result in
300 For advice regarding the dangers of inadvertently poisoning livestock, see, Department of Agriculture,
Horn Flies on Cattle…How to Control Them, 4-6; Harold Stockdale, Dairy Cattle Insects and their
Control, 4-6.
301 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Horn Flies on Cattle… How to Control Them, 4-6.
302 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Use Chemicals Safely in the production of Beef Cattle Swine and
Sheep, 3.
303 Danbom, Born in the Country, 237.
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serious injury, resulting in blindness or even death. Farmers who did not wear proper
protective equipment and did not label dangerous compounds sometimes suffered serious
illness or even inadvertently contributed to the poisoning of family members. In 1951,
DDT caused significant health problems as evidenced by 338 people who were poisoned
by this pesticide in that year.304
Although fragmentary statistics reveal that the problem was serious, the numerical
record does not provide a complete picture. Researchers repeatedly emphasized the
challenge in determining the number of chemical-related farm accidents. In 1962, Mary
K. Farinholt, a prominent agricultural chemical expert, stated, “ It is impossible to know
how many illnesses and deaths have happened and are occurring in the U.S. and
agriculture in particular—because of the use of pesticides. Uniform reliable statistics do
not exist. Most states have no system for reporting or recording injuries attributable to
pesticides.” However, she also indicated that specialists had arrived at approximations
including that 166 Americans were killed in pesticide accidents in 1959 alone. She
stressed that non-lethal incidents might be as much as 100 times as common as deadly
incidents.305 During the same year, Keith Long, the head toxicologist at the University of
Iowa’s Institute of Agricultural Medicine, echoed Farinholt’s statements indicating that
most research devoted to the issue was considerably insufficient.306
304 “Spray Safe,” 4; Frank Princi, “Toxicology and Hazard Record of the New Pesticides,” 7, no. 1
(January 1952): 47.
305 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture (Cleveland, Ohio: National Consumers
Committee for Research and Education, Inc), 3.
306 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 4; Pete Daniels also
stressed the poor statistical understanding of the issue, see, Daniels, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in
The Post-World War II South, 71-72.
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The challenge of determining the problem’s scope appears to have persisted. In
1972, William Fletcher, an NSC Agricultural Safety Engineer, stated that, “[t]he
information available to us as well as to the rest of the industry is woefully inadequate.
We have little information that is specific in the area of mortality from agricultural
pesticides and is even less on the morbidity that results from worker contact while
preparing, mixing, and applying agricultural or household pesticides.” He stated that part
of the problem lay in the fact that most researchers investigate at the state or local level,
which is unsuccessful in providing a national statistical understanding. He stressed that
only California health officials had kept accurate records regarding the chemical accident
problem. He indicated that between 1951 and 1969 there had been a total of 163 deaths as
a result of agricultural chemical accidents.307 Nevertheless, the annual toll of illness
caused by agricultural chemicals was much higher in the state. In 1971 alone, there were
“1284 reported cases” of illness related to such substances.308 As late as 1976, the author
of an NSC rural accident prevention bulletin was still decrying the availability of
adequate data and stressing the sparse nature of useful literature on the subject.309
Despite the paucity of reliable statistics, the agricultural chemical safety problem
continued to mushroom. Such dangers included the methods farmers used to enrich their
soil. Although cultivators of the soil had sought ways to nurture their soil for hundreds of
years, during the mid-twentieth century farmers participated in unprecedented changes in
307 William J. Fletcher, “Pesticide Worker Accidents,” (paper presented at the National Conference on
Protective Clothing and Safety Equipment for Pesticide Workers, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta
Georgia, 1-2 May 1972), 1,4.
308 N.B. Akesson, J.B. Bailey, W.F. Serat, and W.E. Yates, “Health Hazards to Workers from Application
of Pesticides,” 1.
309 National Safety Council, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides (Chicago: National
Safety Council, 1976), 1.
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fertilizer practices. The recognition of anhydrous ammonia as an effective fertilizer
represented one of the significant changes. Historian David Danbom emphasized that
farmers readily incorporated the chemical into their agricultural practices since it greatly
lessened the need to abide by traditional soil maintenance practices as crop rotation and
use of livestock manure as a fertilizer. By the early 1950s, agricultural writers were
celebrating anhydrous ammonia as the solution in meeting farmers’ nitrogen needs. In
1953, an anonymous contributor to Agricultural Chemicals stated that, “[t]he lack of
agricultural nitrogen was accentuated during the war years, due to tremendous
government demand for nitrates for munitions. Recent developments making use of
anhydrous ammonia have now fortunately provided for a huge new supply of nitrogen for
agricultural use.” He also added that the substance possessed as much as double the
amount of nitrogen per volume as previous nitrogen sources. Farmers throughout the
country had also identified it as a excellent fertilizer for a variety of crops including
“corn, small grains, potatoes, tomatoes etc.”310
Indeed, the rate and scale with which farmers adopted anhydrous ammonia
reflects the faith they placed in this economical source of fertilizer. In 1953, F.H. Leavitt,
an engineer for Shell Chemical Corporation, specified that in California alone the
fertilizer aided in the cultivation of over 200 kinds of plants. He believed that the
construction of “a five story high sphere at Kernan, California,” which could “hold
enough NH2 for 65,000 acres of agricultural land,” symbolized how enthusiastically the
state’s growers had adopted it.311 Midwestern farmers soon followed their Western
counterparts by using anhydrous ammonia in copious amounts. In 1955, Iowa farmers
310 “New Business Develops… Anhydrous Ammonia Application,” 46, 48.
311 F.H. Leavitt, “Use and Marketing of Agricultural Ammonia,” 35, 37.
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deposited 18,000 tons of the fertilizer on their fields rising to 348, 000 tons just twelve
years later.312 Farmers’ pocketbooks as well as faith also contributed to their adoption of
anhydrous ammonia since costs continued to decline. Bruce Gardner stated that, “[r]apid
expansion in the use of inorganic nitrogen fertilizer in the 1950s and 1960s was not so
much a matter of a new, improved input as a large reduction in the cost of manufacturing
an old one. The development of economical processes for making NH4 (ammonia) from
natural gas caused the price of anhydrous ammonia fertilizer to fall by about one-half in
nominal terms between 1960 and 1970.”313
Improvements in delivery and application technologies also contributed to the
growing use of the fertilizer. Prior to the Second World War, farmers on the West Coast
were already using substantial amounts of anhydrous ammonia by injecting it directly
into their water before it entered their irrigated fields. In the late 1940s, researchers at
Mississippi State College developed application systems which could be used to inject
anhydrous ammonia in the soil. Factories produced and stored Anhydrous in large tanks
under high pressure. Semi-trucks or rail cars transported the fertilizer from its points of
origin to distributors where farmers purchased it. Fertilizer companies then delivered the
fertilizer in nurse tanks that held the ammonia; tubes delivered it to applicators, which
possessed “sabre-shaped blades.” Tractors pulled this equipment which injected the
material “at a depth of four to six inches” into the earth. These innovations increased the
practicality of using this particular type of liquid fertilizer and assisted in its ever-
increasing use by American farmers.314
312 Scott R. Helmers, W.H. McConnell, L.W. Knapp, “Ammonia Mishaps in Agriculture,” Agricultural
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313 Gardner, American Agriculture in the Twentieth Century: How it Flourished and What it Cost,” 23.
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Despite both cost reductions and improvements in delivery systems, farmers’
escalating use of the chemical was not without its risks. The fertilizer’s characteristics,
which included its high storage pressure, sub-zero temperature, and toxicity, made it a
potentially dangerous material. In 1972, a writer for an OSHA brochure stressed that
mishaps often occurred during transportation of the fertilizer between two storage
devices. The author stressed that a user engaged in transferring the substance from one
tank to another had to release and shut an onerous number of valves in the correct order
and failure to do so correctly could result in serious injury to self and co-workers.
Moving a nurse tank without first disengaging the hoses or attempting to fix “couplers,”
which connected the tubes, were two additional ways that could also result in a leaks.
Such accidental emissions could have disastrous consequences since the fertilizer could
cause severe burns, blindness, or even asphyxiation if inhaled.315
The many accident stories which circulated throughout the agricultural
community illustrate potential hazards. Some of these incidents such as an accident in
Crete, Nebraska in 1969 were spectacular in nature. This episode involved the accidental
release of 33,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia into the atmosphere from a wrecked
railroad car. The discharge of this tremendous volume of ammonia resulted in 6 deaths
and over 30 injuries. Such events were rare, since most mishaps were much smaller in
scale, but nonetheless destructive. In 1971, James Hall of Keswick, Iowa contacted the
fertilizer as the result of a hose leak which sprayed the ammonia across his face and into
his eyes. Arlo Jacobsen, the Des Moines Register’s Agricultural Editor recounted the
314 F.H. Leavitt, “Use and Marketing of Agricultural Ammonia,” Agricultural Chemicals, 8, no. 6 (June
1953): 36; “New Business Develops…Anhydrous Ammonia Application,” Agricultural Chemicals, 8, no. 2
(February 1953): 46.
315 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Agriculture Committee on Safety, Safe Use of Anhydrous Ammonia, (1972), 2, 4.
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young farmer’s harrowing experience stating, “[w]ith no emergency water tank to flush
his eyes, Hall stumbled half a mile to a neighbor’s place for water.” Although he
recovered his eyesight, the incident left a powerful impression, convincing him never to
handle the fertilizer again. Jacobsen stated, “He doesn’t use anhydrous anymore and
doesn’t plan to. The memory of blindness is too vivid. He remembers, too, the ammonia
burns on his lips and face and loss then of his senses of taste and smell.”316
In the early 1970s, there were a number of studies that provided a useful synopsis
of the problem, especially one investigation conducted by a group of Indiana researchers.
The researchers included two Purdue University agricultural engineers, J.B. Liljedahl and
F.R. Willsey, who were assisted by Robert C. Rund, an employee of the office of Indiana
State Chemist. They examined ammonia accidents occurring in their state in 1971 and
1972. Although many incidents were not serious, a substantial number were significant
since the study found that of those who responded, “thirty-three percent classified their
injuries as major.” They confirmed that failures of hoses, valves, couplers and other
transmission devices were responsible for many leaks resulting in “81 percent of the
accidents.” The researchers also stated that “[a]s expected, all of the accidents occurred
between March and July.”317 The study revealed that a farmer’s desire to stay on schedule
represented a factor in ammonia injuries, which should not come at a surprise since this
point was crucial in understanding many types of farm accidents. In 1974, William J.
Fletcher, National Safety Council Agricultural Safety Engineer, also reconfirmed this
316 Scott Helmers, W.H. McConnell, L.W. Knapp, “Ammonia Mishaps in Agriculture,” 118-119; Arlo
Jacobson, “Operation Peach Warns Farmers of Ammonia Dangers,” Des Moines Register, 9 March 1972, 1,
5-F.
317 J.B. Liljedahl, Robert C. Rund, and F.R. Wilsey, “A Survey of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents in
Indiana,” (a report prepared for the National Safety Council regarding Anhydrous Ammonia victims in
Indiana in 1971 and 1972), 1, Normal Wardle Collection, Iowa State University Library, Ames.
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factor in fertilizer accidents in another investigation of Indiana accidents. He stressed that
agricultural workers were often so preoccupied to finish the job that they often tolerated
potentially hazardous conditions and practices.318
Indiana investigations also provided additional insights regarding ammonia
accidents, including the significant point that most incidents occurred on the farm and not
at manufacturing facilities. Such findings once again revealed that farmers were largely
responsible for their own safety in handling a potentially highly dangerous substance.
Researchers revealed that a majority of the accidents occurred on farms and not on the
premises of the fertilizer distributor. Fletcher elaborated upon the meaning of such
findings stating that, “[t]he safety standards used by industry in the manufacture and
distribution of ammonia have served well to provide safe facilities. However, these
standards fall short of providing an equal degree of safety for those persons handling
anhydrous ammonia after it leaves the dealer’s plant.”319 Researchers also revealed that
farmers were heavily involved in bringing the ammonia to their own farms since the
investigators found that “55 percent said they had filled the nurse tank at the dealer’s
place by themselves.”320
Despite the fact that farmers were involved in more mishaps than employees at
ammonia factories, they nevertheless did not believe they were poorly prepared to handle
fertilizers. Instead, they thought that they were sufficiently educated regarding operating
318 William J. Fletcher, “Analysis of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents to Determine Corrective Measures,”
(a report completed by William J. Fletcher in May, 1974 which was supported by an NSC grant), 13,
Norval Wardle Collection, Iowa State University Library, Ames.
319 J.B. Liljedahl, Robert C. Rund, and F.R. Wilsey, “A Survey of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents in
Indiana,” 3; Fletcher, “Analysis of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents to Determine Corrective Measures,”
12.
320 Ibid., 13.
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procedures, that they had been informed of potential hazards, and that they had attained
sufficient experience with application equipment. Despite such perceived knowledge and
know-how, the study also revealed how human error resulted in ammonia-related injuries
and fatalities. Such carelessness included improper use of the equipment, neglecting to
wear safety apparatus, and ignoring standard application procedures. The investigation
showed that in “twenty-seven percent of the hose-end valves on the nurse tank were
improperly secured during transport.” The researchers also discovered that although
nurse tanks were usually fitted with suggested accident prevent devices, individuals
involved in accidents rarely employed the use of eye protective equipment or gloves.321
In addition, “training or failure to follow accepted operating procedures were obvious in
27 out of 64 cases studied.” Farmers were also challenged by the diverse features of
anhydrous ammonia equipment, which further added to operational complexities and
their occasional modification of equipments sometimes amplified dangers.322
Safety activists responded to the problem by providing abundant advice hoping to
prevent such tragedies. They advised those who handled the fertilizer to wear safety gear,
inspect equipment, use proper operational measures, and understand proper emergency
procedures. Goggles and gloves were especially important since the eyes and hands were
particularly susceptible to exposure and injury. In 1972, Arlo Jacobsen advised farmers to
“always check all hose fittings and connections daily to be sure they are tight and there
are no leaks.”323 In the same year, the author of an OSHA pamphlet supported Jacobsen’s
comments emphasizing that, “worn hoses, loose connections, and other defects can cause
321 J.B. Liljedahl, Robert C. Rund, and F.R. Wilsey, “A Survey of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents in
Indiana,” 1.
322 Fletcher, “Analysis of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents to Determine Corrective Measures,” 8-10.
323 Jacobson, “Operation Peach Warns Farmers of Ammonia Dangers,” 1.
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accidents.”324 Agricultural writers also stressed that everyone on the farmstead should be
knowledgeable in case of an ammonia emergency. In 1974, NSC researchers commented
that they had discovered that although the farm owner was usually conversant in
emergency procedures, farm laborers, or children often did not possess such information.
Professionals advised farmers to seek counsel in unusual circumstances such as the need
for make repairs on the nurse tank.325
The advice offered in case of emergency remained relatively consistent
throughout the era; safety writers repeatedly emphasized copious and prolonged use of
water as a rinsing agent. The effectiveness of this treatment was related to the fertilizer’s
highly water solubility. In 1956, a Farm Safety Review writer stated, “In case of an
ammonia burn or injury, your best friend is water used liberally.”326 In 1972, Jacobsen
also highlighted the importance having water close at hand due to the importance of
flushing the affected area with water. He mentioned that everyone involved in applying
ammonia should have a small canister of water since flushing with water was crucial in
the first moments after exposure. In 1972, an OSHA official also emphasized that burn
creams should not be used for an entire day on an ammonia injury since it caused more
severe injury.327
324 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of
Agriculture Committee on Safety, Safe Use of Anhydrous Ammonia, 2.
325 Fletcher, “Analysis of Anhydrous Ammonia Accidents to Determine Corrective Measures,” 11;
“First Aid Rules: In Case of Ammonia Burns or injury,” Farm Safety Review, March 1956, 118. The advice
to seek professional assistance appears to have included a growing number of issues on the farm reflecting
the increasing technical demands placed on the era’s farmers.
326 Scott Helmers, W.H. McConnell, and L.W. Knapp, “Ammonia Mishaps in Agriculture,” 118.
327 Jacobson, “Operation Peach Warns Farmers of Ammonia Dangers,” 5; U.S. Department of Labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture Committee on Safety,
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Farmer’s utilization of new chemical weed control methods also presented
unpleasant complications. Herbicide options were becoming increasingly abundant and
required detailed knowledge on their potential dangers to humans, animals, and the larger
environment. The Halogenated Organic Acid Compounds represented many of the era’s
more common herbicides such as 2, 4-D. The list of other major categories of herbicides
and fungicides included the Dinitrophenols, Carbamates, and the Organic Mercury
Compounds. These various classes of agricultural chemicals and the dizzying number of
products included within them each possessed their own properties and their own
precautions for proper use.328
Plant specialists reminded farmers that they had to be careful regarding herbicide
residues, especially if the same application equipment was used to dispense different
types of chemicals. An Iowa State Extension writer reminded farmers that sprayers that
had been used to apply hormone-type weed killers needed to be cleansed as quickly as
possible if it was going to be employed for other uses. Experts also told farmers to
thoroughly rinse all containers, tubes, and other chemical application components
promptly after each use. They warned against the practice of dumping contaminated
water in locations near livestock drinking water or crops. Agronomists also reminded
operators that even after such intensive cleanings, other chemicals, which counteracted
herbicides might be used prior to using the equipment on soybeans, alfalfa, or clover.329
However, a series of accidents involving sodium chlorate in the late 1940s served
as vivid reminders of the dangers associated with some herbicides could be even more
328 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 8-12.
329 Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Suggestions for Safety Spraying: Herbicides,
Insecticides, and Fungicides, 2-3.
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serious. In 1944, James Elsberg, prominent safety engineer and former employee in the
insurance sector, stressed that farmers’ use of sodium chlorate as herbicide had resulted
in a number of serious and deadly accidents. He indicated that farmers who failed to
promptly rinse the substance from their clothing risked harm because of sodium chlorate
combustibility. In a Farm Safety Review article aptly entitled, “Human Torches,” he
provided vivid examples of the disastrous consequences of such carelessness. He
indicated that, “[t]he slightest spark can cause this highly combustible substance to ignite
into flames. There was a young man who had been spraying weeds and failed to change
his clothes after work. That evening he was walking along a sidewalk in town and a nail
in his heel struck a spark against the cement, igniting his pants. He was very severely
burned.” Elsberg suggested that individuals who used the substance should be educated
regarding its properties; users should never smoke near it and water should be nearby
during its application.330
Farmers adopted new weapons in their struggle against insect pests that consumed
their crops. Although farmers had used such pesticides as arsenic and cyanide for
decades, chemical weapons in the struggle against insects expanded greatly following
World War II. In 1952, G.L. Seth, an official for the Mine Safety Appliance Company,
commented on the ongoing chemical revolution, stressing that farmers previously had
only used a few pesticides applied mostly with simple hand pumps. However, he
indicated that, “all of a sudden this picture changed” after the war. In 1959, J.M. Magner,
an Entomologist employed by Monsanto Corporation, stated that although pesticides had
been available since the nineteenth century the emergence of “organic pesticides” during
the 1940s greatly multiplied such weaponry. In 1961, Mary K. Farinholt, an agricultural
330 James A. Ellsberg, “Human Torches,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1944, 10, 15.
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chemical specialist, provided a numerical understanding of this transformation. She stated
that in that year alone there were “approximately 94,000 brand-registered pesticides on
the market” and that American growers had purchased around “500 million pounds of
pesticides worth 300 million dollars.”331
Many agricultural writers believed pesticides were indispensable in eliminating
pests and meeting the food needs of an expanding global population. They also stressed
that the tremendous financial resources devoted to modern agriculture made acceptance
of reduced yields by pests unacceptable. In 1965, a Farm Safety Review writer elaborated
on the problem’s scope stressing that in the United States there were “10,000 kinds of
insects, 600 weed species, and 1,500 plant diseases,” which could threaten crops and
livestock.332 In 1967, a USDA employee emphasized the likelihood of farmers’ long-term
chemical reliance. He believed that there was no effective non-chemical remedy to the
pests, which, despite the aid of such substances, still consumed almost “a third of our
potential production.” J.M. Magner also justified growing chemical use to meet the
challenges of an exploding world population and to compensate for the continued loss of
farmland from urban expansion. He also indicated that the “intelligent use of agricultural
chemicals alone has contributed to increased yields of 20 percent or more for many
crops.”333 Perhaps, the strongest evidence regarding the widespread acceptance of
331 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 7; Transactions-National Safety Congress,
(Chicago: National Safety Council, 1952), 25; Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National
Safety Council, 1959), 13; Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 1.
332 Ibid., 1; “Here’s Why You Need a Pesticide Safety Program,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1965, 3.
333 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Safe Use of Agricultural and
Household Pesticides (Washington, D.C, 1967), i; Transactions-National Safety Congress , (Chicago:
National Safety Council, 1959), 13.
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chemical control methods laid in the fact that in 1962 only two percent of the nation’s
entomologists were researching alternative insect control methods.334
Thus, agricultural leaders and most farmers accepted agricultural chemicals as
they did new mechanical improvements as necessary tools to increase productivity,
increase efficiency, and reduce the drudgery associated with agricultural work.
Unfortunately, chemical and machine-related dangers were also similar in a number of
respects. Farmers carried much more singular responsibility for safety for themselves,
their families, and even their neighbors than those who worked with chemicals in a
factory setting. In addition, since the farm represented both a home and work setting,
young children were exposed to chemical hazards.
The reality that farmers carried much of the burden in maintaining chemical
safety on their operations is strongly verified by the historical record. A Farm Safety
Review writer expressed that although all chemicals had to pass a governmental approval
process, after the purchase of the chemical “it now becomes the moral and legal
responsibility of the user himself to exercise care in handling, applying, and storing
pesticides, including proper disposal of the empty containers.”335 In 1955, Harold
Heldreth also stressed that the important role the farmer filled in maintaining chemical
safety awareness. He stated, “The farmer should fully understand and be able to explain
to his workers the dangers involved, protective clothing necessary, antidote, first aid
334 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 31; Historian David Danbom has also
commented on this point stating, “The very effectiveness of DDT proved to be a curse. For one thing, it led
to a de-emphasis of research on biological pest control, a more environmentally benign method.” See David
Danbom, Born in the Country, 237.
335 “Here’s Why You Need a Pesticide Safety Program,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1965,
3; A number of writers including, most recently, Pete Daniel have seriously questioned the view that
agricultural chemical manufacturers had to undergo an intensive registration process prior to gaining
acceptance by government regulatory agencies, see, Pete Daniel, Pesticides And Health In The Post World
War II South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 7.
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treatment and proper methods of handling pesticides.” Heldreth also indicated that,
“[f]armers should contact a local doctor well in advance of work season to make sure he
understands what the proper antidote is for the pesticide.” 336
A brief review of federal and state regulations of agri-chemicals reveals that the
consumer benefited the most from agricultural chemical regulatory legislation. This was
especially the case prior to the early 1970s. This was the situation since most government
regulations, although far from optimal, attempted to ensure the overall quality of the
chemical and limiting the amount of chemical residues on food products. Such legislation
included the Federal Food and Drug Act, the Federal Cosmetic Act of 1938, Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) of 1947, and the Food Additives
Amendment of 1958. The last piece of legislation included the Delaney Amendment that
further increased the stringency of tolerance standards. Although state level legislation
eventually required formal training for both professional pesticide applicators and
farmers, for most of the period, a user’s willingness to follow the label’s instructions was
the only instrument to protect him or her from harm.337
The Federal Food and Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 represented one of the first
pieces of legislation enacted to provide the American public with increased protection.
The act “established procedures for setting safe limits called ‘tolerances’ on the amounts
of pesticide residues permitted on crops.” In 1947, Congress also passed the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, which empowered the USDA to determine
which chemicals were acceptable for use and shipment across state boundaries. The act
336 Harold Heldreth, “Read the Label-And Poison Only the Pests,” Farm Safety Review, June 1955, 11.
337 For a more detailed discussion of the history of chemical regulation prior to the 1970s, see, Gino J.
Marco, Robert M. Hollingsworth, and Jack R. Plimmer, ed., Regulation of Agrochemicals: A Driving Force
in their Evolution, (Washington: American Chemical Society, 1991), 1-7.
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required that companies which produced pesticides to “register their labels with the
USDA.”338 Companies seeking to achieve the USDA’s product standards were required
to demonstrate that their chemical could successfully control the targeted insect and that
it was safe when users followed the label’s instructions and excessive residue levels were
not present. FDA chemists and USDA officials worked cooperatively in the registration
procedures.339
The Federal government provided the public with additional safeguards in the
1950s. In 1954, the Miller Pesticide Amendment further streamlined the process of
setting tolerances, as well as decreasing potential dangers associated with eating
chemically treated foods. The Miller Amendment enacted procedures, which essentially
required companies to submit a rigorous self-investigation as to how chemical traces
would be measured and a detailed assessment of the dangerous residue levels. Following
this analysis, FDA researchers analyzed the results of the company’s studies to determine
safe amounts of residues. Government researchers accepted this amount of residue only
“if all reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of consumer safety.” If these scientists reach
such a conclusion then a maximum allowable residue is established for the purposes of
inter-state commerce.340 In 1955, Dr. Walter T. Reed stressed that one of the most
important effects the Miller Bill had upon agricultural chemical companies was that “a
much greater amount of detailed research relative to the use of these compounds be
338 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Facts for Consumers: Pesticide Residues
(Washington, D.C., 1963), 1-2.
339 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Behind the Pesticide Label
(Washington, D.C., 1964), 2.
340 U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Facts for Consumers: Pesticide Residues
(Washington, D.C., 1963), 1, 4, 6.
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carried out in order that they may be registered, and a tolerance established for all
crops.”341
In 1958, consumers received additional protection due to the passage of the Food
Additives Amendment. This legislation also included the Delaney Amendment. In 1991,
Gutave K. Kohn, an authority on pesticide regulation and a contributor to a regulatory
history, stated that the Delaney Amendment “expanded protection by setting zero
tolerance levels for any chemical in food in which animal meat tested at any level
exhibited carcinogenicity.”342 In 1959, J.M. Magner, an entomologist employed by
Monsanto, commented on the registration process. He stated that it often took five years
and the need for the chemical in fighting a particular insect must be proven. Government
requirements mandated chemical companies to compose product labels for their products.
The federal involvement also continued after the chemical’s successful registration.
Pesticide Regulation Division Inspectors in cooperation with state administrators bought
and tested insecticides, ensuring that the chemicals’ properties aligned with the label’s
contents and description. If it is determined the manufacturer is negligent by
misrepresenting their product, government officials removed the chemical from
distributor shelves and/or initiated legal action.343
State governments also constructed a regulatory apparatus for the burgeoning
chemical industry. Such measures were primarily aimed at improving containers and
labeling. In the early 1950s, states passed laws which required registration fees for new
341 Walter T. Reed, “Some Effects of the Miller Law,” Agricultural Chemicals 10 (September 1955): 38.
342 Gino J. Marco, Robert M. Hollingsworth, and Jack R. Plimmer, ed., Regulation of Agrochemicals: A
Driving Force in their Evolution, 4.
343 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1959), 13; U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Behind the Pesticide Label, 3-4.
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chemicals and standards for containers, as well as labeling standards. In 1953, Leo S.
Hitchner, a prominent member of National Agricultural Chemicals Association, indicated
that this amounted to “more than 250 bills with potential impact upon the production,
distribution, and use of agricultural chemicals.”344 By the early 1960s, laws were
becoming more robust. In 1964, the Iowa legislature enacted legislation which regulated
both chemical registration and a professional applicator certification process. Registration
provisions included that the chemical be USDA approved and that the label contain
complete and standardized information. In addition, the law indicated “all commercial
pesticide applicators must be licensed by the Iowa Department of Agriculture. This
includes all public officials or foremen who apply pesticides on public property or
supervise such application.” Certified pesticide applicators were required to pass a test,
demonstrate the ability to assume financial responsibility in case of unintended chemical
damage, and keep detailed work records.345
In the early 1970s, federal agricultural chemical regulatory law became more
stringent as an energetic mix of activists, concerned scientists, and ordinary citizens
worked to lobby for legal controls over what they believed to be excessive and reckless
use of agricultural chemicals. Rachel Carson became a leading figure in this crusade for
stronger governmental regulation of agricultural chemicals. Pete Daniel, a highly
regarded agricultural historian, emphasized the immense influence of her work indicating
that it shifted public opinion towards greater restrictions and precautions regarding
chemical use.346 Thus the publication of her book in 1962 represented a turning point in
344 “New Miller Bill Sounds Good-State Legislatures Consider Pesticide and Fertilizer Bills,” Agricultural
Chemicals 8 (April 1953): 57, 148; Lea S. Hitchner, “Legislative Control in Entomology,” Agricultural
Chemicals 9 (January 1954): 48.
345 “The Pesticide Act of Iowa,” Wallace’s Farmer, 18 January 1964, 26-27.
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the federal government’s regulation of farm chemicals. In 1972, congress amended the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, providing the EPA with greater
regulatory powers. The Federal Environmental Control Act (FEPCA) required that “all
pesticides must be federally registered and approved by October 21, 1974.” Thus, the
EPA was given registration powers over all chemicals, including those substances within
state boundaries. The legislation affected 18,000 pesticides, which had been registered
exclusively at the state level.347 The EPA mandated that after 1976, all agricultural
chemical manufacturers must list both their previously registered chemicals as well as
their new products.348
The EPA also established two pesticide categories identified as “restricted and
general use.” The restricted pesticides class included those that presented the most
potential danger and required certification of the user, while the general use included
those chemicals that were less hazardous to use. This legislation also differentiated
between “commercial applicators,” who were monetarily compensated for their work,
and “private applicators,” who applied chemicals on their property. The Iowa State
Extension Service offered certification classes and the Iowa Department of Agriculture
conferred pesticide licenses. However, such classes were usually short in length, usually
lasting only a few hours. Nevertheless, this certification process signified that farmers
were required to receive some training regarding chemical application and represented a
major change from the era prior to the early 1970s.349
346 Daniel, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in The Post-World War II South, 46, 53, 63, 67.
347 “Time Is Running Out for your Crops,” Agri-Fieldman, March 1974, 58.
348 National Safety Council, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides, 2.
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Thus, for most of the mid-twentieth century, farmers were given the weighty
burden of providing their own chemical safety since few possessed formal training for
handling the growing number of farm chemicals. In addition, farmers’ experiences with
chemicals also differed greatly from that of other settings in which chemicals were used.
In 1957, Henry Doyle, an official for the U.S. Public Health Service, stated that unlike
manufacturing workplaces, which used chemicals in a more controlled setting possessing
safety measures, while on the farm “the methods of application are almost as varied as
the materials used. Many of these methods present dangers that would not be tolerated in
manufacturing establishments.”350 In 1960, J.N. Roney, a University of Arizona
Extension Entomologist, supported such comments. He indicated that, “large
manufacturing plants spend considerable sums of money to maintain a safety record. The
farmer, salesman, and applicator should think along these lines too.”351
Although Roney’s comments were valid in respect to the need for greater safety,
they were also unrealistic. Farmers often lacked both the financial resources and expertise
possessed by large chemical factory owners. This was particularly true for those who
operated smaller family-owned operations. The farmers” rural setting also complicated
both preventative and emergency measures. Dr. Clyde Berry, the Associate Director of
the University of Iowa’s Institute of Agricultural medicine, while speaking at the Society
of Agricultural Engineers national conference, suggested that many farmers did not have
access to the necessary support services. He stressed that some farmers lived in
communities where local businesses did not sell respirators. They might also have little
350 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 6.
351 J.N. Roney, “Insecticides in the Southwest,” July/August 1960, 6.
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access to water in their isolated fields and if an accident occurred, long distances delayed
emergency medical treatment.352
Farm chemical dangers were deeply influenced by the familial nature of the
agricultural lifestyle, evidenced by the dangers they posed to rural children. This is well-
illustrated in the large numbers of youths who died or were injured in chemical mishaps.
A number of other studies confirm this conclusion, including an investigation of
agricultural chemical related deaths in California. The research revealed that between
1951 and 1969, 93 out of a total of 163 deaths involved children. In 1975, similar
evidence surfaced in Missouri as 415 children out of 569 poisoning victims treated at the
state’s poison control centers were youths five years old or younger.353Children were
almost always killed or injured by chemicals due to adult carelessness. This was
particularly true regarding improper storage practices. In 1976, NSC official Jack Burke
wrote, “Often the victims are small children exposed because of improper storage or
other user oversights.”354 Such was the case regarding one six-year-old child. A boy
discovered a discarded jug of TEPP while playing in an orchard and accidentally spilled
it onto his legs. The boy struggled home and despite the fact that his father promptly took
him to the hospital, he died six days later. Children were also poisoned by inadvertently
drinking or eating from containers which held chemicals. Researchers stressed that many
kids accidentally ingested chemicals because adults had carelessly poured such toxic
substances “into a food or drink container,” then neglected to place it into a locked
352 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 16.
353 Fletcher, “Pesticide Worker Accidents,” 4; University of Missouri, Columbia Extension Division, First
Aid For Pesticide Poisoning by David E. Baker and David B. Smith (Columbia, Missouri, 1976), 1915.
354 National Safety Council, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides, 1.
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cabinet or other secure location.355 In 1951, Harold Heldreth, provided vivid examples of
the dire consequences of careless storage practices. He described an incident in which a
four-year-old child fatally poisoned himself with rat poison believing that a tube of toxin
was toothpaste. He also related a number of other stories in which children accidentally
ingested DDT and other harmful substances from soft drink bottles believing that they
contained pop. Although some of the children survived, they only did so after painful and
arduous stomach pumping procedures.356
Children’s vulnerability to such accidents persisted throughout the twentieth
century. A 1983 Wallace’s Farmer article revealed that youngsters faced particular
dangers from granular pesticides. Agricultural chemicals in such highly concentrated
forms could be easily swallowed. The writer elaborated, “The lethal dose of these
granules, if swallowed by a 20 to 30 lb child is in the range of ⅛ to ¼ of a level
teaspoon.” Donald Morgan, a physician employed the University of Iowa’s department
of preventative medicine vividly explained the potential lethality of such pellets. He
stated that a deadly amount could easily “stick to the moist palm of a small child.” Such
poisoning often occurred when the granules were haphazardly spilled on the ground
where children could easily ingest them. Dr. Morgan illustrated his point by describing
one poisoning incident involving two sibling toddlers. The kids were playing on their
Iowa farm and ingested a very small amount of spilled pellets. Morgan concluded his
discussion of the problem by including a number of ways that the problem could be
avoided. He stated that children should be kept out of areas where chemical residues may
355 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 2; National Safety Council, Rural Accident
Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides), 1.
356 Harold Heldreth, “Insecticides are Poisonous!” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1951, 10.
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remain, and that toxic substances should be transported, mixed, and poured as carefully
as possible. He also advised that wise storage practices should be also observed to avoid
such tragedies.357
Although risks were especially great for children, careless pouring and mixing of
chemicals caused harm to people of all ages. Safety writers had frequently alerted farmers
to such problems but the issue persisted throughout the period. In 1969, William Fletcher,
a staff member of the NSC’s farm department, stressed that farmers must maintain a high
level of awareness when mixing or applying chemicals. He stated that operators were
especially vulnerable to accidental contact “during the mixing and proportioning. Anyone
handling chemicals must be alert to spills, splashes and splatter. Even powders can hit
you in the face when trapped air puffs back during the pouring operation.” Farmers’
observance of correct mixing practices was also required for equipment to function
properly. Fletcher also stressed the importance of the correct sequence of dispensing each
substance into the tank since incorrect mixing “can result in the clogging of nozzles,
frequent clean-out and extra exposure of the operator to chemicals.”358
Safety specialists also identified a number of other precautions for using
chemicals, which, if neglected, could result in tragic consequences. Agricultural safety
writers provided a wealth of advice including the need to develop a healthy respect for
chemicals. Safety advocates advised farmers to display a cautionary approach to
chemicals by properly disposing of empty canisters and rinsing clothing and skin after
chemical applications. Safety writers also advised farmers to wear protective devices, to
follow the label’s directions carefully, and to be aware of the larger implications of
357 “Insecticide Dangers… Carelessness Can Cause Death,” Wallace’s Farmer, March 12 1983, 84.
358 William J. Fletcher, “Mix Well—with Safety,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1969, 11.
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improper chemical use. The wider implications could include advertently harming their
crops, hurting those of their neighbors, or even polluting the water resources. Such advice
reflected the reality that just as machines and chemicals had given farmers the power to
produce on an unprecedented scale, the development of both had also increased their
ability to harm to themselves and others.
Specialists often observed that those in the agricultural community could be
shockingly casual regarding their work practices. In 1960, J.N. Roney, a University of
Arizona Extension Entomologist, stressed that all of the phosphate poisoning deaths in
his state could be attributed to carelessness. He indicated that in the six fatalities he had
investigated, including both farmers and professional applicators, operator negligence
represented a primary cause. He stated, “In two of these cases the men wore short-sleeved
shirts, no respirator and no gloves. They wore the same clothing several days without
being laundered. Too, they failed to bathe after exposure to the material.”359 In 1962,
Keith Long, chief of toxicology at the University of Iowa’s Institute of Agricultural
Medicine, echoed such observations. Long stated that farmers were often exposed to
hazardous chemicals both during the mixing and application phases. He stressed that their
attire was also often inadequate stating that many farmers he had observed did not don
any protective apparel or devices while using chemicals.360 The chemical safety
advocate’s advice supports the prevalence of casual chemical use. For instance, a USDA
writer stressed that farmers should “never use your mouth to siphon a pesticide from a
container.”361 The writers of another chemical safety brochure warned farmers to “never
359 J.N. Roney, “Insecticides in the Southwest,” July/August 1960, 5.
360 Transactions- National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 5.
361 “Safe Use of Agricultural Pesticides,” 4.
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stir any chemical solution with your hands.”362 Dr. Clyde Berry stated, “Exposure to
spray drift is unavoidable under most field conditions…there is nearly as many types of
spray rig as there are farmers who have them. Most of the equipment is homemade
affairs.”363 Such comments reveal that a cavalier attitude regarding chemical safety was
not uncommon during the mid-twentieth century. However, farmers who practiced
chemical safety followed rather elaborate practices.
Experts warned that it was essential for all chemicals to be placed in secure
locations where they could not be accessed by those who were uneducated in handling
such substances.364 They also emphasized that farmers needed to carefully place
chemicals in places where they could not contaminate foodstuffs. In 1946, a Farm Safety
Review writer related a story in which a family unwisely stored chemicals in an insecure
container. He indicated that roaches transported the poison from the ripped sack to the
sugar jar and “one entire family suffered seriously from slow poisoning for months
before they discovered the cause.” Safety writers also stressed that farm workers always
needed to place potentially harmful substances in labeled containers. The soundness of
such advice was illustrated by the story of a farm family who was poisoned when an
insecticide was accidentally mixed with baking material. The Farm Safety Review author
stated that, “a Maryland farm family of eight died and the rest were seriously stricken….
a coroner’s investigation revealed that the mother had unknowingly mixed some lead
362 Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Suggestions for Safety Spraying: Herbicides,
Insecticides and Fungicides by E.P. Sylvester, Harold Gunderson, and Gayle L. Worf (Ames: Iowa State
University, 1963), 1.
363 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 17.
364 Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Suggestions for Safety Spraying: Herbicides,
Insecticides, and Fungicides, 2.
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arsenate in a birthday cake which she baked for a family party.”365 Safety writers also
advised that any leftover chemicals needed to be returned to secure storage locations.366
Proper disposal of chemical containers after application was equally important. In
1955, C.O. Barnard, the executive secretary of the Western Agricultural Chemicals
Association, highlighted the problem of improper discarding of chemical canisters.
He stressed that makers of agro-chemicals depended on chemical applicators to observe
such proper safety practices. Barnard also indicated that farmers frequently ignored
appropriate chemical canister disposal procedures. He graphically illustrated the point by
citing an incident in which “[a]gricultural inspectors at one airstrip drained the residual
pesticide from ten-one gallon cans- and collected a full gallon of a very potent
compound!” He also emphasized reasons for such carelessness indicating that growers
often placed speed above such safety precautions as proper chemical container
disposal.367
A farmer’s ingenuity and thriftiness regarding alternative uses of chemical
containers could be especially hazardous. Farm safety advocates disapproved of
individuals who modified chemical containers into feed troughs, water storage tanks, and
raft floats since such ill-advised ingenuity could result into poisoning livestock fodder or
water sources.368 Instead, farm safety advocates advised agriculturalists to observe proper
storage and disposal procedures. In 1962, Keith Long, chief toxologist for the University
365 “Spray Safe,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1946, 4.
366 National Safety Council, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides, 3.
367 C.O. Barnard, “Safety…Problem Child of the Industry,” Agricultural Chemicals, 10 (December 1955):
38.
368 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Safe Use of Agricultural and
Household Pesticides, 2.
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of Iowa’s Institute of Agricultural Medicine, stated “[a]ll used pesticide containers should
be buried or burned, making sure that no one comes into contact with the smoke from the
burning.”369 Farmers had to be aware of additional hazards if they decided upon burning
containers. In 1963, Iowa State Extension writers warned them to keep a safe distance
from the smoke that resulted from incinerating chemical canisters. However, the
consequences of the disposal problem are best illustrated by the continued occurrence of
accidents. For instance, in 1960, the parents of one Arizona child were forced to grieve
over their child’s death after the child used an old chemical container for a seat.370
Safety writers also stressed the crucial nature of rinsing skin and clothing after
applying pesticides. They recommended that gloves and clothing, as well as skin needed
to be washed after handling such substances. They also suggested that hand cleaning was
particularly important prior to smoking or eating. In 1962, Keith Long chief toxologist,
for the University of Iowa’s Institute of Agricultural Medicine, emphasized that cleaning
procedures varied. He stated that the “occasional rinsing in Kerosene may be necessary
for clothing with heavy deposits of chlorinated hydrocarbons such as DDT and dieldrin.”
However, he suggested, “Ordinary washing soda is a better decontaminate for
phosphorylated hydrocarbons such as Malathion, thimet or parathion.”371
Experts also emphasized the importance of wearing proper breathing protection as
well as taking care of such devices. In 1962, Farinholt recommended, “Respirators should
be worn by those who load pesticides into spray equipment, who burn empty containers
369 Donald L. Miller, Farm Safety Review, March/April 1958, 13; Transactions-National Safety Congress,
(Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 7.
370 Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Suggestions for Safety Spraying: Herbicides,
Insecticides, and Fungicides, 1; J.N. Roney, “Insecticides in the Southwest,” 5.
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(the smoke can be lethal), who are exposed to obvious dusts, mists, or who are
continuously exposed to not-so-obvious amounts.” She also stressed such devices
required regular filter replacement, complete and regular cleaning, as well as storage in a
“clean dry place.”372 Mining firms manufactured some of the early breathing masks used
in agriculture. As early as 1955, a Mine Safety Appliances Company advertisement
writer boasted of the “protective benefits” of wearing their brand of breathing devices.
According to the writer, an MSA respirator could protect farmers from a variety of well-
known agricultural chemicals including: “EPN, Dieldren, Aldrin, TEPP, HETP, OMPA,
and Systox.”373
Although safety writers and manufacturers encouraged farmers to use proper
safety equipment, it appears that farmers initially had little access to adequate breathing
protection. In 1964, USDA Entomologists R.A. Fulton, Floyd F. Smith, and Ruth L.
Bugsby published their findings in a study entitled, “Respiratory Devices For Protection
Against Certain Pesticides,” which examined the availability and quality of respiratory
devices. They indicated that the development of breathing protection for agriculturalists
had not kept pace with the rate of chemical innovation. They observed, “No suitable,
fully effective respirators were found to be available in 1949 for protecting operators in
the field from inhaling dusts or mists of parathion and related phosphorous
insecticides.”374 It also appears that many farmers continued to be lax regarding suitable
372 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 15.
373 “Don’t be a Hay Field Oldfield… and it’s just as dangerous to spray poisonous insecticides without
your M.S.A Farm Spray Respirator,” Mine Safety Appliance Company advertisement, Farm Safety Review,
June 1955, 15.
374 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Respiratory Devices for
Protection against Certain Pesticides, by R.A. Fulton, Floyd F. Smith, and Ruth Busbey (Washington,
D.C.), 1.
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protective equipment and needed to consult experts throughout the period. In 1976, NSC
employee Jack Burke stated, “Your pesticide dealer or extension agent can advise on
appropriate equipment for your particular problems if you need guidance.”375 It is also
reasonable to assume that farmers, burdened by the time constraints and financial
obligations, might have neglected such consultation.
Nevertheless, the nation’s agricultural leadership responded to the need of
identifying proper agricultural breathing protection. In the fall of 1949, many government
organizations participated in a convention organized to find solutions for the issue.
Leaders of both agricultural chemical companies as well as firms specializing in the
manufacture safety equipment continued to meet following this initial meeting. These
gatherings resulted in the creation of the “Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control,”
which was responsible for overseeing the manufacture of protective breathing devices
suited for agricultural settings. The Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine tested
and evaluated protective respiratory devices, while other government agencies including
the “Department of the Army, Food and Drug Administration, Public Health Service,
Bureau of Mines, Production and Marketing Administration, and Bureau of Entomology
and Plant Quarantine” assessed research results. In 1954, R.A. Fulton, an employee of the
Entomology Research Branch, Agricultural Research Service, reflected upon the federal
government’s accomplishments and indicated that farmers could now choose from
several different “respirators and gas masks” suitable for agricultural contexts.376
Thus, leaders of federal agencies such as the U.S. Bureau of Entomology and Plan
Quarantine, as well as the heads of respirator manufacturers worked cooperatively to
375 National Safety Council, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides, 2.
376 R.A. Fulton, “Respiratory Protectors for Pesticides,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1954, 6-7.
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encourage the development of new devices. They also regularly advertised the benefits of
respirators which offered adequate protection. For instance, in a 1954 Farm Safety
Review piece entitled, “Respirators and Gas Masks for Agricultural Use,” the author, Dr.
R.A. Fulton, provided a list of USDA approved respirators and gas masks. The article
identified gas masks and respirators manufactured by such firms as the American Optical
Company of Southbridge Massachusetts, Wilson Products incorporated of Reading
Pennsylvania, and the Mine Safety Appliance Company of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania.377
G.L. Seth also indicated that the US Government interdepartmental committee on pest
control had made available a directory of appropriate protective breathing devices for
farmers. However, he also stressed that the register was being continually updated since
new chemicals and application equipment necessitated corresponding changes in
protective equipment. However, it is plausible that the list’s existence did not necessarily
mean that all farmers were consulting it.378
The view that farmers were often inadequately protected is supported by a number
of authorities, both in the public and private sector. Experts stressed that farmers
sometimes improperly used protective equipment or it was of insufficient quality. Some
safety writers also suggested that such equipment was often impractical in the field. In
1952, G.L. Seth, a representative for the Mine Appliances Company, a manufacturer of
protective breathing devices, reminded farmers that both adequate protection and comfort
should also be a priority in choosing a protective device. Dr. Clyde Berry also
emphasized the discomfort associated with using safety equipment, advocating that
377 United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Respiratory Devices For
Protection Against Certain Pesticides, by R.A. Fulton, Floyd F. Smith, and Ruth Busbey, 1; R.A. Fulton,
“Respirators and Gas Masks for Agricultural Use,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1954, 10-11.
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researchers should don this equipment themselves. He stated, “Wear these protective
devices yourselves if you doubt me. Wear them for a full day in the blazing summer sun,
and you will return to your air-conditioned office and take another look at the
Frankenstein you have created.” Berry had also observed that Iowa farmers often
carelessly dropped their mask to their chin exposing the mask’s interior to air-borne spray
residue. Berry also stressed that cleaning small components, such as the spray nozzles,
often required the removal of gloves, sometimes resulting in direct chemical exposure.
He indicated that occasionally the toxic liquid “runs down over the hands and arms of the
operator, sometimes reaching the chest and abdomen.” Farinholt stated that on occasion
agriculturalists used safety devices that were inadequate for meeting the safety
requirements of new chemicals. She also believed that the problem could be corrected by
requiring chemical manufacturers to create adequate protective devices for substances
before they were allowed on the marketplace.379
Safety advocates also repeatedly emphasized the importance of reading the labels
since such descriptive stickers represented the primary means by which farmers learned
how to properly use a chemical. This also indicates that farmers were particularly
dependent on experts who composed chemical labels for their safety. In 1955, Harold
Heldreth an NSC employee indicated that by reading the label, farmers could access
essential information such as detailed directions and appropriate safety measures. The tag
also represented the combined expertise of both private industry and governmental
regulatory agencies. Heldreth stated, “The label is checked by government regulators for
the enforcement of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act. These
regulations are constantly being strengthened by more specific, clarified labeling
379 Ibid., 25; Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 15-17.
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requirements.”380 In the mid-1970s, Jack Burke, an NSC official, pointed out that the
label represented the consummation of years of research regarding a product’s safety, its
suitability for the proscribed task, and its potential effect upon the ecosystem. He stressed
the level of detail, indicating that it revealed “who made it, what is in it, what pests it will
control, how to use it correctly, toxicity, precautions and safety measures that must be
taken, [and] practical treatment in case of mishap.”381 Burke’s comments reveal that
farmers could only benefit from public and private sector expertise if they carefully read
and observed the labels’ directions.
Although the era’s NSC writers were definitely correct in their view that
agricultural chemical users should attentively read product label prior to use; substantial
evidence suggests that directions were sometimes inadequate. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a number of incidents illustrate the poor quality of some of the labels.
Manuel Velez-Velez and Jamie Ramos-Sanches, two Puerto Rican farm workers were
applying parathion dust on a Massachusetts vegetable farm. The product label lacked
both directions regarding the need to dress in protective clothing as well as a cross-bones
warning emblem; tragically both men died of parathion poisoning after repeatedly
applying the chemical without such protective equipment. On other occasions individuals
received delayed treatment for poisoning when labels lacked the antidote instructions.
Furthermore, chemical company officials sometimes composed labels which used highly
specialized language or excessively minute print, which were generally difficult to
understand. 382 Such observations reinforce the point that farm families were generally ill
380 Harold Heldreth, “Read The Label—And Poison only the Pests!,” Farm Safety Review, June 1955, 11.
381 Jack Burke, Rural Accident Prevention Bulletin: Safe Use of Pesticides, 2.
382 Daniels, Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in The Post-War World War II South, 138-139, 136.
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prepared and inadequately informed to sufficiently protect themselves from the era’s
chemical hazards.
Despite critiques, both the era’s agricultural chemical officials and safety
specialists persistently emphasized the importance of reading the manufacturer’s
instructions for proper chemical use. On some occasions they did so with unwarranted
confidence. In 1955, V.K. Rowe, a Dow Chemical researcher, called attention to the
importance of following the label’s instructions stating, “I should like to state that if
every consumer would read, understand, and heed the precautionary information given on
the label of the agricultural chemical product he buys today, it is doubtful that a single
case of ill effects would result from the handling and use of that product. In the interest of
safety—read the label!” In 1963, Iowa State Extension writers advised farmers “to
completely and fully understand, and follow explicitly all directions on chemical
containers and in pertinent brochures. Become thoroughly acquainted with chemicals you
are using, including strong and weak points, tolerances, clearances, and uses for which it
is recommended.”383 Safety writers continually underscored that farmers also needed to
thoroughly understand a product’s label since the sheer diversity of chemical choices
could be dizzying. General categories of pesticides included chlorinated Hydrocarbons,
Organic Phosphates, and Rodenticides; however, these broad categories contained
hundreds of individual chemicals. In 1960, J.N. Roney revealed how the nation’s
agricultural community had been forced to adapt to relentless waves of chemical
innovation stating, “Since World War II, Organic insecticides have been used on the
farm. First we had the chlorinated hydrocarbons like DDT, BHC, Toxaphene, Lidane,
383 Iowa State University, Cooperative Extension Service, Suggestions for Safety Spraying: Herbicides,
Insecticides, and Fungicides, 1.
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dieldrin, aldrin chlordane and endrin. Then along came the phosphates—TEPP,
parathion (ethyl and Methyl) demeton or systox, phosdrin, thimet, malathion, diazon,
dibrom and others.” He also indicated that such categories differed greatly in their
toxicity to people and animals, stressing that the organic insecticides posed less of a
concern than the phosphates. The label represented the primary tool to safely navigate
this dizzying chemical diversity.384
However, safety writers acknowledged that chemical applicators did not always
read the label. They also recognized that the label could not provide complete
information regarding all application situations. In 1964, the writers of a pamphlet
cooperatively produced by the NSC, USDA, and the National Agricultural Chemicals
Association instructed farmers to “use common sense to bridge the gap between what is
written on the label and the actual chemical application.”385 Safety writers also
encouraged farmers to confer with a qualified chemical dealer or other authority if the
label was not sufficient in answering all the farmer’s questions.386 In 1957, Henry Doyle,
an official for the Occupational Health Program, U.S. Public Health Service, stated that
unlike manufacturing workplaces, in which there existed a more controlled setting with
strict safety measures, “agricultural workers generally have little idea of the hazards of
384 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 8-12; J.N. Roney, “Insecticides in the
Southwest,” July/August 1960, 5. In 1952, Frank Princi also emphasized the hazards associated with
organic phosphorous compounds stating, “Perhaps the most toxic of the new pesticides are that group
known as the organic phosphorous compounds. In common with many other insecticidal materials, these
substances may be absorbed through the skin, respiratory tract, conjunctive and gastro-intestinal tract.” See
Frank Princi, “Toxicology and Hazard Record of Newer Pesticides,” Agricultural Chemicals 7 (January
1952): 46- 47; Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1955), 15.
385 Publication produced cooperatively by National Agricultural Chemicals Association, National Safety
Council, U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National
Vocational Agricultural Teachers’ Association, Manufacturing Chemists’ Association, Inc, Chemicals in
Agriculture: Be Safe! Use them Properly (Washington, D.C January 1964), 2.
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handling and applying powerful chemicals. Although most chemicals of this type carry
warnings on the container labels, the tendency is to pay little or no attention to the labels,
particularly if a material has been used previously without incident.”387
The farmer’s reliance on product labels underscores the nature of agricultural
chemical safety from the 1940 to the early 1970s. Farmers carried most of the burden in
keeping themselves, their families, and even their neighbors safe from chemical
accidents. Although they benefited from the period’s chemical revolution, the explosion
of new compounds added additional complexities to the farmstead. Unlike workers in
other settings who benefited from a much more controlled and supervised setting, farmers
were required to educate themselves regarding the proper use of potentially dangerous
compounds. The copious amounts of safety literature regarding the proper mixing, use,
and storage of chemicals revealed that it was far from easy. The significant number of
chemical related accidents on farms illustrated that many users were either unwilling or
unable to follow safe procedures. However, chemical manufacturers did not always write
the labels correctly, which clearly suggests that even reading a product’s label did not
guarantee an understanding of the various dangers associated with a chemical.
Additionally, the fact that both the availability and practicality of protective devices was
not always sufficient reveals that some safety measures may not have always been
feasible. Furthermore, the federal government and the states possessed rather weak
chemical regulatory tools prior to the early 1970s, which lessened the possibility of sound
safety conditions for the nation’s farm families. Nevertheless, farm safety advocates
387 Mary K. Farinholt, The New Masked Man in Agriculture, 6.
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mounted a vigorous safety education campaign for all the nation’s farm hazards,
including those associated with chemicals.
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CHAPTER SIX
Raising Safety Awareness: Farm Safety Advocates Educate in Response to a Complex
and Ever-Evolving Issue
Farm safety activists demonstrated impressive levels of flexibility in creating
educational programs since farm families experienced considerable change in their living
and working environment. In 1978, Jack Burke, a veteran National Safety Council (NSC)
farm safety writer, reflected on this reality stating that “new accident problems arise and
some older ones fade into relative obscurity as the world passes them by or we learn how
to deal with them.”388 Burke’s comments symbolize how the great technological
transformation the agricultural sector experienced required continued reflection from
farm safety educators. However, new technologies were not the only factors that
advocates addressed in their safety programming. New legal realities were also
considered. Such legislation included the emergence of federal laws that restricted certain
types of child agricultural labor. Furthermore, by the 1960s, farm safety promoters were
not only obligated to instruct farm families about hazards but also were called upon to
raise awareness regarding new preventative devices. Such devices as roll-over-protective-
systems (ROPS) and slow-moving-vehicle emblems (SMVs) either prevented tractor
accidents or reduced the likelihood of one resulting in a fatality. Thus, extension workers,
farm safety specialists, and youth club leaders continually demonstrated creativity
regarding the development and implementation of their safety programs.
Safety advocates exhibited such inventiveness during the movement’s early years.
For instance, in 1949, the employees of the Auto-Owners Insurance Company
headquartered in Lansing, Michigan sponsored a particularly imaginative display. They
388 Jack Burke, “Out of that Mountain, You Could Mine Some Gold,” Agri-Safety Newsletter, Fall 1978, 2.
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desired to raise awareness of farm dangers at Michigan State College’s “Annual Farm
and Home Week.” A Review writer indicated that the exhibit showcased an electronic
device akin to a “pinball machine” featuring various pictures depicting farm tasks. Such
work as “Piling Filled Bags,” “Using Power Take-Off,” and “Leading Bull” were
illustrated. The “Electronic Safety Quiz” presented participants with the choice of
whether the person portrayed in the illustration was behaving in a safe or hazardous
manner. Safety activists consistently demonstrated such ingenuity throughout the era in
addressing almost every conceivable farm hazard.389
Agricultural safety education represented a crucial component in reducing the
numbers of accidents since the unique aspects of the rural lifestyle required convincing
farm families instead of forcing them to live and work with caution. They labored with
few regulatory protections, exerted high-levels of workplace independence, and used
machines in which often lacked sufficient safety features. Thus, activists often used the
term “selling safety” to explain their efforts to reduce accidents. In 1961, Frank Burrows,
a traffic safety specialist employed, by Citizens Traffic Safety Board headquartered in
Chicago, Illinois, also emphasized the principle of selling safety to a farm safety activist
audience. He pointed out that raising safety awareness required an imaginative and
experimental approach. Burrows encouraged his listeners to use humor, eye-catching
props, and other techniques to capture listeners’ attention. He stated, “Let me encourage
you to use some of these ideas so that you will not only be doing a good deed, selling
safety, but will enjoy it more and you will be creating an appetite in people who are not
389 “Electronic Safety Quiz,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1949, 10.
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hungry by making them want to do what they ought to do- that is, to do every job the
right way.”390
A variety of organizations, including the state Farm Bureaus, agricultural
implement manufacturers, as well as a variety of local businesses financially supported
safety instruction. Such financial contributions ranged from very small donations to
relatively substantial monetary gifts. In 1944, J.S. Jones, Secretary-Treasurer, of the
Minnesota Farm Bureau Federation, indicated that his organization’s insurance division
had a direct interest in supporting farm educational programming. Jones stated, “I have
to admit that we had a selfish motive when we started the safety program. It was started
as an issue to our insurance department. We had thousands of claims each year, and being
a mutual insurance company where losses averaged over all policy holders, we found
ourselves confronted with this situation and losses are paid from premiums- and losses
showed us to be in the red for the state at the time to the amount of $500,000.”391
Although Jones’s comments reveal that self-seeking motives were present, such gifts
undoubtedly bolstered the movement.
Although farm safety educators exhibited considerable zeal in their efforts, they
also encountered significant obstacles in their attempts to “sell safety.” Many of these
problems were rooted in human behavior including the willingness of rural residents to
sacrifice safe practices in order to work quickly. In 1951, Maynard Coe, acknowledged
the problem of farmers’ “indifference” to safety. He stated that although “it is heartening
to note that farm folk in increasing numbers are recognizing the importance of safety, yet
390 Transactions-National Safety Council (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1961), 76.
391 J.S. Jones, “Why Farm Organizations should be interested in Farm Safety, Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1944, 6.
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there are many who consider ‘other matters’ of greater importance. Such people practice
safety only if they have a little extra time or when these ‘other matters’ are not pressing
them too hard. And such people are the favored candidates for accidents.”392 In 1951,
USDA officials sent a questionnaire asking farm safety specialists to list the most
frequent problems regarding their work challenges. The experts cited problems such as
needing more data to better formulate their safety programs, an improvement in their
ability to reach the rural audience, and more effective methods to aid in eliciting a more
enthusiastic response from farm families.393 Accident prevention activists appeared to
have faced similar obstacles in their efforts to raise awareness throughout the period.
Rural educators during the era continued to reveal the existence of such
difficulties. C.W. Dalbey, an Iowa agricultural educator, also indicated that sometimes
farmers’ preoccupation with promptly completing tasks overrode a cautious approach to
work. He stated, “I remember many farmers in my adult evening classes who had lost
fingers and hands. Often this was due to corn picker accidents. The attitude seemed to be
that the job had to be done now.”394 Although such comments contain considerable merit,
farmers’ perceived insensitivity to safety should be viewed with an understanding of their
challenging lifestyle. Safety was only one of many concerns farm families faced in
attempting to derive a livelihood from the land. Unlike safety professionals and extension
employees who held a special concern toward the issues, farm families were inundated
with a myriad of issues related to the many challenges of work and living.
392 Maynard Coe, “Indifference,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1951, 1.
393 Transactions-National Safety Congress 1951 (Chicago: National Safety Council), 32.
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Advocates attempted to “sell safety” to farm families in a variety of ways;
however, one of the more important was utilizing the nation’s major communication
media. In 1953, C.M. Ferguson stated, “Mass Media channels are important. Out of every
100 families asked where they get their new ideas, 38 say newspapers, magazines, radio,
TV and other mass media. Extension agents use these methods of communication for two
purposes: First to reinforce direct teaching; and second, to reach people not ordinarily
available for face-to-face contact,”395 Such methods included distributing voluminous
amounts of printed safety educational materials including handbooks, pamphlets, and
posters. Activists also utilized radio and, later, television. Additionally, they provided
direct instruction, including exhibits, formal courses, and demonstrations. Such displays
often highlighted both the dangers of practicing unsafe habits as well as the benefits of
safe work behaviors. NSC officials and other advocates were also constantly seeking
better ways to raise farm families’ awareness regarding the numerous dangers lurking in
their environments. Activists attempted to invigorate their safety campaigns with catch-
phrases in hopes of capturing the public’s attention and encouraging community wide-
participation. They also consistently proved that they were adept at enlisting the private
sector financial support.
Although the issue had been addressed in safety textbooks and handbooks in an
earlier era, the onset of the Second World War signaled the proliferation of such
materials. Even though the NSC and the USDA fulfilled a major role in this aspect of the
movement, they were just two of many organizations providing safety activists with this
type of educational resource. Thus, extension employees, the staff of state educational
395 C.M. Ferguson, “Can Television Strengthen the Approach to Learning?,” Extension Service Review,
July 1953, 123.
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institutions, and even corporations developed their own printed resources.396 Accident
prevention boosters depended on such publications to educate themselves regarding a
number of issues, as well as to educate farm families regarding various safety issues. As
the years progressed, educators could select from hundreds of resources to find those
ideally suited to fulfill their educational requirements.
Even though the NSC had been producing farm safety publications since the early
1940s, the organization’s materials continued to develop throughout the era. Farm safety
leaders could benefit from an annual dose of information by signing up for NSC’s farm
safety service for only $3.00. Subscribers received such resources as the Farm Safety
Review, annual farm accident data summaries, and a register of safety films. They also
were provided with the annual NSC congress transactions. A recipient also received
resources to be used in local safety awareness campaigns, including a packet of
promotional items specifically designed for use during Farm Safety Week. The
organization continued to produce new safety educational materials to meet the new
challenges of the agricultural work. In 1973, a Farm Safety Review writer indicated that
the NSC authors had produced a handbook aimed at informing rural Americans about the
importance of observing safety practices. The book entitled “Farm and Ranch Safety
Guide” consisted of 40 pages of text covering a variety of significant agricultural
hazards.397 In 1974, a Farm Safety Review writer celebrated the “31st consecutive
observance” Farm Safety Week. The piece also revealed the NSC’s continued emphasis
on the publishing and dissemination of farm safety educational materials. The author
396 For an example regarding how authors of safety textbooks treated the farm safety problem, see, Harry
W. Gentles and George H. Betts, Habits for Safety: A Textbook for Schools (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1937), 110-124.
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stated that “Program kits” have been sent throughout the country to in order to raise the
public’s awareness.398 NSC staff continually expanded and adapted such material to the
changing agricultural safety issues as demonstrated by the numerous educational
materials ads that frequently appeared in the Farm Safety Review and other NSC
publications, which cumulatively listed hundreds of separate educational documents
throughout the era.399
Federal government agencies as the United States Department of Labor (DOL),
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Public Health Service, and the
Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Division also published farm safety materials.
DOL officials appeared to be particularly concerned with the issue of child agricultural
labor. In 1965, Charles R. Cavagnaro, a DOL official cited such brochures as “Farm
Safety and You” and “Going To Do Farm work? Take Safety Along,” as resources aimed
at educating the agricultural community about the child labor issue.400 The FDA also
produced a considerable number of pamphlets directed toward growers in hopes of
instructing them concerning how to avoid excess chemical residues. The Public Health
Service and the Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Division also provided
chemicals safety resources, but it appears to a lesser degree than the two other
organizations.401 Such examples reveal that as the technological complexity of farming
increased, the amount of specialized safety information also rapidly ballooned.
398 “Farm Safety Week,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1974, 7.
399 By the late 1970s, the NSC was publishing the Agri-Safety Newsletter in addition to the Farm Safety
Review. This publication was less substantial than the Review and aimed more exclusively toward safety
professionals. The newsletter frequently advertised safety resources, which addressed current safety topics.
400 Charles R. Cavagnaro, “A Full Measure of Safety for Young Farmhands,” Farm Safety Review,
March/April 1965, 10.
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However, the USDA assumed a particularly active role in generating printed
safety resources. In 1943, Lester A. Schlup, chief of the USDA’s division of information,
stressed that more pamphlets needed to be published to meet wartime needs. The
government printing office published “[f]ifteen thousand copies of ‘safety for the U.S.
Crops Corps’” and only “500,000 each of ‘Start Them Right’ and ‘Going to the Farm
Front’,” which resulted in a shortage of materials for distribution.”402 In 1947, Stanley H.
Gaines also verified his organization’s information dissemination role. He indicated that
the agency’s farm safety council “devotes time and effort to prepare and distribute
materials on fire prevention of interest to department employees as well as the farm
public.”403 The agency also routinely distributed pamphlets regarding the safe use of
agricultural chemicals.404 However, USDA researchers were particularly important in
disseminating the results of some of the first national farm accident studies. For instance,
in 1942, the USDA’s Bureau of Agricultural Economics produced a work entitled The
Prevention of Accidents on Farms and in Homes, which provided a wealth of information
regarding the national farm accident picture. Such publications were crucial since they
alerted farm safety activists to those issues in need of special attention.405
401 United States Department of Agriculture in cooperation with National Chemicals Association, National
Safety Council, United States Department of Health Education and Welfare, National Vocational
Agricultural Teachers Association, Manufacturing Chemists’ Association, Inc. Chemicals in Agriculture: A
Guide for Adult and Youth Programs in Agricultural Chemical Safety. Washington, D.C., 1964, 3; “4 Keys
to Pesticide Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1965, 6.
402 “Farm Safety Roundup,” September/October 1943, Farm Safety Review, 14.
403 Stanley H. Gaines, “Prevention is the Key to Farm Safety: The USDA and Farm Safety,” Farm Safety
Review, July/August 1947, 6.
404 Chemicals in Agriculture: A Guide for Adult and Youth Programs in Agricultural Chemical Safety.
Washington, D.C., 1964, 3.
405 United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, The Prevention of
Accidents on Farms and in Homes, Washington, D.C., 1942.
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State extension officials and university faculty also contributed a significant
amount of safety materials to address almost every conceivable farm hazard. In 1943,
John C. Snyder created a series of pamphlets to tackle the dangers associated with those
who labored during the apple and peach harvest. In 1961, W.E. Stuckey, a farm safety
specialist employed by Ohio State University extension developed an “educational
program” to educate farm families regarding the potential hazards associated with farm
elevators. Stuckey and his associates advertised the kit in the pages of the Farm Safety
Review. A recipient of the safety packet received “a cartoon, color slide series and a
model elevator, as well as a script and promotional material.”406 Extension personnel
generated materials regarding a host of others including the safe operation of harvesting
equipment, electrical hazards, and material handling equipment.407
Agricultural journalists also devoted many of their articles to raising an awareness
of the issue. Editors often expressed the view that they fulfilled an important educational
responsibility by featuring farm safety pieces in their magazines. In 1964, Delmer E.
Groves, an editor for Nation’s Agriculture, supported the important place in the
movement held by himself and his counterparts. He stated, “The average farm home
receives and reads some two to five magazines.”408 Thus, Groves supported the
importance of his communication medium in reaching rural America with the message.
The large number of safety articles that appeared in Wallace’s Farmer, Successful
406 “Safety Tips for Fruit Pickers,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1944, 12; “Recent Programming
Aids,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1961, 5.
407 For an additional example, see, Harvey Hirning, Robert Woell and David Swenson, Electric Farm
Power: Look Up! (Fargo, North Dakota: Prepared Cooperatively by the North Dakota State Agricultural
Engineering Department, Cooperative Extension Service and the North Dakota Power Council, 1977), 1-4.
408 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1964), 26.
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Farming, and a variety of other agricultural publications attests to the important part that
such correspondents played in raising safety consciousness.
NSC officials also acknowledged those editors who made special contributions. In
1950, they formally recognized such efforts in an award ceremony held during the
Agricultural Editors’ Association’s annual meeting in Chicago. Sidney J. Williams, an
aide to an NSC president, presided over the award ceremony. He presented eleven
agricultural publications with accomplishment certificates. These distinguished
magazines included such important periodicals as Wallace’s Farmer and Iowa
Homestead, the Southern Planter, and Farm Implement News.409 In 1953, a similar
recognition banquet reconfirmed how the farm press had continued a high degree of
participation. A Review writer stated that in that year alone, “a mid-west magazine ran 12
major articles, or editorials, on farm safety during the year, and devoted its July 19 issue,
including a striking cover to the theme of National Farm Safety Week, ‘think safely –act
safely.’”410
In 1959, Milon Grinnell, the editor of Michigan Farmer, commented on the
widespread attention the issue had received as well suggested effective methods to raise
the public’s awareness. He acknowledged the fact that many farmers showed little
enthusiasm regarding safety education; nevertheless, he believed that the subject was
vital. He stated, “Today practically all farm magazines devote considerable space to
encouraging readers to work safely.” Even so, he believed that such articles could be
improved by making the content more specific and engaging. He believed that general
pieces were far less effective than those which focused on a singe issue and provided
409 “NSC Award Goes to Magazine and Radio Stations,” Farm Safety Review, February 1950, 3.
410 “For Exceptional Service to Farm Safety Program,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1953, 8.
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specific safety recommendations. Grinnell also believed that they needed to be more
positive in their approach stating that “[i]nstead of saying children shouldn’t drive
tractors, it’s better to say: children are old enough to drive a tractor when they show
mature judgment in completely maintaining the tractor without their father’s having to
check on their performance.”411
Robert G. Rupp, an assistant editor for The Farmer, a Minneapolis-based
publication, indicated that writers who incorporated farmers’ accident experiences were
particularly effective at capturing attention. He stated, “The stories, after the first few had
established themselves, climbed up to rank among the highest readership of any editorial
content in the magazine.” He continued, “Readership surveys repeatedly have shown
from 80 percent to 90 percent of all readers, both men and women, read each story.” The
fact that communities sometimes raised money for injured members of distant farm
communities supported the power of such first-hand accounts. He also indicated that his
staff increased the effectiveness of such pieces by aligning particular topics with seasonal
work schedules. Rupp wrote, “Stories on corn-picker accidents, for example appear in the
fall, just before farmers begin picking corn.”412 Rupp’s comments support the view that if
safety educators were to be effective they should be empathetic and knowledgeable
toward their audience.
As could be expected, private organizations or business associations whose
industries were closely tied to agriculture also produced printed safety materials. They
often created materials aimed at educating farm families regarding the potential dangers
of their products. In 1964, a pamphlet entitled Chemicals in Agriculture: A Guide for
411 Milon Grinnell, “Present Positive Programs,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1959, 3.
412 Transactions-National Safety Council (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 4-42.
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Adult and Youth Programs in Agricultural Chemical Safety cooperatively produced by
the NSC, the USDA, and the National Agricultural Chemicals Association (NACA)
featured an extensive bibliography of potential chemical-related safety materials. The
tract listed five pamphlets and other kinds of written material which NACA members had
made available to the public including Four Keys To Pesticide Safety, Agricultural
Chemicals Safety Code and Pesticides and Safety.413 NACA also provided the NSC with
many of the written materials required for the safety organization to encourage state and
local activists to mount agricultural chemical safety awareness campaigns. A Farm Safety
Review writer indicated that safety educators could also obtain such resources from the
Manufacturing Chemists’ Association (MCA).414
Farm safety specialists found these chemical industry resources helpful in their
educational activities. In 1963, Norval Wardle, the first president of the newly formed
National Institute of Farm Safety (NIFS), indicated that both NIFS members and the
faculty members at his home institution of Iowa State University were actively involved
in chemical safety education. He pointed out that the NIFS leadership had created a
separate committee devoted exclusively to addressing the issue. Wardle also disclosed
that ISU had recently hosted a “Youth Safety Conference” in which chemical safety had
been addressed. In a letter to MCA members, Wardle revealed how his work had been
greatly aided by the association’s materials. He stated, “I wrote to your organization
requesting copies of your booklet, Agricultural Chemicals-What They Are and How They
Are Used. You very graciously provided us with sufficient copies for this workshop and
413 Chemicals in Agriculture: A Guide for Adult and Youth Programs in Agricultural Chemical Safety.
Washington, D.C., 1964, 3-4.
414 “4 Keys to Pesticide Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1965, 6.
183
also for a Youth Safety Conference which was held here on the campus.” Wardle also
invited MCA associates to participate in future farm safety specialists’ meetings.
Accident prevention educators continually received such literature and by the late 1960s
could freely obtain a variety of posters, stickers, and other written materials designed to
warn and educate the public regarding chemical hazards.415
Safety leaders also incorporated more recent forms of communication including
films, radio, and television into their educational efforts. Advocates used all three of these
methods to alert rural Americans regarding the many dangers existing in their homes and
workplaces. Members of both the private and public sector produced an extensive
collection of safety films. Farm broadcasters often searched for new ways to capture the
public’s attention in order to raise awareness. They often discussed real accidents and
sometimes infused their shows with such attention-grabbers as ear-catching sound
effects. Promoters also harnessed the power of new information disseminating tools, such
as television, in an effort to inform the public regarding potential threats to their well-
being.
Both non-profit organizations and the private sector produced a burgeoning
number of farm safety films with assistance from academia. During the1950s, the NSC’s
Farm Safety Division distributed an ever-increasing number of these short movies. In
1952, the NSC produced a film regarding possible corn-picker dangers entitled, “Are You
Inviting Corn-Picker Accidents?” The film’s narrator discussed the problem’s scope, the
consequences of careless practices, as well as preventative measures. The NSC staff
received support in producing such films from farm safety experts, various land-grant
415 Norval Wardle, Ames, Iowa, to Manufacturing Chemists Association, Inc., 5 September 1963, Norval
Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University, Ames; “Pesticide Materials Available,”
Farm Safety Review, January/February 1967, 6.
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college faculty members, and researchers employed by agricultural implement
manufacturers.416 Such for-profit entities as insurance companies also produced films
with the aid of university staff. The Iowa division of Blue Cross also funded the
development of a film entitled, “Hands Off,” which used farmers’ personal accident
experiences to highlight corn-picker hazards. Visual aid technicians at Iowa State College
created the film, which provided farmers with ways to prevent corn-picker mishaps.
Although such resources were distributed nationally, the number of farm families who
viewed them is impossible to ascertain.417
The nation’s oil companies also recognized the dangers associated with the use of
their products. Such activities probably not only represented a desire to assist in
preventing farm fires, but also a desire to promote a positive image. In 1954, the
members of the American Petroleum Institute’s Committee on Agriculture produced a
film entitled, “Farm Petroleum Safety.” Clifford N. Hinkle, a Standard Oil Company
executive, provided much of the administrative leadership in creating the film. The
picture’s first segment featured a narrator at a county fair explaining the basic properties
of various petroleum products. This portion of the piece included a lengthy discussion of
the high flammability of fossil fuel products. Following this section, a teenage boy
related the story of how his family had lost their home in a fire. Subsequent sequences
dramatically recreated an incident in which a farm wife attempted to start her stove using
kerosene. Unfortunately, her innocent attempt to ignite a fire led to a conflagration
resulting both in personal injury and her home’s destruction. This part of the movie
416 “Timely Visual Aids,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1952, 3.
417 Ibid., 3, see also “The Safest Township Anywhere,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1961, 5
which discusses the content of a General Motors sponsored film.
185
featured an actual farmhouse burning down which graphically confirmed the tragic
consequences of careless practices.418
Advocates also recognized the importance of enlisting radio broadcasters into
their cause. Extension researchers had long verified the radio’s importance in the lives of
rural Americans. NSC staff fulfilled a key role in getting the nation’s radio broadcasters
involved in the effort to raise safety awareness. They encouraged cooperation amongst
different stations, provided broadcasters with audio material as well as developed ideas
regarding the most effective means of utilizing radio to improve farm safety.419 In
addition, radio journalists displayed much initiative in raising their listeners’ awareness
of the importance of living and working safely. In some cases, radio broadcasters even
assumed leadership roles in the movement by serving on state farm safety committees or
by assuming voluntary NSC positions.
The NSC promoted the involvement of radio broadcasters by providing them with
safety material and opportunities to meet and discuss their respective efforts. As early as
1943, the NSC provided farm safety announcements, transcripts, and scripts to stations
throughout the nation. Farm Safety Review writers also provided useful articles such as
one piece entitled “What You Can Do to Help Put Safety On the Air.” Such writings
informed safety leaders how they could utilize their medium to spread the farm safety
message.420 The NSC’s Publicity Director and Farm Radio Safety Committee provided
the administrative leadership required to enlist broadcasters in raising awareness. The
committee included influential media figures representing NBC, the BLUE Network’s
418 “New Farm Color Film,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1954, 4.
419 “Farm Radio Audience in Pennsylvania,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1943, 6.
420 Dan Thompson, “What You Can do to Help Put Safety on the Air,” Farm Safety Review, July/August
1943, 6.
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National Farm, and Home Hour as well as other important stations. These individuals met
periodically to discuss ways to enroll radio journalists in a cooperative effort to reduce
agricultural-related accidents.421
By 1946, the NSC also recognized those radio broadcasters who had made
exceptional contributions in raising the public’s awareness. In 1950, Sidney J. Williams,
the aide to the president of the NSC, presided over a ceremony to acknowledge their
efforts. A Farm Safety Review writer stated that, “Fourteen radio stations and three
networks also received the National Safety Council’s Public Interest Award for
exceptional service to farm safety during a luncheon given by the council to members of
the National Association of Radio Farm Directors.” The NSC held an awards banquet
honoring the members of the National Association of Radio Farm Directors who had
used their stations to endorse the cause.422 The following year, organization members
hosted another award ceremony at the Hilton Hotel in Chicago. The dinner celebrated the
contributions of the staff of thirteen radio stations that had marshaled an exceptional
effort in increasing public safety knowledge. Stations receiving recognition included
KFEQ of St. Joseph, Missouri, WHFB of Benton Harbor, Michigan and, WHO of Des
Moines, Iowa. These and the other ten broadcasting stations had featured a diverse range
of safety programming. Such activities included numerous interviews with farm accident
sufferers, sponsoring various kinds of safety contests, and placing numerous safety
awareness ads on the air. For instance, an NSC staff member indicated that KWTO of
421 “Farm Safety on the Air,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1944, 6.
422 “Farm Week Publicity Winners Named,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1946, 13; “NSC
Award Goes to Magazine and Radio Stations,” Farm Safety Review, February 1950, 3.
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Springfield Missouri featured “50 special programs and 400 spot announcements during
the year.”423
Broadcasters demonstrated much initiative and sometimes even assumed highly
influential roles in the movement. Keith Kirpatrick, a “farm broadcaster with WHO
Radio in Des Moines, Iowa” not only regularly included safety spots on his station, but
also assumed a leading role in directing safety efforts in his state. He was an important
member of the Iowa Safety Council, worked closely with Iowa youth organizations, and
even assumed important positions in the NSC’s Farm Division.424 His station also
exhibited creative methods in alerting the public to farm hazards such as employing
safety jingles and farm accident victims’ individual stories and contests. For instance,
during the winter of 1949, WMT, a radio station located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa offered a
prize for a listener who could come up with the best safety device. Howard D. Fountain,
of Iowa City, won by creating a device that prevented stock tank drownings. A.L.
Hamilton of the NSC, and Norval Wardle, cooperatively judged the radio safety
competition.425
Radio journalists demonstrated enthusiasm in enlisting youth in the effort by
instigating a variety of activities, including encouraging children to develop their own
safety ideas and sponsoring a variety of competitions. In 1949, Ohio farm radio
broadcasters and that state’s farm safety council cooperated in creating a slogan and
423 “1951 Publicity awards,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1952, 9; see also, “Safety Publicity
Winners,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1949, 8 for an earlier example of such a NSC sponsored
awards banquet.
424 “Focus on People,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1967, 3.
425 “Safety Rhythm,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1948, 3; “Use Radio to Promote Farm Safety,” Farm
Safety Review, November/December 1948, 12; Chuck Worcester, “Gadgets that Save Lives,” Farm Safety
Review, March/April 1949, 3.
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jingle contest. Station managers compiled all the submissions and sent them to a panel of
judges, which included state 4-H leaders, home economics instructors, and other safety
conscious individuals. The winners included Dan Barlow, of Hudson, Ohio who came up
with the catchphrase, “Safety is a factor that is often sought, but it has to be practiced and
can’t be bought.” Richard Dacklin of Lima, Ohio triumphed with the maxim, “Leave no
pitchforks loose on the farm, but a lot of people don’t give a darn. It is easy to get hurt
with a pitchfork too, if you don’t put them up they’ll run right through your shoe, may
puncture an eye, a leg or two.”426 In 1950, Frank F. Atwood, a radio station manager for
Connecticut’s station WTIC challenged the state’s youth to develop safety projects in
observance of Farm Safety Week. He indicated, “Twenty-four prizes worth more than
$1000 were awarded to the winners.”427 Similar contests were held in other states across
the nation.
Both the academic community and the NSC provided broadcasters with advice
regarding their radio segments. In 1955, Frederick E. Beckett, a faculty member at
Louisiana Polytechnic Institute’s department of agricultural engineering, praised his
pupils for their accomplishments. He indicated that his students had developed methods
aimed at improving such programming. Beckett’s students had identified problems with
the university radio station’s safety spots believing that they were rather bland. The
college students thought, probably correctly, that such lackluster safety ads failed to
attract attention. Thus, they harnessed the station’s resources and produced more exciting
programming by infusing realistic sound effects into their shows. Beckett stated that
426 Chester S. Hutchison, “Jingles And Slogans Promote Safety,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1949, 11.
427 Frank F. Altwood, “Radio Contest Saves Lives,” Farm Safety Review September/October 1950, 13.
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“although the production of the dramatized programs requires more work on their part,
students have derived a great deal more enjoyment from producing these programs.”428 In
1956, Wallace N. Dudney, a Farm Safety Review contributor also provided advice
regarding ways to improve radio safety spots. He stressed those who deliver such
segments should “talk clearly,” the programs should be “personal,” and they should direct
listeners to where they can “obtain additional information.”429 Thus, activists continually
sought to improve broadcaster’s ability to help farm families avoid accidents.
Rural educators also believed television could propagate information more
effectively than other media tools. Miriam J. Kelley, a marketing and consumer
information extension expert from Kentucky, wrote, “Television is a natural for
presenting any kind of information, offers opportunity for reaching a vast new audience,
both rural and urban. It helps bridge the gap for the person to busy to get to a meeting
brings in the ones who had been ‘cool’ to participate in extension activities.”430 C.E.
Craver, a Blair County, Pennsylvania extension agent expressed similar sentiments. He
stated that “[o]ur T.V. station has potential viewers of 1 million sets. If 1 percent of these
sets are on and people watching, that means that probably 10,000 people seeing the
demonstration or the information we are presenting. We feel that this is one of the best
extension meetings we could possibly have.”431 Farm Safety promoters also hoped to
428 Frederick Beckett, “Farm Safety with Sound Effects,” Farm Safety Review, June 1955, 13.
429 Wallace N. Dudney, “Publicity Techniques for Farm Safety Leaders,” Farm Safety Review, June 1956,
12-13.
430 Miriam J. Kelley, “Open the Door to Television,” Extension Service Review, July 1953, 129.
431 C.E. Craver, “We Multiply our Efforts on TV,” Extension Service Review, March 1956, 61, for
additional evidence regarding extension officials’ excitement about television’s potential to reach their
audience, see, Arlie A. Pierson, “One Way To Measure the Value of Mass Media,” Extension Service
Review, February 1956, 45.
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capitalize on this potentially influential technology. A Farm Safety Review writer stated,
“Imagine actual demonstrations of intricate farm operations brought into every farm
home through the magic of television.”432 Such comments were common during the late
1940s and 1950s as the technology’s potential began to be revealed.
Campaigners used television to educate farm families regarding the dangers
present in their environment. In 1952, C.V. Phagan, an Oklahoma Extension engineer,
and Burnis Arnold, director of the organization’s Radio and Television Department,
cooperatively produced a farm safety program which aired on station WKY-TV. A Farm
Safety Review writer indicated that Phagan incorporated a combination of elements into
his demonstration including “model farm machinery, parts from machines which had
been involved in accidents, photographs, and sketches.” He addressed a number of issues
including hazards associated with electricity, farm machinery, and livestock. He also
informed viewers regarding how they could identify potential farm dangers and take
practical steps in eliminating them.433 In 1957, O.L. Hogsett, an Illinois farm safety
specialist, indicated that he had worked cooperatively with his state extension’s editorial
office to produce short farm safety film clips. He assisted in incorporating the short films
into “a packet of news and information,” which the Illinois extension service had sent to
the state’s television broadcasters. A Farm Safety Review writer pointed out that “all told,
29 stations are receiving television materials.”434
Safety promoters advanced used television to advance their message throughout
the era; however, it appears that they utilized television less vigorously than radio.
432 “Farm Safety Roundup,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1945, 14.
433 “Farm Safety via TV in Oklahoma,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1952, 4.
434 Ibid., “Selling Safety with Television in Illinois,” Farm Safety Review, January 1957, 12-13.
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Evidence suggests TV stations did not enlist into the movement to the degree to which
radio broadcasters participated. In 1956, the NSC gave three achievement certificates to
TV stations, while the organization gave awards to a vastly larger number of radio
stations. Such facts reveal the likelihood that there was less involvement amongst the
television community. Although safety educators were probably less successful in
utilizing television, they, nevertheless, occasionally employed its communicative powers.
In 1974, a Review writer indicated that an Indianapolis station, WTTV, observed Farm
Safety Week by including the topic in their regular programming. Station managers
emphasized the importance of youth safety by featuring the issue on the “Chuckwagon
Theatre,” a locally popular children’s show. The host stated, “Although we have lots of
city children watching the program, farm safety rules still apply because these youngsters
may be around lawn mowers, garden tractors, and various lawn and garden chemicals.
Also, they may be visitors to a farm at some time.”435
Although farm safety activists’ use of print, film, radio, and TV were crucial
elements in their accident reduction efforts, direct instruction also played an important
part in their educational work. Demonstrations regarding agricultural machinery hazards
represented some of the more popular events. Farmers sometimes witnessed such
presentations as part of larger agricultural contests including such popular occasions as
corn-picker matches and tractor pulls. Advocates also developed occasions exclusively
devoted to disseminating the safety message such as fire fighting simulations and tractor
tipping displays. Such exhibitions served to highlight dangerous habits as well as safe-
435 “Radio and Television… Award winners,” Farm Safety Review, January 1956, 7; “NSC Public Interest
Awards,” January/February, 1960, 15; “Media Awards Given,” Farm Safety Review, January 1962, 8;
Becky Surface, “Showing and Telling About Farm Safety Week,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1974, 9.
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operating practices. These displays tended to attract large crowds due to their dramatic
and competitive nature. Safety proponents’ use of the in-person approach addressed a
variety of farm dangers including those associated with the rural fire problem. Such
activities also evolved as the political, social, and legal context of the problem changed.
Stand-alone safety demonstrations included those aimed at the rural fires. In 1949,
Chuck Forbes, a KASI farm broadcaster, became concerned with the rural fire threat as a
result of several incidents near his hometown of Ames, Iowa. He quickly discovered that
members of other organizations and institutions such as Iowa Retail Farm Equipment
Association, the Ames Fire Department, and Iowa State College were also troubled about
the issue. Forbes, with the aid of individuals from these organizations, worked together to
create the “First Annual KASI Farm Safety and Rural Fire Prevention Field Day,” which
was held “on a farm south of Iowa State College at Ames, Iowa.” Event organizers were
pleased at the large numbers of local farmers who attended and watched the activities.
These included the opportunities to observe firemen putting out an actual fire, implement
dealers demonstrating the importance of using protective guards, as well as exhibits
advertising other safety equipment. Activity leaders also installed a “5,000 gallon
concrete tank” at the location to show the importance of having an adequate water supply
required to fight fires.436
In 1952, Norval Wardle, an Iowa State College Farm Safety Specialist, Chuck
Forbes, of WHO radio station, and Keith Royer, Iowa State College fire fighting
instructor, collaborated in creating another fire fighting demonstration. They presented
their program at a Conservation Field Day. The event provided a wonderful opportunity
436 “Farm Safety Field Day,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1949, 3.
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to raise fire safety awareness for the approximately 14,000 Iowa farmers in attendance. A
Farm Safety Review writer summarized their display by stating, “[I]n one demonstration
a farm tractor was doused with gasoline and set afire, similar to a gasoline spill while
refueling a hot tractor. Then various extinguishers were used, as well as a shovel and dirt.
Farmers were shown how valuable a short-handed shovel can be in case of a fire with
farm machinery in the field. The crowd also saw how a pool of burning gasoline could be
controlled, and how difficult it is to extinguish a fire in piles of burning boards.” The
author commented that the event attracted much attention as demonstrated by the many
questions from the audience.437
However, safety experts and the farm community demonstrated particular
enthusiasm in response to tractor-tipping demonstrations. In 1953, the University of
Nebraska’s agricultural engineers conducted one of the first of these types of events at the
state’s Tractor Field Day. The display primarily involved showing farmers the various
kinds of operator decisions which resulted in over-turns. The tractor was fitted with a
dummy named “Jug-head” who represented a reckless farmer. Dan Kitchen, a University
of Nebraska at Lincoln agricultural engineer, commented on the symbolism associated
with the mannequin. He stated, “Jug-head represented a common type of operator, always
hurrying, never stopping to think, and who fails to recognize danger until it is too late.”
Another dummy named “Bozo” signified the dangers associated with “showing off”
while operating a second rider. Kitchen stressed that such unwise practices could have
tragic consequences. He stated, “Bozo, a different type, represented the show-off. With
little brother in his lap, he thrilled him with tractor capers, zig-zagged, turned corners at
eight miles per hour…. the tractor rolled over, fatally crushing Bozo and his little
437 “Farm Fire Fighting Demonstrated,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1952, 3.
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brother.”438 Although the names of the demonstration dummies were humorous, their
presence provided a realism regarding the catastrophic harm that might occur if one
drove a tractor carelessly.
Safety activists also hosted another tractor roll-over affair in Boone, Iowa shortly
following the Nebraska event. C.L. Hamilton, an NSC agricultural engineer, stated,
“People who pass up articles and lectures on safety stood up in the hot sun for over an
hour to catch every point demonstrated. The exhibition’s popularity was verified by a
flood of requests for repeat performances.” Hamilton indicated that more than 20,000
farmers had viewed both the Iowa and Nebraska demonstrations. These dramatic displays
proved to be much more effective than the earlier use of small tractor models in
instructing farmers of the dangers of careless tractor driving practices.439 Kitchen agreed
with Hamilton’s sentiments regarding the usefulness of such realistic demonstrations. He
stated that “[t]his full scale visual education was highly effective. People who ignore
safety articles or lectures stood to catch every point. Numerous local groups requested
repeat performances. With equipment scheduled ahead and demonstrations promised
throughout Nebraska, many requests cannot be met.”440 Both safety experts most
probably correctly assessed the educational value of such events since they appeared to
better capture the public’s attention than less vivid educational programs.
In 1954, a Farm Safety Review writer indicated that safety advocates outside of
the Midwest were also experiencing success with tractor tipping events. The author
stated, “Today, tractor tipping is demonstrated throughout from the Atlantic to the
438 Dan Kitchen, “Tractor Tipping Demonstrations,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1953, 9.
439 Agricultural Leaders Digest, October 1953, 18. The popularity of tractor tipping demonstrations is also
evidenced by the occasions in which he received requests regarding proper tractor tipping procedures.
440 Dan Kitchen, “Tractor Tipping Demonstrations” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1953, 9.
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Pacific.” This popularity is supported by the success achieved by New Hampshire safety
educators while using roll-over exhibitions. The state’s farm families viewed their first
tractor-tipping event at the “Coos County Farmers’ Field Day.” The Review writer
indicated, “Over 500 attentive spectators saw the roaring tractor tip and thud on the turf.”
The Review contributor revealed that local implement dealer provided many of the
tractors and much of the other types of equipment required for the event. He stated, “The
tractor was made available by Nathan Beecher, Lancaster equipment dealer.” The
business also provided the funding required for “the labor of assembling the ramp for the
grade demonstration.”441 Thus, local businesses, like their national counterparts, most
likely recognized the public relations value of supporting such efforts.
Safety experts displayed great interest in tractor-tipping exhibitions and actively
sought out how their counterparts in other states conducted such affairs. In 1956, Norval
Wardle received information after inquiring Kansas Farm Bureau Safety Department
officials regarding how to implement a program. Grice E. Sexton, the Bureau’s director
of safety, expressed confidence in their educational validity. He stated, “We certainly feel
that this demonstration is making all the tractor operators who see it more safety
conscious.” Sexton’s letter also contained a detailed instructional packet. The most vivid
aspects of the demonstration involved graphically revealing how careless driving
practices could easily lead to overturns. Such programs also often informed attendees
regarding power-take-off hazards, dangers associated with poor fueling practices, and
precautions necessary for navigating rural roadways. Sexton also included materials
detailing the layout of bleacher locations, agricultural implement dealer’s booths, and
441 “New Hampshire Demonstrates Tractor Tipping,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1954, 5.
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even phony tombstones, which were added for dramatic effect. Thus, Sexton, like many
other specialists, was very thoughtful in his planning of educational programming.442
Instructors who lacked the resources required for full-scale tipping
demonstrations continued to purchase small tractor model kits well into the 1960s.
Specialists could obtain such teaching aids from companies which manufactured realistic
miniature tractor replicas. In 1958, the advertisers employed by MO-RE, INC of Bonner
Springs, Kansas promoted such a scaled-down tractor model. The author of one
company’s advertisement pamphlet described the tractor’s quality stating, “The tractor is
electrically powered with a special 12 volt direct current motor. Its gear box is designed
with the precision of a fine watch.” The tractor came with a variety of other useful
teaching materials including a guidebook, a small ramp to demonstrate points of
instability, and charts to assist in conveying the information. The booklet advertised the
product’s many benefits, stressing that it was useful in teaching safety in school
classrooms, county fairs, or at farm organization meetings.443 Although educators often
commented on the superiority of large-scale tractor demonstrations, specialists were still
using these models due to their affordability and practicality.444
Safety advocates also used mechanical corn-picking and tractor-pulling
competitions to reach large rural audiences with the safety message by including safety in
their assessment of a participant’s performance. Chuck Worcester, a Cedar Rapids, Iowa
radio broadcaster, indicated that referees investigated contestants’ corn-pickers to
442 Grice E. Sexton to Norval Wardle, 25 June 1956, Norval Wardle Papers, Special Collections, Iowa
State University Library, Ames.
443 The employees of MO-RE, Inc., Bonner Springs, Kansas, composed the advertisement pamphlet
entitled, “Tractor Safety Teaching Aid,” which came into Norval Wardle’s possession, Special Collections,
Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
444 “New Tractor Kit,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1961, 12.
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determine whether they operated the machine properly. The judges deducted points from
a farmer’s total score for not working safely. He stated, “The safety score card used in
judging the contests is divided into three sections: equipment on the tractor and picker,
safety features and operation.”445 Safety specialists also assisted event organizers in
developing the appropriate operating criteria.446 Participants who displayed careless
practices were sometimes even disqualified. In 1952, Harold J. Schmitz, a Missouri radio
broadcaster, recounted how seriously some of the contest’s officials regarded safety and
how the judges’ actions left a strong impression on the audience. He recalled that at one
event, “Levi Caraway, from Jamesport, Mo., was conspicuously disqualified before a
crowd of over 5,000 people, because he got off the tractor and left the corn-picker
running.”447 In 1953, O.I. Berg, a University of Wisconsin agricultural engineer,
indicated that safety had been included in tractor-pulling contests. Berg stated, “Safety
was incorporated by penalties for raising the front wheel off the ground, hitch height and
rear wheel weight.” Thus, just as in corn-picker contests, safety boosters incorporated the
accident prevention message into the competitive farm events rural Americans had long
enjoyed.448
Although the safety instructors’ ingenuity did much in shaping safety
programming, other factors were also important in influencing the nature of accident-
445 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 36.
446 “National Corn-Picking Contest,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1950, 6.
447 Harold J. Schmitz, “Rules that Count,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1952, 12.
448 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 37; for a useful
discussion of the development and importance of corn husking competitions in North Dakota, see, Gordon
L. Iseminger, “North Dakota’s Cornhusking Contests, 1939-1941,” Agricultural History 71 (Winter 1997):
19-45; Iseminger reveals how such events were especially popular, showing how similar contests would
provide an ideal venue for safety activists to communicate their message to a large audience.
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prevention instruction. An altered legal environment and a greater recognition of dangers
associated with specific technologies were also important determinants. These new legal
realities included restrictions pertaining to child labor in agriculture, which contributed to
the rise of more standardized forms of tractor-driving training. The recognition of the
dangers associated with increasingly diverse types of agricultural chemicals all
contributed to more formalized types of safety education for these potentially dangerous
substances. Activists also diligently promoted new safety devices such as ROPS and
SMVs, which were developed primarily by the nation’s agricultural engineers. Even
though safety instruction exhibited such change, the labor requirements of farmers
persisted as a motivating factor for such efforts, representing historical continuity with
the movement's origins.
In the 1970s, an altered regulatory environment influenced the character of
educational programming. Vocational agricultural instructors created youth-oriented
safety classes in response to the enactment of the Hazardous-Occupations Order in
Agriculture. This legislation represented an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act
barring youth under the age of sixteen from doing certain kinds of agricultural work on
farms which their own families did not own. However, students under sixteen who
completed training received certificates which allowed them to be “exempt” from some
of the restrictions.449 Thus, the development of such safety courses reinforced the theme
that the features of the safety movement were shaped by a host of technological, political,
and cultural factors.
449 Charles E. Wilson, “Rural America Cooperates for Safety,” Safety Standards, November/December
1970, 1; for a detailed discussion of the characteristics of such training programs, the nature of completion
certificates, as well as a course curriculum, see, Thomas A. Silletto, Dale O. Hull, J. Clayton Herman,
“Safe Operation of Agricultural Equipment,” Ames: Iowa State Cooperative Extension Service, October
1975, 3.
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In 1970, Michigan State agricultural educators indicated farmers’ labor concerns
had encouraged the development of such safety courses. They stated that although “[t]he
intent of the order was to protect the well-being of youth. It presented problems to farm
operators who had traditionally hired youth to cultivate, drive tractors, and perform other
tasks now listed as hazardous.” They also stressed that “[a]s a result, Vocational
Agriculture teachers received many requests from farmers for some type of assistance
with these problems.” Such comments reveal that although such classes did present a
positive step in providing youth safety training, the desire for the courses essentially rose
from growers’ concerns about meeting their labor needs. Interestingly, this was not the
first time in which labor concerns had instigated an interest in safety training. For
instance, the fear of labor shortages precipitated improved safety awareness during the
Second World War.450
Such classes provided these youths with practical safety training especially
regarding safe tractor operation. Vo-Ag instructors, owners of agricultural implement
businesses, and extension specialists cooperatively produced and supported such
instruction. Charles E. Wilson, a US Bureau of Labor official, indicated that these local
safety classes were met with enthusiasm from the agricultural community. Wilson stated
that private businesses had been particularly supportive. He also stressed that “[h]undreds
of implement dealers have donated the use of their shops as classrooms and have
provided the tractors and machinery to be used in the instructions.”451 Such sponsorship
450 Neil O. Snepp, Frank Bobbitt, and Howard Doss, Vocational Agriculture Training Program, (East
Lansing: Michigan State University, Rural Manpower Center, December, 1970), ii.
451 Wilson, “Rural America Cooperates for Safety,” 2-3.
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confirms once again the important support the private sector continually supplied to farm
safety efforts.
Although the training was originally developed for those youths working on
farmsteads not owned by their families, young people with different motivations also
attended. In 1970, Wilson stated, “Many youth enrolled in the training program do not
anticipate working for anyone other than their father.” He also supported this point by
indicating, “In a recent survey of the students in one area, it was found that less than 50
percent planned to work off the farm home during the summer.” Wilson also revealed
that many students who met legal age requirements lacked agricultural equipment
training and wished to acquire such skills. He stated that one sixteen year-old Iowa boy
who possessed little tractor driving experience wanted to learn how to safely operating
one before beginning a farm job.452 Thus, such a course probably had a positive effect on
improving the skills of agricultural workers other than the target audience.
In the 1970s, private industry also occasionally sponsored such formalized
tractor-driving training. Such was the case regarding a vigorous educational effort
cooperatively created by International Harvester (IH) officials and the staff of Harlingen
Technical College located in the Rio Grande Valley of South Texas. A Review writer
wrote, “Local IH dealers and other company personnel developed an intensive training
program to help a group of 114 sugar cane growers in the valley who had joined together
to form a local cooperative and build a new processing mill with a daily capacity of 8,500
tons of cane.” The services of “160 tractor drivers” were required to harvest the
approximately 25,000 acres of cane. Jack Niles, an IH marketing official who greatly
influenced development of the course, summarized the program’s objectives. He stated,
452 Ibid., 1.
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“we wanted a complete training course-one with heavy emphasis tractor maintenance and
safety-and one the could properly prepare someone who had limited tractor experience.”
His goals appear to have been achieved since the program’s participants received a
mixture of classroom instruction and supervised tractor-driving instruction from highly
qualified teachers.453
By the late 1960s, agricultural chemical safety education was also becoming more
official. In 1969, Dr. L.C. Gibbs, an administrator for the Federal Extension Services
Agricultural Chemicals Program, discussed the success of his organization’s “applicator
schools.” Instructors at these seminars sought to educate chemical applicators regarding
general safety principles. They also provided advice on how to avoid harming bystanders
and polluting the environment, in addition to offering specifics regarding application
equipment maintenance. Gibbs indicated that attendees included “aerial and ground
applicators, pest control operators, representatives of chemical companies, associations,
State and Federal government agencies, and university research and extension workers.”
He also said, “About 5,000 persons have attended the 18 schools that have been held in
the past two years in the Northwestern, Southern, and Western regions of the country.”
The development of such schools revealed that government officials acknowledged that
the proliferation of agricultural chemicals required an increased emphasis upon safety.454
Unfortunately, farm families had been using ever-increasing numbers of such substances
since the early 1940s, long before the developments of such formalized chemical training.
The emergence of Rollover Protective Systems (ROPS) influenced farm safety
education as well. ROPS included roll-bars and protective canopies attached to tractors
453 “Driver Training-Texas Style,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1974, 10-13.
454 L.C. Gibbs, “Pesticide Safety,” Extension Service Review, January 1969, 6-7.
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aimed at preventing drivers from receiving catastrophic injuries as a result of tractor roll-
overs. Even though workers in the lumber industry had been using ROPS since the late
1950s, the farming community adopted them much more slowly. Nevertheless, by the
early 1970s, Review writers were directing safety activists to encourage farmers to
purchase tractors fitted with ROPS or to install such protection on older models. Efforts
included writing articles for the farm press and showing informational films to rural
audiences regarding the benefits of operating ROPS-fitted tractors. By 1973, both
International Harvester and John Deere had produced films highlighting the advantages
of such devices. NSC officials recommended that safety activists hold tractor accident
demonstrations highlighting how the new technology prevented serious injury and
death.455
For instance, in 1970, a tractor roll-over demonstration held at Nebraska’s
“Tractor Power and Safety Day” featured a tractor fitted with a protective cab. A Des
Moines Register reporter indicated that the tractor’s interior remained structurally intact
despite undergoing significant stress. The journalist commented on the pictures featured
in the article stating, “The particular cab shown here survived not only this overturn, but
also a crushing resistance test carried out with the aid of a heavy pendulum, and another
test involving three backward flips.” These demonstrations encouraged farmers to install
ROPS or purchase tractors which already possessed them.456 By the early 1970s, the
NSC’s staff vigorously promoted ROPS use by instigating their “Tractor Overturn
Prevention and Protection (TOPP) program.” The NSC effort included the distribution of
455 David V. MacCollum, “Tractor Canopies: Army Engineer Research Proves their Value for Protection
of Operators,” Pacific Builder and Engineer, October 1958, 3; “Reducing Injuries with ROPS,” Farm
Safety Review, January/February 1973, 14-15.
456 “Safety is not an Option,” Des Moines Register, 27 October 1970, 1F.
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educational materials in addition to cooperating with other organizations in hopes of
increasing farmers’ awareness of the life-saving advantages of ROPS.457
Activists also sought ways to encourage farmers to attach slow-moving vehicle
emblems (SMVs) on the back of their tractors, wagons, and other farm machinery.
Although researchers had sought various ways to improve farm equipment visibility, an
Ohio investigator eventually developed a reflective triangular sign that became the
standard device. A Review writer described the symbol’s appearance and function as
being “a 14 inch-high equilateral triangle with fluorescent orange in the center and
reflective red as a border. It is designed for use on the farm tractors, trailing equipment,
animal-drawn vehicles, self-propelled farm machinery and construction equipment.” In
1963, Kenneth A. Harkness and other Ohio State university faculty members discovered
a solution after a lengthy investigation of the issue. Organizations such as the Automotive
Safety Foundation and the Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station financially supported
their efforts.458 Harkness and other farm safety authorities encouraged farm safety
activists across the nation to mount promotional efforts intended to persuade farmers to
adopt the sign. Such suggestions included mounting campaigns to educate farmers about
the emblem’s benefits, enlist the aid of local media to promote SMV use, and personally
contact rural residents regarding the devices’ advantages.459
457 “Zero in on Safety,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1970, 4.
458 Unpublished slide presentation composed by Norval Wardle regarding the history of visibility devices
entitled “Tractors + Traffic = Trouble,” 15 March 1968, 1-3, Special Collections, Iowa State University
Library, Iowa State University, Ames; “The Slow-Moving Vehicle Emblem,” Farm Safety Review,
September 1963, 14-15.
459 “Developing an effective SMV emblem program for your community,” Farm Safety Review
March/April 1965 5-7; initially farm safety activists were forced to convince farmers to use the emblem;
however, by the late 1960s, Michigan lawmakers and legislators in other states had made the emblem’s use
the law for farmers, see, “The SMV Emblem in Michigan,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1968,
14-15.
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Farm safety leaders not only devoted themselves continually refashioning their
programs to the new situational realities, but also occasionally reflected upon their own
effectiveness. They generally provided a mixed view regarding the levels of participation
safety programs elicited from the rural public. While they often boasted of the numbers
attending a tractor-tipping demonstration or other event, some safety activists expressed a
general frustration at a public lack of interest. In 1970, Page Bellinger, chairman of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers safety committee, admitted disappointment
regarding how much attention the issue had attracted. He stated, “You’ve heard it many
times: ‘farmers won’t buy safety’ why not? They buy other things they consider essential
for a productive effort. Why not safety? ” He also stated, “Early efforts did not produce
an avalanche of response, so safety received a back-page treatment, except by a handful
of dedicated persons.” His comments mirrored the assessments of other safety proponents
who had earlier concluded that those in the agricultural community enthusiastically
embraced technological improvements without an equal zeal for working cautiously.460
Nevertheless, there is also evidence that contradicts such pessimistic appraisals of
the responsiveness of farm families to the issue. As early as 1953, George Small, a farmer
from Clinton County, Iowa mounted his own safety campaign. Small had been forced to
leave farming after his arm was amputated in a corn-picker accident. He raised awareness
of the need to be cautious around corn-pickers by creating a “countywide card
campaign.” He along with the assistance of local farm youth distributed signs which
stated, “Will You be Next to Swap Your Hand for a Hook?” These posters were
“distributed to all farmers through school children and 4-H clubs, to hang on corn pickers
where operators could see them constantly.” A Farm Safety Review writer stated, “As a
460 Page L. Bellinger, Farm Safety Review, November/December 1970, 16.
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result no corn-picker accidents were recorded in the county during the harvest season. In
the previous harvests there were three arm and four hand or finger amputations from
corn-picker accidents in Clinton County.” Farm safety programming often contained
similar examples of community spirit, which translated into enthusiastic participation.461
Farmers who owned large farm operations which required the services of a large
number of employees also appeared to be interested in promoting safe operations. In
1966, William Spangler who operated a 3,700-acre farm in California’s Sacramento
Valley revealed a number ways in which his agricultural business had benefited from
safety improvements, especially financially. Spangler revealed that during harvest time
he employed a minimum of twenty people full time. He indicated that it was challenging
to find a suitable substitute for a experienced agricultural laborer, and that the costs
associated with his “workmen’s compensation insurance” were partially figured by the
number of accidents that occurred in a given year. Spangler revealed that such practices
as adding guards to machinery, requiring the use of safety goggles when workers used
“grinding equipment,” and holding regular safety sessions had decreased the number of
farm mishaps.462
Regardless of farmers’ interest in the subject, safety advocates argued that
educational programs had a positive effect in reducing accident rates. In 1965, Ralph E.
Patterson, a Federal Extension Service Agricultural Engineer, stated, “It has been proven
many times under many circumstances that where there is an active safety program, there
the accident rate is reduced. Also, where there is no accident prevention program, the
accident rate does go up.” He cited a reduction in accidents both Minnesota and Georgia,
461 “Corn Picker Programs Pay Off,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1953, 5.
462 “Safe Practices Cut Operating Costs,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1966. 4-5.
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both of which had active rural safety programs. Patterson indicated that Minnesota’s farm
families had benefited from a farm safety program. Glenn Prickett, the state’s farm safety
specialist, directed the Minnesota program, which Patterson credited with dramatically
reducing farm mishaps. Patterson indicated that between 1949 and 1964 accidents on the
farm had been reduced by fifty percent. He also indicated that the “water safety program”
in Georgia had also dramatically reduced the numbers of people who had died in
“drowning” incidents.463
Despite Patterson’s comments, ascertaining their ultimate effectiveness of
educational efforts presented considerable difficulties. For instance, it is important to
remember that farm safety statistical data was often incomplete and that accidents might
have been less frequent due to factors other than an education program. For example,
safety writers acknowledged that some older types of machinery appeared to be
potentially more dangerous than other new types of machinery. The case of the combine
replacing the corn-pickers in the 1960s provides one example. Furthermore, safety
activists often presented the numbers attending an educational event as a singular
measure of success. This obviously signifies a superficial approach in determining a
program’s value in accident prevention. Despite such criticisms, safety activists also
identified such problems in measuring the effect of their efforts. 464
463 Ralph E. Patterson, “We are Responsible for Farm Safety,” Extension Service Review, November 1965,
14. In 1970, Charles E. Wilson praised the positive effect of the “Cooperative Extension Service and the
U.S. Office of Education training programs in safe operation of farm equipment,” claiming that of the
35,000 graduates of the program not one had yet been involved in a farm mishap causing “serious injury,”
see, Wilson, “Rural America Cooperates for Safety,” 13.
464 David W. Taber, “Promoting Safety Awareness,” Extension Service Review, December 1969, 3; farm
safety writers often identified the problem of non-standardized farm accident research methods, which they
believed greatly reduced the usefulness data collection projects, see, “Zero in on Safety,” Farm Safety
Review, September/October 1970, 4.
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Additionally, other abundant examples of farm safety specialists who critiqued
their work exist. Farm Safety Review writers and attendees at the annual farm safety
division meeting continually offered advice concerning better ways to both disseminate
the accident prevention message and quality of programming. Writers and speakers
emphasized such techniques as personalizing the information, selecting the proper words
in communicating to the public, and continually seeking ways to capture an audience’s
interest. In 1965, E. Gene Brown, an NSC employee, elaborated on the latter point stating
that “competition for people’s attention is tremendous. The average person is literally
barraged with appeals to get him to buy something, do something or adopt a particular
way of thinking. In order to compete, your exhibit must have the impact to capture
attention and thought.” In 1967, Jack Burke also indicated that detailed planning should
precede every safety campaign or program. He stressed that preparation should include
obtaining a detailed understanding of the problem, eliciting the assistance of the local
community, and creating a sound strategy to carry out the program. He also suggested
that activists should thoroughly assess their performance upon the campaign’s
conclusion.465
As the movement progressed, rural educators gained additional insights regarding
the most effective ways to gain farm families’ attention. A particularly interesting insight
pertained to their view that people were more likely to listen and internalize information
if it was presented by people from their own communities. In 1968, Robert E. Kowalski,
an Iowa State University extension official, elaborated upon this point stating, “Research
465 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council 1962), 8-13; Jack Burke,
“Guidelines for Successful Community Safety Programs,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1967, 7-
10; see also, “Are They Getting Your Message?,” Farm Safety Review, September 1963, 4-7.
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shows that people are sometimes more willing to believe messages conveyed by friends
and acquaintances than those who are purported to be experts.” Kowalski indicated that
his fellow extension colleagues had recently used this finding in their effort to raise
awareness regarding the dangers of placing “household chemical” containers near food
products. He revealed that they placed posters to alert women of the issue in local grocery
stores. Kowalski stressed, “Homemakers shop in supermarkets which give them the most
for their money, and in which they can place their trust concerning quality of products.
They eventually establish friendly relationships with their grocer, perhaps on a first-name
basis.” Thus, safety proponents became increasingly perceptive in their approach as the
movement matured.466
This discussion reveals that farm safety educators were generally responsive to
the changing realities of the farm accident situation. They attempted to raise the rural
public’s awareness of the issue by utilizing varied types of communication technologies
and teaching techniques. In the decades immediately following the Second World War,
activists produced increasingly diversified safety educational materials and accident
prevention programs. Nonetheless, they faced a number of obstacles in disseminating
their message into the countryside including the demands of educating during en era of
great agricultural change as well as overcoming public indifference to their message. The
movement’s leaders also appeared to devote insufficient efforts in determining their
effectiveness in raising safety awareness. However, in all fairness, any attempt to
determine the connection between their efforts and a reduction in accidents was
problematic. Nevertheless, safety specialists believed, probably correctly, that safety
466 Robert E. Kowalski, “New Route for Safety Messages,” Extension Service Review, February 1968, 3.
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programs that encouraged community participation or elicited excitement from the
audience were superior to less dynamic educational approaches. Such a contention can be
easily supported by an investigation into the many youth-centered safety programs. Such
efforts were particularly effective in infusing community involvement and excitement
into safety education efforts.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
An Ideal Fit: 4-H, FFA, and the Farm Safety Movement
Both 4-H and FFA clubs were crucial in reaching the rural public with the farm
safety message. The fact that both organizations viewed community service as crucial for
the proper development of young people made them particularly well-suited for
contributing to the farm safety movement. Youth group leaders held the view that youth
should be instilled with a desire to contribute to the local community’s betterment. In
1940, Leon O. Clayton, a South Carolina 4-H club leader, expressed his organization’s
high regard for community service. He stated, “The club leader is that big hearted, likable
person in the community who gives freely of his or her time to broadly developing the
community through working with the 4-H Club Boys and Girls. The 4-H leader lives a
life of service.” Club leaders also hoped to instill the value of community service into
youth group members. Both 4-H and FFA exemplified these principles as they
enthusiastically assisted in the effort to reduce farm accidents in the nation’s
countryside.467
Safety advocates also acknowledged both the advantages of aiming accident
prevention programming toward young people as well as the eagerness with which young
people participated in such activities. In 1940, T.A. Erickson, an official for the
Minnesota Extension Service, articulated this sentiment at the NSC ’s Farm Division
annual meeting, stating, “They are still plastic, they are still receptive to ideas, they
467 Leon O. Clayton, “Factors Contributing to 4-H Success,” Extension Service Review, November 1940,
149. Thomas Wessel and Marilyn Wessel, 4-H An American Idea 1900-1980: A History of 4-H (Chevy
Chase, Maryland: National 4-H Council, 1982), 1; for other examples which demonstrate how 4-H leaders
placed a high value on community service, see, Donald Y. Yates, “Two Years of Club Work,” Extension
Service Review, September 1940, 118; H.N. Hunsicker, “The Farmers of the Future,” American Education,
February, 1966, 20-22.
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become enthusiastic about things, and they can talk dad and mother and put these ideas
across them where a grown-up person wouldn’t be able to do it.”468 In 1949, Kenneth H.
Anderson, a member of the committee for Boys and Girls Club Work, stated, “For the
time money and effort expended, I believe that more can be accomplished with youth in
the safety field than adults. I say this because youths are open-minded and receptive.
They are joiners and like to participate in organized efforts. They usually have more time
than adults and their persuasive powers with parents and neighbors are great.”469 In 1956,
Maynard Coe, Director of the NSC farm Division, recognized how rural youth were
enthusiastically participating in safety activities. He stated, “They are truly missionary in
their zeal to make the families in their home communities safer at work and play. This
work is not being carried out under the compulsion of a curriculum, but rather from a
sincere interest in the safety of neighbors and friends.” Safety leaders also recognized the
growing involvement of 4-H and FFA organizations in their movement. For instance, in
1956, 130,000 Texas 4-H youth were participating in accident prevention activities.
Willie L. Ulich, the vice president of the state’s Farm and Ranch Safety Committee,
stated, “Hazard Hunts, Safety Meetings and workshops are common to practically
community clubs.”470
Youth groups shared some of the same challenges that other organizations faced
in raising safety awareness, such as convincing local citizens of the need to address the
problem and gaining their participation in safety events and activities. An Ohio youth
delegate to the NSC Farm Safety sectional meeting also indicated that young people in
468 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1940), 40.
469 Kenneth H. Anderson, “4-H Safety Marches On,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1949, 3.
470 Maynard Coe, “Youth Works for Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November 1956 1, 15; Willie L. Ulich,
“Texas 4-H Members Fight Farm Accidents,” Farm Safety Review, October 1956, 15.
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their state needed more reliable farm accident statistics and wider cooperation amongst
other organizations to improve his state’s program.471 Nevertheless, youth groups also
possessed some advantages, including the fact that local citizens trusted youth club
members and that the youth possessed an understanding of the safety issues in their own
neighborhoods, as well as access to local resources. Safety advocates also often expressed
the view that if they reached the youth with the message, it would assist in raising
accident prevention awareness in adults.472
Rural youth became involved in the farm safety movement at its very inception.
In 1943, the National Committee on Boys and Girls Club Work cooperated with the
Federal Extension Service by enacting the “Farm and Home Safety Campaign.” The
national program was patterned after Minnesota and Kansas 4-H safety programs, which
had been in existence since the mid-1930s.473 The nation-wide effort demonstrated that
the national 4-H leadership was committed to enlisting their organization into the cause
of safety. Such interest was also verified by the fact that the youths of hundreds of local
chapters participated in safety programming. In 1946, the comments of a Farm Safety
Review writer reflected the rapid expansion of youth-oriented efforts. The author stated,
471 Hazel K. Beman, “What’s New in Safety,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1954, 4-5.
472 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1959), 18; The Farm Safety
Review featured a significant number of articles whose authors expressed the view that reaching youth
could also result in disseminating the safety message to adults. For an example, see, “When Youngsters
Preach Safety, Adults Listen,” Farm Safety Review, May 1955, 10-11.
473 “4-H Names Safety Winners,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1944, 5; although the
development of the 4-H “Farm and Home Safety Campaign” represented a considerable expansion of 4-H
safety activities, the program was not the first. Several state and local 4-H clubs had already autonomously
enacted safety programs. For instance, Bob Rupp, an employee of the University of Minnesota’s office of
publications, indicated that his state’s 4-H clubs had been involved in safety activities since 1934.
Minnesota youth conducted Hazard Hunts, distributing safety information and constructing exhibits prior to
the creation of the 4-H national program. For more on these early activities, see, Bob Rupp, “Minnesota 4-
H Program For Safety,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1947, 6-7 and Clara M. Oberg, “They Know
Their Hazard Ten-Year 4-H Safety Program Saves Old and Young Untold Misery,” Farm Safety Review,
September/October 1943, 10-11.
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“Leading the nation in practical farm accident prevention work for another year, 35,000
4-H club boys and girls have completed their 1945 safety activities.” The Review
contributor also congratulated rural youth’s “immeasurable” contribution to the effort to
reduce farm accidents.474 Another writer indicated that the club leaders who participated
in the program hoped to “draw members’ attention to common accident hazards on farm
and in homes and encourage them to participate in programs and promote safety as a 4-H
principle.”475
The 4-H “Farm and Home Safety Campaign” directors recognized youth who
devoted special efforts for the cause. In 1950, the Jackson County, Arkansas 4-H chapter
won a special commendation. Club members had divided themselves into “four
committees,” each dedicated to a specific farm danger including fire, home, highway, and
farm hazards. Helen Baker, a particularly active member, gave farm and home safety
demonstrations to a combined audience of 2,000 people. Both individuals and club
chapters whose achievements were exceptional received prizes. These awards included
free trips to the National 4-H congress, cash awards, and a plaque. The 4-H Farm and
Home Safety Campaign’s participants expanded from 100,000 in 1943 to approximately
400,000 a mere seven years later.476 The numbers remained large and consistent
throughout both the 1950s and 60s. In 1968, a Farm Safety Review writer indicated that
516,600 youth participated in the 4-H Safety program.477
474 “Honor 4-H Safety Champs,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1946, 3.
475 “4-H Safety Winners,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1953, 3.
476 Margarite McNally, “Millions of Hazards Removed,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1950, 8.
Prior to the enactment of this national program, the NSC had encouraged FFA youth to instigate safety
awareness activities by recognizing students who had made special contribution to making their
communities safer with certificates of recognition, see, “Safety Award For FFA Boys,” May/June 1943, 12.
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FFA leaders also enacted a national safety program, which attracted a similarly
enthusiastic response. In 1950, the Future Farmer of America Foundation sponsored a
program which was comparable to the 4-H’s “Farm and Home Safety Campaign.” The
organization’s national leadership began a program in which they provided cash prizes to
clubs that made special contributions to improving safety conditions in their local areas.
FFA foundation leaders presented 200 separate $50 awards to winning chapters and
medals to individuals who had contributed exceptionally. In 1950, an FFA chapter from
Smith County, Tennessee earned a particularly high recognition. John Farrar, an official
for the Federal Security Agency, praised the chapter’s members who had implemented a
variety of awareness activities including constructing safety exhibits and distributing
educational materials.478
The Smith County FFA chapter provides a vivid example of how a local youth
club could mount a vigorous effort. Members enthusiastically involved themselves in a
variety of safety-related activities, including constructing exhibits, participating in Farm
Safety Week, and enlisting the local media’s involvement. Chapter members constructed
an exhibit highlighting the most common farm hazards and showed it at their county and
state fair. Area youth also observed Farm Safety Week by visiting schools and private
residences to raise safety awareness. They also distributed safety materials to an
477 “4-H Club Safety Winners Named,” Farm Safety Review, January 1968, 8.
478 John Farrar, “First National FFA Safety Award,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1950, 4-5.
The FFA national leadership continued to recognize accomplishments and offer prizes throughout the era.
By 1956, such cash prizes given to youth and chapters totaled $6,100 for that year alone, see, “Future
Farmers Name Safety Winners,” Farm Safety Review, December 1956, 1; although national coordination of
FFA safety activities emerged in the 1950s, some chapters in states such as Illinois and Wisconsin were
already intensively involved in improving safety in their communities, see, “FFA Safety Club,” Farm
Safety Review, May/June 1945, 6; and “FFA and Rural School Promote Safety,” Farm Safety Review,
January/February 1949, 8-9 for a discussion of these early state and local programs.
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estimated eighty-five percent of the county’s citizens. Club members also developed
safety radio announcements and newspaper ads, which local media outlets featured. In
addition, they educated themselves in first aid techniques and distributed first aid
materials to area farmers. The Smith County example is representative of numerous other
4-H and FFA chapters throughout the nation and also demonstrates how successful
agricultural educators were in galvanizing rural youth for the safety cause.479
Many organizations and individuals supported the nation’s youth leaders and
chapters in mounting safety programming. Farm safety specialists and state extension
services employees provided important professional advice regarding specific
information. They also aided in designing educational programming for chapters. Donor
assistance also made it possible to provide youths who won safety contests with plaques
or financial gifts. Such contributors included not only the National Safety Council and
state governments, but many corporations as well. The NSC also played a crucial
supporting role in all these activities by providing educational materials, advising club
leaders, and encouraging private companies to donate funds.
Extension personnel and farm safety experts continually offered their expertise,
educational materials, and also, on occasion, helped guide the creation of youth safety
programs. Extension workers often served as judges in various youth safety contests,
including national competitions. In 1961, the National Institute for Farm Safety attendees
produced a paper which outlined numerous considerations in developing educational
programming aimed at farm equipment safety. The booklet clearly explained basic yet
crucial operating instructions helpful for preventing machinery accidents. 4-H and FFA
479 Ibid., 4-5; for a discussion of a 4-H chapter in Kansas which was particularly committed to safety, see,
Franklin M. Reck, “The 4-H Story: A History of 4-H Club Work,” (Ames: Iowa State College Press 1951),
289.
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advisors could receive the paper by writing the NSC’s Farm Division, which provided it
free of charge. Farm safety specialists also supplied more direct support by visiting and
advising youth groups. In 1967, Fred Meinke, a Vo-Ag and FFA advisor from Beaver
Dam, Wisconsin acknowledged that much of his local chapter’s success was due to the
dedicated support of specialists including Randall Swanson, the state’s safety specialist,
and Donald Jensen, an “emergency preparedness” expert who was employed at the
University of Wisconsin. Meinke indicated that he had received useful educational
materials from them, as well as obtained personal assistance in designing their safety
programs.480
Private sector donations were crucial to the creation of 4-H and FFA safety
programs. Benefactors included manufacturers of farm equipment, food processors, and
even automobile manufacturers. Such contributions not only assisted in the development
of educational activities, but they also provided opportunities for companies to improve
public relations. 4-H Historians Thomas Wessel and Marilyn Wessel indicated that
Standard Oil’s support of 4-H tractor maintenance programs largely stemmed from the
company’s desire to enhance its reputation amongst rural Americans. Their long-standing
financial support of 4-H tractor educational programs confirmed this desire.481 The
nation’s implement dealers also routinely donated tractors as well provided the needed
repairs for tractors used in youth tractor educational programs. Thus, symbolizing a
desire to promote positive relations with the communities in which they served.482
480 “4-H for Safety,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1947, 3; “For Your Operator Training
Program,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1961, 12; Jack Burke, “Beaver Dam’s FFA: A Safety Program
for Young and Old,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1967, 3.
481 Wessel, 4-H: An American Idea, 94.
482 Leon M. McNair, “Make Safety Part of the Project,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1949, 13.
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Corporate supporters of rural youth safety programming provided the financial
assistance required for many accident prevention activities. The events included safety
campaigns, recognition banquets, and the expenses required for trips to national youth
meetings. The Farm Safety Review is filled with numerous examples of such corporate
backing. In 1959, the Farm Equipment Institute provided the monetary support for the
FFA’s National Safe Corn Harvest Program. In 1960, the Oscar Mayer Company
provided an award dinner for Wisconsin youth who had made special contributions for
Wisconsin safety programs. In 1961, Allis-Chalmers and other agricultural equipment
manufacturers paid for several 4-H Wisconsin youth members to attend the National
Safety Congress meeting.483
Private donations sometimes supported efforts to educate rural youth regarding
the dangers associated with their products. Throughout the 1960s, Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company provided substantial monetary support for the 4-H Automotive Safety
Program. Insurance companies likely contributed at least partially out of self interest. For
instance, in 1961 William P. Steinmetz, an assistant secretary to the National Association
of Mutual Insurance Companies, indicated that his organization had faithfully sponsored
the “National Youth Fire Safety Contest.” Steinmetz’s association supported the program
by developing contest materials, providing the monetary awards, as well as assisting in
the contest’s administration. In 1966, Schwinn Bicycle Company supported an effort to
improve bicycle safety in Kansas. The bicycle manufacturer provided monetary
483 “FFA Corn Harvest Program,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1960, 8; Wisconsin Honors FFA, 4-H
Clubs,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1960, 10; “Awards for Farm Youth,” July/August 1961, 11.
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achievement awards for the program. Instructors taught children about proper riding
practices, basic traffic rules, and repair procedures.484
The General Motors Corporation was especially involved in supporting 4-H safety
efforts. In 1945, GM initiated its backing of such programming and continued such
assistance for decades. In 1968, a Farm Safety Review writer stated that currently
“516,600 4-H members were enrolled in the safety program which has been sponsored by
General Motors for the last 23 years.”485 GM’s leadership also displayed a personal
interest in the promotion of safety and the company’s contributions supported the cause
in a variety of other ways. In 1961, GM funded the development and distribution of a
book entitled 4-H Leaders’ Handbook, which outlined specific strategies and ideas that
were useful in planning a local 4-H accident prevention programs. Company executives
also presented safety awards at the National 4-H Congress or National 4-H meetings. In
1970, Richard C. Gerstenberg, GM’s vice president, personally presented safety award
winners with scholarships. He praised their accomplishments, stating, “You are working
in an area of vital importance to everybody. I am sure the 4-H Safety Program has saved
many lives and prevented countless injuries.”486
The corporate support which the nation’s 4-H and FFA members received was
well deserved. Youth who were members of both organizations made substantial
contributions in addressing the problem. They initiated local safety awareness campaigns
and participated in a wide range of other educational programming, including
484 “Let the Sun Shine,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1969, 13; William F. Steinmetz,
“Young Hazard Hunters Wage War on Fire,” Farm Safety Review, September 1961, 6-7; Joe Van Cleve
and Gary Staiger, “4-H Team Up on Bicycle Safety” Extension Service Review, August 1966, 20-21.
485 “4-H Club Safety Winners Named,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1968, 8-9.
486 “Handbook Out,” Farm Safety Review, September 1961, 15; “4-H Safety Winners Named,” Farm
Safety Review, January/February 1970, 8-9.
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constructing posters and exhibits, and producing plays. They also instigated more
intensive efforts such as personally examining local farms and correcting hazards. Youth
sometimes even led community discussions regarding the issue. They also distributed
educational materials throughout their communities, which assisted rural Americans in
gaining the latest safety information. Young people addressed the entire gamut of hazards
from those experienced at play, at work, and in the home.487
Agricultural fairs and meetings of various agricultural organizations provided a
place for safety exhibits and posters that rural youths constructed to be displayed. In
1948, James A. Schwalbach, a Wisconsin extension employee indicated that fifty-three
Wisconsin youth had participated in “a farm safety poster contest.” He also revealed that
Maynard Coe, the director NSC’s farm division, presented cash prizes to youth who
produced exemplary work. The Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Company granted the
necessary funds for the cash awards. Schwalbach also emphasized the educational value
of the poster competition for both adults and youth. The event’s organizers distributed the
winner’s poster throughout the state in order to heighten public awareness regarding the
need to raise safety consciousness. Schwalbach also indicated that “ [e]very boy and girl
who participated in the contest learned something about safety as they worked on their
posters.”488 In 1950, a safety exhibit contest was held at the Pennsylvania Farm Show for
the state’s FFA youth. The club that created the best exhibit received a monetary prize of
fifty dollars.
487 Although most of the youth group safety efforts were directed toward more prevalent dangers such as
those associated with automobiles, fire, and agricultural equipment, 4-H and FFA efforts included almost
the entire breadth of dangers including those experienced during recreational activities such as swimming
and bicycle riding, see, Virginia Nance, “Paving the Way to Farm Pond Safety,” Extension Service Review,
July 1959, 149 and “4-H Members Ride Bikes Safely,” Extension Service Review, March 1951, 42.
488 “Rural Schools Raise Big Crop of Safety Posters,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1948, 7.
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Club leaders, extension personnel, as well Farm Safety Review writers provided
4-H and FFA youth with guidance regarding the proper construction of their visuals. In
1953, Samuel L. Horst, a safety education expert employed by the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Instruction, while speaking at the NSC Farm Division meeting,
provided a variety of suggestions concerning how such displays should be constructed.
He stated, “Exhibits should be colorful and leave something in motion to attract attention.
For motion you can use a continuous slide projector, poster machine, or mechanical
devices such as a model of a power take-off, a corn picker or a tractor.”489 In 1957,
Martha Kohl, a National Safety Council Home Economist, stressed the usefulness of such
displays as a creative means to educate the public regarding a variety of safety issues. She
stated that a good display should “fit the audience,” have an “uncluttered” appearance,
and possess appealing features to “attract attention” from onlookers. Kohl also suggested
that such artistic creations should possess a main idea and be well organized.490
Youth group leaders also incorporated farm accident plays into their
programming. These dramatic presentations provided an interactive approach to instruct
youth and educate the larger community about safety. The titles of such plays usually
made their message very clear, possessing such titles as “This May Happen to You,”
“You Use Your Head: Else You Wind Up Dead,” and “Farm of Broken Men.”491 The
scripts of such plays were sometimes rather absurd. In “This May Happen to You,” the
489 “Safety Displays Win,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1950, 5; Transactions-National Safety
Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 39. For an example of the kinds of advice Extension
personnel provided in the construction of visual displays, see, John H. Behrens, “Open the Way with
Visuals,” Extension Service Review, February 1957, 27.
490 Martha Kohl, “Safety Exhibits Prevent Accidents,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1957, 7.
491 E.H. Regnier, “This May Happen to You,” Farm Safety Review, December 1955, 11; “You Use Your
Head: Else You Wind Up Dead,” National 4-H News, September 1950, 22-23; George Forgey, “Farm of
Broken Men,” Farm Safety Review, July 1955, 13.
221
main characters were named “Minor Injury,” “Permanent Injury,” and “Fatal.” One of the
“Fatal” character’s lines included the statement, “Yes, I am fatal. I remove the victims
who get beyond my brothers, Minor and Permanent.” The writer directed the actor
playing “Fatal” to “laugh hideously” while delivering the line. Although safety plays
might have had questionable artistic merit, they nonetheless served to educate both
parents and their children. However, the popularity of such presentations diminished by
the 1960s when they ceased to be published in either the Farm Safety Review or the
National Safety Congress Transactions.492
4-H and FFA youth often conducted “hazard hunts,” which involved club
members visiting rural residences searching for hazards. Such investigations not only
assisted in the elimination of farm dangers but also provided youth with useful
educational experiences. Investigators visited local farms armed with safety checklists
used to assess the property’s potential dangers. The examiner then alerted farm families
to specific hazards and provided recommendations for correcting them. Participants
usually returned to the farm to see if the problem had been corrected and sometimes even
offered to fix the hazard. Such investigations also the benefited the youthful investigators
since they were required to learn about many dangers prior to conducting such
investigations. Participants usually discovered a variety of hazards while conducting the
hazard hunts, which sometimes involved investigations inside the home. In 1950,
Margarite McNally, a national 4-H leader, indicated that young peoples’ investigations
involved identifying the entire gamut of farmstead and household dangers including those
492 E.H. Regnier, “This May Happen To You,” Farm Safety Review, December 1955, 11-12.
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associated with electricity, livestock confinement practices, and agricultural
equipment.493
Rural families were usually receptive to such events, which was probably related
to the fact that the youths who examining the homes were from their own communities.
Thus, they were not outsiders, but were probably perceived as helpful neighbors wishing
to a aid fellow farm families. In 1962, Roger Moan, a 4-H club member from South
Dakota, indicated that most of the people whose farmsteads he had examined were
appreciative. Moan stated, “On the 32 farms that I inspected, I found people to be very
cooperative and happy to learn that hazards existed.” The large number of inspected
homes supports Moan’s statement. Thus, 4-H and FFA youth chapters were well-suited to
delivering the safety message since they were closely connected to the local
community.494
The nation’s youth groups displayed impressive levels of enthusiasm while
conducting these investigations. In 1952, Leigh Cree of the University of West Virginia,
revealed that youth in his mountainous state had enthusiastically mounted a large number
of hazard inspections. Cree congratulated the region’s youth regarding the cumulative
effects of the hazard hunts when he shared that “[m]ore than 8,800 accident hazards” had
been discovered and that “about 5,325” had been “corrected.” Cree also stressed that such
hazard inspections, as well as many other activities, had brought the 4-H youth of his
493 “State-Wide Farm Youth Hazard Hunt,” Farm Safety Review, May/June 1954, 3; Margarite McNally,
“Millions of Hazards Removed,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1950, 7-8; during the early years
of such investigations, 4-H clubs adapted their hazard “checklists” from those developed by organizations
such as the American Red Cross, see, “4-H Clubs Use Hazard Check Sheet,” Farm Safety Review,
March/April 1943, 12.
494 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1962), 25.
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state “community, state and national attention.”495 In 1956, the Rocky Gap, Virginia
Future Farmers, received an FFA national safety award partially due to their successful
“Hazard Hunt.” The investigation was particularly impressive since they “surveyed 128
farms of the community for safety hazards and marked nearly 5,000 conditions that might
lead to an accident of fire. A later survey showed that 90 percent of the hazards had been
corrected.”496
However, a large number of such inspections were related to the rural fire
problem. For instance, in 1952, Iowa’s Rural Fire Prevention Program included a
particularly vigorous youth fire inspection campaign. Norval Wardle believed that the
most significant part of the fire prevention program concerned youth’s “inspection of
their own and neighboring farms and the removal of as many hazards as possible.” He
celebrated Iowa’s youth accomplishments, stating that “2,292 of the state’s youth made
5,605 inspections, located 4,920 hazards and removed 2,802 of these dangers.” Wardle
also pointed to the 3,850 fire prevention discussions that youth had conducted with adults
as another positive outcome of the program. During the same year, J.L. Pennington,
advisor of North Dakota’s Rugby FFA chapter, also acknowledged the accomplishments
of youth stating, “I know that the men of the Rugby Fire department agree when I say
that the tremendous reduction in fire losses in our community is due almost entirely to the
fine work of FFA boys.”497
The fire problem was one of the earliest hazards rural youth organizations focused
on due to the extensive financial cost and human life they exacted. FFA and 4-H clubs
495 Leigh Cree, “4-H Safety Goes Specific,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1952, 6.
496 “Future Farmers Name Safety Winners,” Farm Safety Review, December 1956, 2.
497 Norval Wardle, “Rural Schools Check Farm Fires,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1952, 11;
Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1952), 16.
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began their fire educational programs in the early 1940s. The NSC, the National
Committee for Boys and Club work, and the farm press often provided the required
advisory assistance. However, the effort to reduce fires garnered the support of a diverse
group of organizations including both the Volunteer Firemen’s Association and various
insurance companies. In 1958, the Volunteer Firemen’s Association and various national
insurance companies supported the development of New York’s fire awareness program.
Instructors who participated in the project provided young participants with five
informative sessions aimed at educating youth in both identifying and eliminating fire
hazards. L.W. Knapp, Jr., Cornell University Extension agricultural engineer, stated “One
of the chief purposes of this project is to acquaint boys and girls of all club ages with the
potential hazards and control of the fire.” He also stated the program was “intended to
make safer farms and homes through fire drills and a practice use of both homemade and
purchased fire extinguishers.” Knapp emphasized that this educational effort was well
suited to complementing fire inspection programs.498
The Iowa Farm Safety Committee directed another particularly successful state-
wide fire prevention program. In 1943, this effort took the form of the state’s annual
Rural Fire Prevention Program. The Iowa Association of Mutual Insurance Companies,
Iowa Fire Prevention Association, Farmers Mutual Reinsurance Company, and radio
station WHO provided the financial support for the annual event. The faculty members of
Iowa State College assisted the state’s school districts in administering the effort. The
staff of the state’s rural school districts encouraged their pupils to engage in a variety of
fire prevention activities. This work included accessing local radio stations with the fire
prevention message, participating in essay contests, and constructing prevention
498 L.W. Knapp, Jr., “4-H Cubs Learn Fire Control,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1958, 12-13.
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awareness exhibits. Norval Wardle, the state’s farm safety specialist, stated “their most
important activities involved the inspection of their own and neighboring farms and the
removal of as many hazards as possible.” In 1952, Wardle proclaimed, “2,292 of the
state’s youth made 5,605 inspections, located 4,920 hazards and removed 2,802 of them.”
They had over 3,800 fire prevention discussions with owners and conducted 131 local
programs with a total attendance of about 4,500. During that year, 17 of the state’s 99
counties participated in the program He also stated, “During the nine years this program
has been underway, the elementary school children from Iowa farms have removed
39,412 farm fire hazards. They have made a total of 61,705 inspections and uncovered
77,160 hazards. During the last four years, they have discussed fire hazards with 14,851
farmers and presented 366 fire prevention programs to 9,087 Iowa farm people.”499
Although fire was an important era of emphasis, rural youth organizations
appeared to dedicate particular attention toward dangers related to farm technology.
These included long-standing programs aimed at improving safe use tractors and corn-
pickers. Such efforts as the 4-H’s tractor maintenance program and the FFA Safe Corn
Harvest Program persisted throughout the era. Youth organization leaders believed such
training was crucial to provide young farmers with the tools to safely operate in
agriculture’s increasingly mechanized environment. In 1949, Leon M. McNair, an official
for the National Committee on Boys and Girls Club Work, indicated that such programs
as the 4-H tractor maintenance program had been conceived to meet this need. He stated
that participants in the program were “instructed that a tractor which is improperly
operated is a menace to life and limb, and that making a habit of the rules of safe tractor
operation is equally important” as all other aspects of the care and operation of a
499 Norval Wardle, “Rural Schools Check Farm Fires,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1952, 10-11.
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tractor.500 In addition, such organizations also dedicated themselves to lowering the
numbers of accidents with other technologies that were not exclusively rural in nature
including automobiles and electrical appliances.
In 1944, the national leadership of 4-H instigated the tractor maintenance program
hoping to instruct the nation’s youth in the proper tractor use and care. They believed that
wartime labor shortages had resulted in less experienced drivers operating these
dangerous machines. Such a view served as a justification for the program into the 1950s.
In 1951, a writer for the National 4-H News stated that “in the last war as the lads of 18
and older were called to service younger boys and girls, slipped into their tractor seats.
Should this again come to pass it will be a godsend to farmers if these younger ones have
been trained to operate tractors correctly.” In that year alone, 4-H members from 46 states
participated in tractor maintenance programs. These events included clinics conducted by
extension officials, 4-H leaders or university faculty members. In 1951, a tractor training
session held at Purdue University covered a variety of topics encompassing how to
perform routine tractor upkeep as well tips for observing proper safety considerations.501
Historians Thomas Wessel and Marilyn Wessel noted that every state but Pennsylvania
had a tractor maintenance program in progress by 1951.502 The popularity of such
instruction is a testament to the reality that although the tractor represented a particularly
important piece of agricultural equipment, it was potentially one of the most dangerous.
By the early 1950s, Nebraskans possessed a particularly vigorous program
through creation of over eighty tractor clubs that educated the state’s youth in proper
500 Leon M. McNair, “Make Safety Part of the Project,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1949, 12.
501 “Tractor Again is Farmers’ Key Weapon,” National 4-H News, February 1951, 46.
502 Wessel, 4-H: An American Idea, 95.
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tractor operation. In 1953, William D. Lutes, a University of Nebraska farm safety
specialist, stated that they are “doing a commendable job in developing a safety
conscious attitude amongst young tractor drivers.” Lutes stressed that clubs provided a
setting in which young tractor drivers were informed of tractor’s “safety features” and the
“hazards” inherent in improper operation. He emphasized that participants also benefited
from tractor driving contests which assessed their operating skills. In 1955, Henry
Hatcher, the manager Omaha Safety Council, revealed that Bennington’s 4-H tractor club
members endured blazing 100 degree summer heat to clear dangerous vegetation
obstructions. He stated that the youth “armed with sickles, scythes and corn knives”
successfully cleared vegetation which could potentially block a driver’s vision at
dangerous intersections. Hatcher indicated that the entire community benefited from
“unobstructed vision for the remainder of the summer.”503
A tractor program’s success depended largely on enthusiastic community support
as evidenced the Jackson County, Arkansas tractor club’s achievements. Ollie Smith, a
prosperous farmer who owned 650 acres and possessed a long record of community
service contributed greatly to the success of the 4-H program. Smith donated countless
volunteer hours to establishing the county’s tractor club and transformed it into both a
popular and valuable educational experience. Club members learned how to keep a
tractor in proper running condition, as well as operate the machine safely. The county
implement dealers donated equipment and local businesses financially supported the
program. The club also provided entertainment and social activities for the youth who
participated. A National 4-H News writer stated, “Glamour is attached to the tractor
503 William D. Lutes, “4-H Tractor Clubs Build Safe Drivers,” Farm Safety Review, November/December
1954, 8. Harry Hatcher, “Cutting Corners For Safety,” Farm Safety Review, June 1955, 4.
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program through county-wide events which have become popular social affairs for the
boys and their girlfriends and parents.” The program’s success was illustrated by the
expanding enrollment and the high achievements of the program’s participants. In 1947
the tractor club began with a mere three members, but by 1958 over 200 Jackson County
youngsters were participating annually.504
Youth who participated in such educational efforts could also test their knowledge
and skills in tractor operator competitions. Young drivers who had mastered safe
practices earned recognition in these matches. In 1949, the winners of county 4-H tractor
driving competitions competed for the New York state title in an event held to determine
the state’s best drivers. C.M. Edwards, of Cornell University, stated, “During the
operation of the tractors the judges checked on such points as the use of time, engine
speeds for starting, turning, gear shifting, clutching, steering, braking, hitching and
maneuvering skill.” He stressed that the event also tested participants regarding their
knowledge of proper maintenance procedures. Edwards indicated that the winners
received an expense-paid trip to tour farm equipment manufacturing facilities. They were
also given the opportunity to attend the “International plowing match,” held in Canada.
The state’s extension agents provided much of the leadership required for the event and
the “New York State Farm Equipment Dealers Association” donated the cash prizes
given to event winners.505
Tractor operator contests also included regional competitions, which brought
young drivers together from across the nation. In 1961, 4-H youth from 40 states
504 Ex-Air Force Technician sparks an Arkansas…County Tractor Club,” National 4-H Club News, July
1958, 11-12.
505 C.M. Edwards, “Tractor Operators Show Their Skill,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1949, 10.
For discussion of similar events in other states, see, Harlan Geiger, “Tractor Cowboys Thrill Farm Folk,”
Farm Safety Review, November/December 1948, 6.
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participated in 11th Annual Eastern United States and Western United States 4-H Tractor
Operators Contests. Tractor drivers from eastern states traveled to the Virginia State Fair
held at Richmond while their Western counterparts gathered in Dallas, Texas.
Participants were judged by a variety of criteria including observing proper starting
procedures, practicing sound driving habits, and employing the correct refueling
practices. The 4-H judges also took advantage of these contests to instruct parents in
proper operating procedures. Such advice included avoiding the careless practices of
having a “second rider” or wearing “loose-fitting clothing” which might become
entangled in a power-take-off.506
In the 1960s, the NSC and the Industrial Equipment Institute (IEI) assisted in
making tractor safety education more standardized. In 1963, the NSC and the IEI
cooperatively produced a tractor safety program for the nation’s FFA chapters. A Farm
Safety Review writer said that the “kit is designed to assist any chapter in developing an
effective local farm safety activity. It contains materials for a community tractor accident
prevention program, among which are stickers ‘remember cards’ given out during farm
visits. Stickers and cards can be ordered free in quantity.” By the early 1970s, these
materials also included “a safety lesson outline, a large tractor safety poster and a guide
for a community Slow-Moving Vehicle Program.” Both the NSC and IEI received
assistance from University of Nebraska faculty. These agricultural engineers assisted in
the development of the materials that derived from their research activities. In 1970, a
Farm Safety Review writer wrote, “During the 1969-1970 school year, more than 8,300
506 “4-H Youth Learn Tractor Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November 1961, 9.
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FFA chapters in 49 states uses the tractor safety kit,” which represented the largest
number which had ever used such materials.507
Youth organizations also launched corn-picker safety campaigns to combat the
frightening toll caused by these potentially deadly harvesting machines. These crusades
to reduce corn-picker accidents included conducting corn harvest accident surveys, using
the media to raise awareness, and inundating farm families with safety information. The
efforts to reduce corn-picker accidents were very similar to education efforts aimed at
other rural safety issues. They utilized a diverse group of rural organizations and
institutions in the enactment of a focused safety program. They were also successfully
mounted due to the cooperation of a diverse group of organizations who pooled their
collective resources to combat a rural accident problem. Although such corn-picking
safety campaigns originated in the Corn Belt, such awareness crusades eventually
encompassed a much wider geographical area.
In 1952, the Illinois FFA enacted the first corn-picker safety program, which
resulted in informing thousands of farmers about the specific hazards of using these
machines. The Illinois program received financial support from the state’s implement
dealers, the National Safety Council, the Illinois Farm Bureau, and other benefactors who
were concerned about the problem. J.B. Adams, Illinois FFA president, planned the
ambitious effort in which 100 FFA chapters contacted 10,000 farmers with the corn-
picker safety message. Art Johnson, an employee of the Illinois Farm Supply Company,
celebrated the campaign’s achievements stating that youth “armed with leaflets, posters,
507 “FFA Tractor Program Announced for 1970-71,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1970, 9.
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film strips and pledge cards” had “launched a successful attack on corn picker
accidents.”508
By 1954, the Illinois FFA corn-picker program had significantly expanded since
the campaign’s organizers enlisted the aid of a total of “142 FFA chapters in the corn
picker safety program.” The Newark, Illinois FFA chapter’s corn-picker campaign was
typical of state efforts during the year. FFA leaders directed their members to make five
or six neighbors aware of corn-picker safety’s importance by distributing corn-picker
pamphlets, discussing some typical causes of accidents, and inviting local farmers to
safety film showings. FFA members also placed safety posters throughout the community
and utilized local news papers that carried corn-picker safety ads in their issues. FFA
youth also dispensed stickers to farmers to place on their machines displaying their
promise to “pick corn safely.”509
The Illinois program’s success led to the development of a national effort. In
1957, the FFA leadership enacted the Future Farmers of America Safe Corn Harvest
Program, representing a concerted Midwestern effort to reduce picker accidents. The
National Safety Council’s Farm Division, the Farm Equipment Institute, and the National
Retail Farm Equipment Association supported the expanded plan. In 1957, over 2,100
FFA chapters from ten states participated. FFA members “made more than 150,000
personal calls on corn-picker owners,” successfully dispensed “2,700 corn-picker safety
information packets,” and “161,250 stickers and pledge cards.” FFA clubs whose
508 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 20-21; Art Johnson,
“Illinois FFA Tackles Corn Pickers,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1953, 6.
509 V.E. Burgener, “FFA Out to Stop Farm Accidents,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1954, 4-5,
Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 33.
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contributions were exceptional were recognized at the FFA National Meeting.510 The
program was even popular in states beyond the corn-belt. For instance, the contributions
of the Berthoud, Colorado FFA chapter illustrate the enthusiasm displayed by Western
rural youth. These young people “contacted 75 operators and visited 105 farmers to show
them special safety precautions for the corn harvest season.”511
In 1963, R.E. Hauptmann, a vocational agricultural teacher and FFA advisor from
Mount Ayr, Iowa, discussed his club’s experience with the Safe Corn Harvest Program at
the NSC’s farm division meeting. He revealed that Vo-Ag teachers throughout Iowa had
consistently cooperated with each other to ensure the program’s success. He also
indicated that community of Mount Ayr had vigorously supported the program as
evidenced by the willingness of local newspaper staff to publicize the event. Hauptmann
also indicated seven local businesses contributed financially. He also stressed that the
FFA youth held each other accountable for carrying out the required duties. The
instructor stated, “Without my knowledge, class members were assuming the
responsibility of talking with and encouraging the slow doers to get on the job and
support the program. They let it be known that class members would not tolerate a poor
job by any member.” Such comments reveal that the young peoples’ competitive nature
and peer pressure also worked in favor of strong participation in youth safety
campaigns.512
510 Maynard Coe, “An Impressive Example,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1958, 1; “Here are
the Winners,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1958, 6. James E. Hamilton, “How They did it in Iowa,”
Farm Safety Review, September/October 1959, 14.
511 “Introducing-the FFA Winners,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1961, 3.
512 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1963) 8-9.
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Youth organizations also responded to dangers of both urban and rural
Americans, including hazards associated with electrical use. The electrification of the
nation’s farms posed special hazards. Rural youth responded by mounting safety
awareness efforts devoted to the prevention of electrical accidents. In 1947, the
Wisconsin Utilities Association assisted the state’s 4-H club organization in conducting
electrical safety seminars for the state’s youth. Evelyn Evert, an official for the
Wisconsin Electric Power Company, indicated that the educational effort centered on
various demonstrations highlighting the dangers of improper electrical wiring. She stated
such demonstrations provided rural people with “a visual appreciation of the relation of
proper wiring and fusing to satisfactory performance of electrical equipment.” Arkansas
FFA youth were also active in promoting safe electrical practices. In 1948, FFA youth
supported by the Arkansas Power and Light Company labored to prevent electrical
accidents in their state. In the early 1950s, 4-H clubs in West Virginia also mounted in
electricity awareness programs. Home demonstration workers, County Extension Agents,
and Agricultural Engineers supported 4-H clubs in conducting such electrical danger
awareness efforts in that mountain state.513
The nation’s rural youth organizations also directed their energies toward the auto
accidents problem, which also threatened lives irrespective of place of residence. Both 4-
H and FFA also directed their energies toward reducing the numbers of rural Americans
who were injured or killed on the nation’s roadways. Such safety activities were aimed at
both reducing automobile accidents as well as accidents involving slow-moving tractors
513 Evelyn Evert, “Demonstrating Electrical Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1947, 12-
13; Cleva Burks, “‘Know How’ Wins Trip for Boys,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1949, 13; the
activities of the Arkansas youth included one FFA student assisting in improving the electrical wiring for
his school; “State Starts Safety Program in electricity,” National 4-H Club News, March 1953, 35.
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and other agricultural equipment. In 1956, 4-H directors established the “4-H Automotive
Project,” which provided young people with automobile training. The overall goals of the
course were to “give teenagers the opportunity to learn and practice safety rules and to
teach them to take precautions and keep their cars in safe operating condition.” Extension
agents, law enforcement officials, as well insurance industry representatives assisted the
nation’s 4-H clubs in establishing the program. Topics for instruction included safe
driving habits, basic car upkeep, and the criteria for selecting a car.514
Ohio was one of the first states to mount a 4-H course aimed specifically at
educating young drivers. H.W. Harshfield, the state director of Ohio’s 4-H clubs,
applauded the adding of the class into his state’s 4-H programming. Club leaders used a
69-page booklet as a resource to cover a variety of car maintenance and safety issues. The
instructional manual also provided assessment materials, auto maintenance checklists,
and a variety of other resources, which provided instructional support. During the
program’s first year, 4-H clubs in nine Ohio counties participated in the program.
However, the citizens received the class so enthusiastically that soon it was available to
youth in all of the state’s counties. Austin Showman, an Ohio State Extension employee,
stated, “The project was so popular that this year it is being offered to all Ohio club
members 15 years of age and older. Other states across that nation now are picking up on
the cue from the Buckeye State offering a similar activity to their older club members.”515
Rural youth benefited from such programs since they lived farther away from commercial
and entertainment centers and thus were tempted to drive at a younger age than their
514 “4-H Project Stresses National Emphasis,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1961, 8-9.
515 Austin Showman, “Ohio 4-H Boys and Girls Learn Auto Maintenance and Safety,” Farm Safety
Review, June 1957, 5.
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urban counterparts. Additionally, they often experienced more challenging driving
conditions due to roads which were less well-maintained in adverse weather conditions.
Showman’s assessment of the national scope of the program was correct. In
addition, automobile safety education also remained a part of 4-H education throughout
the era. Lin Helton, a county extension agent responsible for three Western Nebraska
counties including Garfield, Loup and Wheeler, assisted in directing an auto safety
program. The 4-H clubs and Boy Scouts of the tri-county area cooperated in conducting
automobile instruction. The members of both organizations received assistance from area
businesses, schools, and law enforcement officials. Participants raised automobile safety
awareness by placing auto safety posters throughout their communities. They also
involved themselves in activities such as volunteering to check the cars of local citizens
for hazards. The automobile inspection included “horns, lights, wipers, and play in the
steering column.” Lin Helton revealed that most drivers appreciated the vehicle
examinations. He commented that the “4-H campaign got a ‘wonderful reaction in town’”
and that the state’s highway patrol was particularly pleased with the efforts of these
Nebraska youth. The nation’s 4-H club membership participation in the organization’s
automobile safety program continued unabated. In 1969, a Farm Safety Review writer
indicated that approximately 70,000 youths had satisfactorily fulfilled the course’s
requirements in that year alone.516
Although automobile collisions represented a major problem, the issue of crashes
involving slow-moving agricultural equipment signified another cause of rural highway
516 “Sand Hills Safety,” National 4-H News, July 1959, 17; “Let the Sun Shine,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1969, 13.
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fatalities. In 1954, the NSC enlisted the aid of the growing number of state farm safety
committees in hopes of enrolling thousands of youth in an effort to “reflectorize” farm
equipment. Both FFA and 4-H members participated enthusiastically in the NSC’s “Lite-
Farm Equipment” program. The campaign’s success was largely due to a cooperation of
the National Safety Council, state farm safety committees, and local youth clubs. The
NSC provided the state committees with highway safety awareness tracts, reflective
materials, and directions for applying these illuminated strips. State committees
distributed such supplies to local youth clubs. Rural youth then encouraged local farmer
to use reflective materials and even helped them attach the materials to their
equipment.517
The NSC program received widespread participation from nation’s 4-H and FFA
Clubs throughout the late 1950s. In 1957, a Farm Safety Review writer stated, “The
National Safety Council continues to urge that farmers equip farm machines with
reflective material to supplement regular lighting devices provided by equipment
manufactures.”518 Youth groups worked diligently in the closing years of the decade to
fulfill this aim. In the spring of 1955, only the program’s second year, youth in nineteen
state’s participated “Lite-Farm Equipment” program. A Farm Safety Review writer stated,
“In one state, more than 20,000 pieces of farm equipment and 2,500 farm automobiles
and trucks were reflectorized in the first 60 days after the project got under way.”519 In
517 “National Safety Campaign: FFA and 4-H Members Reflectorize Farm Implements,” Farm Safety
Review, May/June 1954, 4-5; although the federal government would soon mandate lighting through the
Lamps on Farm Tractors and Equipment section of the uniform traffic code. Many safety writers believed
that many farmers still lacked adequate lighting and reflective materials, thus farmers needed to augment
such lighting by attaching additional reflective devices. For specific information regarding this legislation,
see, Kenneth Fiske, “Light for Life,” Farm Safety Review, April 1957, 12-13.
518 “Reflectorizing-A Continuing Program,” Farm Safety Review, April 1957, 4.
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1956, the Iowa Farm Safety Committee alone enlisted a host of local 4-H and FFA
chapters, resulting in the attaching reflective material to “15,000 pieces of farm
equipment.”520 Such state campaigns illustrated the effectiveness of the farm safety
organizational network since the NSC provided reflective materials and accompanying
educational materials to state farm safety committees who then distributed them to the
states 4-H clubs. The USDA also supported the reflective drive by “supporting the project
through publicity releases to TV and radio stations.”521
The ultimate effectiveness of these youth programs on promoting safety
awareness and reducing accident rates in their communities is difficult to ascertain. This
is particularly true regarding the educational value of safety exhibits, posters, and plays.
Although they probably served to instruct youth regarding a host of safety issues, as well
as raising the public’s safety awareness, it is difficult to tell to what degree. Even the
era’s 4-H and FFA club leaders admitted this point. In 1952, Richard M. Goss, a 4-H
leader from Colorado, stated, “We can’t tell exactly how many accidents we have
prevented or lives we have saved. But we do know that many farms and home are safer
places to live.”522 4-H historians Thomas Wessel and Marilyn Wessel also admitted that it
519 “Nineteen States Set Up for Reflective Lighting,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1955, 4; although,
the NSC’s Lite-Farm Equipment campaign represented a particularly large and well-coordinated improve
vehicle visibility effort it was not the only effort of conducted by youth groups during the era. In 1954,
Rodger Sandage, a 4-H club leader from Benton County, Iowa, mounted such an effort independently of
the NSC. The county’s 4-H youth sold flags to farmers who attached them to their tractors to improve
visibility, see, Mark Kruse, “Iowa’s Record County Record Drive: Benton County 4-H Boys Make
Highways Safer For Tractors and Motorists,” Farm Safety Review, May/June, 1954, 5.
520 “Reflectorizing: A Continuing Program,” Farm Safety Review, April 1957, 5.
521 “National Safety Campaign FFA and 4-H Members Reflectorize Farm Implements,” Farm Safety
Review, May/June 1954, 4; “Nineteen States Set Up For Reflective Lighting,” Farm Safety Review
March/April 1955, 4.
522 “The Miracle of Safety Comes to Montrose County,” National 4-H News, November 1952, 11.
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would be difficult to assess the effect safety education had in reducing hazards in the
countryside.
Nevertheless, the NSC, state extension officials, and rural youth organizations
collected enough favorable data to justify the continuance of rural youth safety programs.
Wisconsin safety advocates believed young people had played a crucial role in the
reduction of farm accidents. In 1952, a brief article in the Farm Safety Review indicated
that farm mishaps that resulted in death had been reduced from 168 in 1945 to 115 by
1951 in their state. The piece also revealed that every year in that six-year period had
witnessed a gradual reduction in the fatality numbers. In 1955, Randall Swanson,
Wisconsin’s farm safety specialist, gave much of the credit to the state’s youth stating,
“We have had large reductions in farm accident deaths. Much of the credit for this goes
to the youth organizations of our state.”523
Although it is difficult to determine the overall effectiveness of hazard hunt
activities, it is highly probable that they at least temporarily reduced the presence of
dangerous conditions. Youth clubs that conducted such investigations often examined
hundreds of farmsteads and also identified hundreds of potential dangers. In 1951, the
Rugby North Dakota Chapter examined the properties of 496 farm families. Even though
they did not correct the hazards themselves, they provided the families with specific
advice on how to rectify dangers. Investigations including a second visit were probably
more effective in reducing risks to farm families. An examination by a group of 4-H
youth in Ohio featured such a structure and produced impressive results. In 1951, George
523 “Progress in Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1952, 11; although the cited farm
accident study shows a reduction in the instances of farm accident fatalities, it does not provide information
regarding who conducted the study; Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety
Council, 1954) 31.
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Tewksberry, an employee of the Ohio, Farm Bureau Insurance Company, stated, “After a
second inspection tour found that Mr. Farmer had corrected over 2000 hazards, giving
them a 53.5 percentage of hazards eliminated.”524 Club members who directly eliminated
dangerous conditions ensured safety improvements. In 1954, the Bottineau, North Dakota
FFA youth club members revealed that they had “repaired or installed power-take-off
shields on 37 tractors, replaced 271 loose or broken tool handles, repaired or built 48
ladders, inspected 560 electrical appliances for shorts, repaired the cords on 189
appliances, removed the sharp edges from 540 machines, repaired floors on 50 hay racks
and wagons.” Youth groups who conducted hazard hunts throughout the era boasted of
similarly impressive results.525
FFA and 4-H members who conducted reflective campaigns measured success
similarly. Instead of disclosing how many hazards they had identified and corrected, they
revealed how many pieces of farm equipment they had “reflectorized.” In 1955, Melvin
Simmons of the Jasper Missouri FFA chapter enthusiastically proclaimed that his chapter
that “purchased 400 feet of Scotch light tape and applied the tape to 180 machines.”526
Sharon Hansen, a member of the Richland Center, Wisconsin 4-H chapter also measured
success in the same fashion. She stated that her 4-H club participated in the national
organization’s “reflectorizing” campaign by “applying the reflective tape to 125 farm
machines and vehicles that travel on the road at night.” Hansen believed that the
524 “FFA Farm Safety Award,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1951, 8; “443 Safer Farms,”
Farm Safety Review, March/April 1951, 3.
525 “National FFA Makes Awards,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1954, 7; for additional
examples of the results of youth investigation of farmsteads, see, “FFA Safety Awards,” Farm Safety
Review, January/February 1953, 4; Peggy Duggan, “Safety Enthusiasts,” National 4-H News, April 1955,
45; Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 25.
526 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1955), 26.
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campaign had helped reduce the number of accidents, stating, “This year we had only
three minor accidents in our community but this number is considerably smaller than that
of last year.” Although it is probable that the 4-H safety activities helped in this
reduction, there could easily have been a myriad of other factors that contributed to the
reduction of automobile accidents in that part of Wisconsin.527
Rural safety leaders provided more convincing evidence to support the
effectiveness of corn-picker safety campaigns. In 1953, Otto Steffey, a high-ranking
official for the Illinois Farm Supply Company, credited his state’s “Corn Picker Safety
Program” for reducing the number of harvesting accidents. Steffey, who was a vigorous
supporter of the program, disclosed that in Illinois there had been 235 corn-picking
accidents in 1951, which had been lowered to 168 the following year. Robert Howey, a
Vo-Ag teacher from Sycamore High School, admitted that “part of this may have been
due to better picking conditions.” However, he also stated, “We like to think that part of
it was due to our safety education program.”528 In addition, Minnesotans also experienced
success with the program. In 1953, Glenn I. Pickett, a University of Minnesota farm
safety specialist, remarked that Minnesota’s Corn picker Safety Program had also been
worthwhile. He stated, “One county reports results of this type of safety campaign: ‘no
corn picker accidents in a heavy corn producing area for the last three years to October
17, 1953.’”529
527 Sharon Hanson, “Year ‘Round Safety,” National 4-H Club News , February 1955, 37. 4-H and FFA
clubs improved the visibility of thousands of tractors and pieces of farm equipment while participating in
such campaigns, see, “FFA Farm Safety Award,” Farm Safety Review, November/December, 1951, 9; FFA
Safety Awards,” Farm Safety Review, January/February 1953, 4.
528 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953), 21, 33; Howey is
referring to the reality that varying conditions in the crop contributed to instances of clogging which
invariably increased the likelihood of harvesting accidents.
529 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1953) 56.
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The corn-picker campaign’s success is also supported by both more longitudinal
and nationally grouped data. In 1955, Roland Espensheid, a Vo-Ag teacher from
Franklin, Illinois, provided a more comprehensive picture of the corn-picker campaign’s
positive effects in his state. He stated, “In 1951, we did not have an organized corn-picker
program in Illinois, and we had, at that time, about 292 corn picker accidents in our state.
In 1952, we had 221; in 1953, we had 192; and in 1954, we had 115.”530 The “FFA Safe
Corn Harvest Program” had expanded to ten states by 1958, which resulted in thousands
of farmers being reached with information regarding the safe use of corn-pickers.531
Safety advocates believed that the campaign’s dissemination had achieved significant
cumulative results. In 1959, an anonymous Farm Safety Review writer indicated that
there had been 83 corn picker related injuries in 1958, which had been reduced from 214
the previous year. 532
Such less exclusively rural accidents as fires and automobiles accidents also
witnessed marked reductions by youth-driven safety efforts. Norval Wardle indicated that
since the inception of the youth-oriented fire prevention program in the early 1940s,
instances of farm fires had been lowered from 844 conflagrations to 544 in 1952. In
1952, J.L. Pennington, an advisor for North Dakota’s Rugby FFA chapter, also
speculated that his area’s fire prevention campaign had resulted in a positive impact since
there had not been a fire in the surrounding area since the program’s inception. In 1969, a
Farm Safety Review writer E.C. Hale, Lexington, Kentucky’s chief of police commenting
on the state 4-H automobile program revealed that although the program had only been
530 Transactions-National Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1955) 36.
531 “Here they are-The Winners,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1958, 6.
532 “A Job Well Done,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1959, 14.
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existence for three years, area accidents had been reduced from 1,034 to 967 and
accidents resulting in death had been lowered from nine to two.533
Regardless of the ultimate impact of youth-oriented safety activities, such
accident prevention programs represented some of the era’s most vibrant and widespread
safety efforts. Safety advocates had early on identified both 4-H and FFA as ideal
organizational tools to reach the rural public with the safety message. Characteristics of
youth safety programs such as their diverse nature of safety programming, the large
numbers of participants, and the apparent receptiveness of farm families appear to have
justified their positive appraisal of such organizations to be uniquely suited to carry the
message. Fortunately for farm safety proponents the call to enlist rural youth in accident
prevention efforts was met by the generous support of individuals and groups both from
the private and public support. Although such backing was not entirely altruistic, it was
nevertheless crucial for providing the resources required for the participation of
thousands of youth in the Farm Safety Movement. In 1951, Franklin M. Reck reflected
on the accomplishments of the organization in the first history of the 4-H organization.
He stated, “Multiple streams of precious knowledge have flowed from the source of
learning to the farms, there to be converted into practice by willing young hands and
minds and hearts.” Reck’s words were particularly valid pertaining to the information
disseminated by 4-H safety activities. 534
533 “Rural Schools Check Farm Fires,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1952, 11; Transactions-National
Safety Congress, (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1952), 16; “Let the Sun Shine,” Farm Safety Review,
November/December 1969, 13.
534 Reck, The 4-H Story, 289.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Lawsuits, Institutional Struggles, and Legislation: A More Contentious Environment
Characterized the Farm Safety Movement
By the early 1960s, the nation’s farm safety leaders could reflect on their notable
achievement of establishing a coordinated national farm safety movement. They had
demonstrated flexibility in their successful effort to increase the public’s awareness of the
problem. The same organizations continued to direct the movement’s course; however,
the effort’s cooperative tone had become less dominant. A variety of factors and events
altered the character of a movement that had arisen amidst Americans’ feelings of unity
and patriotism. Farm safety leaders desired to increase their professional prestige and
autonomy, which in some cases meant that they were willing to sacrifice a harmonious
relationship with other members of the movement. Individuals involved in farm accidents
increasingly responded to their injuries by taking legal recourse against farm equipment
manufacturers, which also produced a more contentious environment. This trend was
demonstrated particularly in the growing numbers of product liability cases concerning
accidents involving farm equipment. Furthermore, by the 1970s, OSHA’s attempt to
improve agricultural safety also sparked controversy as many farm community members
resisted what they viewed as an unwarranted intrusion into their affairs.
In the early 1960s, farm safety specialists separated themselves from the NSC by
creating a distinct organization. In July 1962, they changed the National Institute of Farm
Safety into their own autonomous non-profit organization. They took this step at the
yearly NIFS meeting held at Sarasota, Florida. The NSC’s Farm Division had previously
exerted control over the annual meeting; however, farm safety experts wanted their own
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independent organization. Although farm safety specialists had been without such a
professional association, it appears they had long desired one. In a letter dated March 6,
1963, Norval Wardle, the first president of the NIFS, wrote to Howard Pyle, the head of
the NSC, regarding the origins of the newly independent association. He stated, “This is
not a fly-by-night organization which developed overnight. It is the result of the desires,
dreams, studies and plans of a large group of the professional workers in farm safety over
the years since 1950 when I had the honor of first proposing it at one of our workshop
get-togethers. It did not appear feasible at that time, but we think it is proper and right
now.”535
The correspondence between the leaders of the NSC and the NIFS also reveals
that this rather audacious move had caused some tension. In the spring of 1963, Wardle
wrote another letter to Pyle revealing a lack of communication. He expressed dismay
regarding how NSC officials had not corresponded with the Farm Institute officials and
also articulated his determination to forge an independent organization. Wardle stated,
“May I assure you again that we have every desire to cooperate with the National Safety
Council but we do not plan to subordinate.”536 Although this particular letter was never
sent, the correspondence between NIFS and NSC officials throughout 1963 alludes to the
535 Norval Wardle to Howard Pyle, National Safety Council President, March 6, 1963, Norval Wardle
Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
536 “National Institute for Farm Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November, 1962, 14. Norval Wardle to
Howard Pyle, National Safety Council President, May 2, 1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special
Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames. Although Wardle indicates that
he did not send the letter, it nonetheless reveals how the NSC coolly received the news of the development
of a separate farm safety organization and the determination of the specialists to be autonomous. The initial
steps to establish a discrete organization had been taken unbeknownst to NSC leaders by farm safety
specialists at their annual meeting which was to be held in Florida, see Norval Wardle, “To All Safety
Specialists,” September 21, 1962, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University
Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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existence of some inter-organizational strain. On May 8, Norval Wardle sent a memo to
Howard Pyle demonstrating the desire of NIFS members to work harmoniously with
NSC leadership. He stated, “May I assure you again that we have every desire to
cooperate with the National Safety Council and particularly with the Farm Division.
There is no desire or consideration of being in any way competitive but only
complementary and supplementary.”537 The letter’s conciliatory tone reveals the
likelihood NSC officials had not greeted the NIFS establishment favorably.
Additional correspondence between NSC and NIFS leadership provides more
convincing evidence of a relationship in stress. In June 1963, Glenn I. Prickett, a
University of Minnesota farm safety specialist, wrote to Randall C. Swanson, his
University of Wisconsin counterpart, regarding the situation. Prickett indicated that he
would be disappointed if any hard feelings resulted with the NSC as a result of the
organization’s desire to be autonomous. He stated, “My personal feeling is that we can be
of help to the Farm Department and we do need the Farm Department in carrying on our
educational program.”538 On November 15, Randall Swanson wrote to Norval Wardle
stating that, “all of us appreciate the fine work that you did as the first president of the
National Institute for Farm Safety. It has been a difficult year because of resistance
coming from the National Safety Council. I believe that we have conquered our major
obstacles and that we can go forward from here.” He further indicated that the
537 Norval Wardle to Howard Pyle, May 8, 1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa
State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
538 Randall C. Swanson to Glenn I. Prickett, University of Minnesota Farm Safety Specialist, June 21,
1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University,
Ames.
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organization’s first meeting held at Des Moines, Iowa had been a “real ‘touch and go’
affair.”539
Although the organization’s first meeting resulted in some tension, Norval Wardle
had taken the opportunity of his first presidential address to usher in a new period in his
occupation’s development. He indicated that the creation of a professional organization
meant that, “we are, as a group, now mature.” Wardle alluded to the fact that farm safety
efforts needed to be increasingly based upon sound research and analysis. He also
indicated that a more rational approach would not only make the nation’s farms safer but
also improve the farm safety profession’s stature. He stated, “Our safety programs can no
longer be based on what we think is right. We have some knowledge, some facts in
safety; here is where we should have our programs. As we get more and more facts, we
can broaden and extend or programs.”540 Such words indicate that farm safety leaders
now fully identified their cause as one that demanded a more systematic approach. They
also appear to have fervently believed it was a challenge which could best be solved by
applying their own unique brand of expertise.
Despite Wardle’s optimism, a number of individuals in the movement disliked the
organization’s exclusionary practices. The NIFS leaders’ creation of rather rigid
membership qualifications stirred controversy. Such selectivity reflected their desire to
increase the professional respectability of farm safety careerists. Wardle reflected this
view when he stated that the organization should not only “promote the safety of farm
people in all ways possible,” but also “develop the profession of farm safety.” In 1963,
539 Norval Wardle to Randall C. Swanson , November 15, 1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special
Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
540 Norval Wardle, “First President’s Message,” 1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections,
Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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Randall Swanson stated that “we have a sound foundation on which to build the prestige
of our profession so that we might take our proper place among other professional
groups.”541 Institute leaders expressed this desire in the organization’s restricted
membership requirements. NIFS policies limited full membership to individuals who
devoted themselves exclusively to the safety profession. Swanson expressed this view to
C.E. Stevens, a safety specialist employed at the University of Missouri, stating that he
did “not want to belong to an organization professing professional status on one hand and
accepting anybody that had money for membership on the other.” Thus, the institute’s
leaders fashioned a system in which full membership was reserved to those who devoted
their time exclusively to accident prevention. A candidate could only become a full
member if they had been employed for at least five years as a safety specialist. Such
procedures eventually involved a prospective member submitting a detailed application in
which NIFS officials would then decide if their qualifications best suited them to be a full
member, associate member, or sustaining member.542
The policy meant that many of the organization’s associate members exerted less
influence than those who served as full-time farm safety specialists. In the summer of
1963, E.W. Foss, a Cornell University safety specialist, resented this practice since it
symbolized the dominance of a small group of individuals over the field. In a letter to
Howard Pyle, he stated that upon attending a meeting of the incorporated group at the
1962 NSC Congress, “I learned that this newly formed institute had bylaws which
541 Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle, March 21, 1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections,
Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
542 Norval Wardle to Howard Pyle, March 6, 1963; Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle, March 2, 1963;
Randall Swanson to C.E. Stevens, September 19, 1962, see the NIFS membership application which
reveals how each of these status levels afforded distinct privileges, Norval Wardle Collection, Special
Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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restricted membership.” He went on to state that this membership policy “automatically
cuts out a large number of part time farm or rural safety specialists.”543 The leaders of the
newly formed NIFS did not view Foss’s complaints with sympathy but probably feared
that he represented a threat. In an October letter from Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle,
Swanson wrote that, “You are aware, I am sure, of the Ed Foss situation which is rather
disgusting, at best, but I am sure it will work out with any serious problem. We have a
solid majority of the executive committee so that we can handle the situation even if
some of them get foolish enough to support approval of such a move.”544 Although the
existent letters do not provide sufficient evidence regarding what might have been Foss’s
retaliatory plan, such letters, nevertheless, reveal that veteran farm safety professionals
wanted to limit the influence of those they perceived to be less qualified to lead the
organization.
Additional correspondence supports Foss’ view that a select few were guiding the
organization’s aims and structure. In a letter from Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle
regarding meeting place selection for the 1964 institute, Swanson voiced concerns on the
subject of holding their meeting at the University of California at Davis since it might
threaten the institute’s emerging structure. Swanson distrusted the intentions of that
university’s extension safety specialist stating, “Ralph Parks is not a member or a
sympathizer with the Institute’s organization.” He also felt the NSC would have a
prominent presence at the meeting believing that “if this [meeting] were held in
California, the Safety Council can travel to and from that area at their expense while the
543 E.W. Foss, Farm Safety Specialist, Cornell University to Howard Pyle, July, 31 1963, Norval Wardle
Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
544 Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle, October 22, 1962, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections,
Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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Institute will not have travel funds with which to protect themselves. I think it is very
important that for at least another year the institute be held at a location where a strong
full membership can protect the interests of our organization.” Despite such
controversies, most farm safety specialists confirmed their support for the organization
since almost all of them quickly joined the NIFS.545
The leadership of the NIFS also created the institute’s committee of professional
development, which symbolized an additional effort by farm safety experts to improve
their profession’s status. The committee’s members continually encouraged their
associates to publish academic articles, create farm safety college classes, and become
active in other professional organizations. In 1967, the group composed a report
identifying such activities as crucial to improving their profession’s standing. They wrote
that, “the quickest way to develop professional status and recognition is by the
publication of papers” and that members should work to create “farm safety courses in
our colleges and universities.” The individuals serving on the committee also encouraged
their associates to gain “the recognition” of “other professional groups.” Such
organizations included the American Society of Safety Engineers, the American Society
of Agricultural Engineers, and the National Fire Protection Association.546 These efforts
545 Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle, October 14, 1963; Randall Swanson to Norval Wardle, March 21,
1963, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University,
Ames.
546 Professional Improvement Committee Report, June 18, 1970. This report and similar documents reveal
how the NIFS leaders created a number of committees including groups such as Tractor and Machinery,
Fire and Electricity, Emergency Preparedness, Home and Farmstead, Rural Traffic, Farm Chemicals and
others associated with studying and reducing agricultural dangers. Committees dedicated to improving the
organization’s effectiveness and prominence included the membership, program planning, and professional
development committees. For details regarding who served on these groups, see Program Area Committee
Roster 1967/1968, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa
State University, Ames.
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bore fruit in an organization whose leaders dedicated themselves to furthering the
professional advancement of members as well as contributing to the emergence of a
respected cadre of farm safety specialists.
In the 1960s, the farm safety movement was also influenced by a considerable
shift regarding the public’s view of accident culpability. The opinion that corporations
needed to provide both safe environments for their workers and place greater emphasis
upon safety in product design became more prevalent. This trend is illustrated by the fact
that farm equipment manufacturers and implement dealers faced increasingly large
numbers of lawsuits from people injured in accidents while using their products. In 1967,
Norval Wardle, while speaking to a group of Iowa trial lawyers, reflected upon this
development. Wardle stated, “Product liability is becoming an increasingly potent force
because courts are rewriting the liability laws. Twenty years ago, if an individual had an
accident with an agricultural machine, he was simply recognized as a careless person.
Today there is an implied warranty that if you put a machine on the market, it is
merchantable for a stated purpose, with a strict liability for defects notwithstanding they
may occur without intended negligence. Liability insurance is affecting and being
effected drastically.” He also went on to state that, “[t]here is an increasing tendency to
write safety into strict compliance laws.”547 Wardle’s comments suggest that product
safety was becoming an increasingly important issue amongst the agricultural community
by the late 1960s.
In 1969, speakers at an Iowa Farm Safety Council meeting articulated similar
sentiments. Lex Hawkins, a Des Moines attorney, who had represented auto accident
547 Speech Given by Norval Wardle entitled “A Safety Engineer’s Views on Accident Responsibility,” to
Iowa Trial Lawyers, at Iowa State University, August 1967, 4, Norval Wardle Collection, Special
Collections, Iowa State Library, Ames.
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victims, addressed the audience concerning the issue. Hawkins had also worked with
Ralph Nader and other safety advocates in convincing the nation’s political leaders to
increase auto manufacturing safety standards. He warned farm equipment manufacturers
of the dangers of ignoring the issue. He stated that, “In my business as an attorney, I
make my living off the manufacturers’ and distributors’ goofs in not protecting the user
of machines and equipment.” He went on to discuss how car manufacturers had already
been forced to learn about the need to improve safety. Hawkins stated, “I saw what
happened there…the industry refused to make cars safer so the government stepped in
and drew up safety standards. This same thing can happen in farming.” He also implied
that if they neglected the problem they had a lot to lose financially.548 In 1974, L.R.
Modlin, a John Deere attorney, expressed a similar view at a regional ASAE meeting. He
stated, “Fueled both by outspoken advocates such as Ralph Nader and by each consumers
own experience and frustration in coping with inadequacies and breakdowns of
increasingly sophisticated goods available to the buying public, the consumer is
demanding action and is getting it.”549 Such instances reveal that the potential for
legislation and improvements in safety engineering appear to have begun to overshadow
education as a means to improve farm safety.
In 1974, Frank Buckingham, an Implement and Tractor writer also indicated that
manufacturers and dealers were operating in a more challenging legal context. He
548 Don Muhm, “U.S. Could Act if Farm Tractors Not Made Safer,” Des Moines Register, December 6
1969, 1.
549 Frank Buckingham, “The Dealer’s Position In Product Liability,” Implement and Tractor, August 7,
1974, 61; the view that a shift had occurred in American society regarding placing responsibility upon
manufacturers was expressed repeatedly during the era, such comments also persisted past the era studied,
see, Johnson, “Product Safety and the Agricultural Engineer,” 553; T. David McFarland, “On-Farm
Accidents… How to make the farm machine man-environment system function as it should,” Agricultural
Engineering 49 (October 1968): 581, 611 and Kenneth F. Packer, Rodney E. Schaeffer, William M. Cade,
“Products Liability: How Can We Minimize Hazards?,” Agricultural Engineering 67 (May 1986): 30-32.
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stressed a number of changes in ways judges interpreted the law had expanded the
consumers’ power. Such developments included much less of a demand on the operator
to be “free of fault” in accidents, that the machine no longer had to be the “sole cause” of
the mishaps but just a “contributory cause ” and that the extension of written “warranties”
to “implied” ones.550 William Johnson, an NSC official, indicated that accident victims
were also becoming more likely to receive large monetary awards as a result of changing
legal understandings. He stated, “In some areas the doctrine of punitive damages has
been added. This means that if a manufacturer had acted wrongly you might almost say
‘immorally,’ as in not testing a drug, the courts will assess punitive damages. In such
cases that damages are usually large enough to impress upon the company the seriousness
with which its actions are viewed.”551 In 1976, R.O. Diedrichs, an engineer who had
served as an expert witness and had done extensive safety research, spoke at an ASAE
winter meeting. He alerted his listeners regarding the expanding costs which liability case
awards had exacted upon the nation’s manufacturers. Such monetary penalties had totaled
$500 million in 1965 but had ballooned to approximately $50 billion by 1975.552
550 Buckingham, “The Dealer’s Position in Product Liability,” 61.
551 William Johnson, “Product Safety and the Agricultural Engineer,” Agricultural Engineering 48
(October 1967) 553, see “Learning to Cope with OSHA Product Liability,” Implement & Tractor,
December 15, 1972, 9; for additional insights regarding how farm equipment industry leaders were
becoming increasingly concerned about the issue.
552 R.O. Diedrichs, “Product Liability-Some Background and a Team Approach to Defense,” (paper
presented at the 1976 American Society of Agricultural Engineers Winter Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, 14-17
December 1976), 2. In 1968, E.C. Carlson, an International Harvester engineer, expressed similar
sentiments regarding ROPS. He stated, “People are now less inclined to accept safety and safety devices as
only ‘luxury’ items; they now consider safety in the framework of a requirement.” See E.C. Carlson
“Tractor Roll-Protection Frames,” National Safety News, March 1968, 66. In 1973, Warren W. Eginton, a
lawyer who specialized in product liability law characterized the growth of such cases as a “geometric
progression in product liability claims,” see, Warren W. Eginton, “Minimizing Product liability Exposure,”
Quality Progress 5 (January 1973): 21.
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These expanding costs also coincided with disagreements amongst members of
the agricultural engineering community regarding how diligent farm equipment makers
had been in incorporating safety into their machines. The issue appears to have in some
cases pitted the agricultural engineering community against itself. Those employed by
private industry often believed that manufacturers were designing machines with safety
in mind while some working for public institutions such as universities often alleged that
manufacturers had responded slowly. In 1980, the comments of Bill Field, ASAE
Agricultural Safety Committee secretary, commented upon this more acrimonious tone.
He stated, “There is a struggle within the farm safety profession between persons and
groups being motivated by different concerns. Farmers, professors, insurance executives,
engineers and others are not all driven by the same interests and desires. Therefore, our
joint efforts may be modified by the fear of adverse economic impact, hurting someone’s
feelings or the desire to avoid conflicts.”553 Field’s statement appears to have described
many of the events related to the farm safety movement that occurred in the 1970s.
Norval Wardle’s accusations about agricultural equipment manufacturers were
particularly visceral. In 1972, he spoke as part of a panel to an audience of farm safety
experts at a NIFS summer meeting. Wardle, along with Carlton Zink and Randall
Swanson, both safety experts, commented on farm implement makers’ accident
prevention responsibilities. Although he believed some improvements had been made in
553 Bill Field, “Getting Personal,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1980, 15. Carlton Zink, a veteran
agricultural engineer, also provided evidence of these diverging opinions. In 1972, Zink stated, “I am a
middle of the roader. Brother Norval give the manufacturers ‘hell’—nicely of course, and Swannie stands
up for them and points to what has been done with some approval, but I am not satisfied to take either
unqualified stand. I think that there is responsibility enough for all if we are to reach what I consider to be
the ultimate goal—the elimination of injuries and fatalities on the farm.” Speech given by Carlton Zink at
NIFS summer meeting as part of a panel discussion regarding agricultural machinery manufacturers’ safety
responsibilities, June 18-22, 1972, 1-2, Norval Wardle Collection, Iowa State University, Special
Collections, Ames, Iowa.
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agricultural related technologies, he nevertheless thought that such efforts had been
inadequate. Wardle stated, “The progress in actual machines, chemicals, electrical
systems and farmstead equipment as used on the farm when compared to the knowledge
in the field available to guide in this field is skimpy, kindergarten, inadequate and entirely
unworthy [of the] mechanical genius of America.” He also believed that the rise in
liability cases was a positive development indicating that,“[o]ur courts and trial lawyers
are performing a real function to make the manufacturers and merchandisers of such
machines and equipment realize what the real cost of accidents resulting from such
machines and equipment really are.”554 Wardle also expressed his view that farm
equipment manufacturers treated accident prevention measures only as an afterthought on
another occasion.555 The passionate safety advocate also came to believe that such views
had cost him professionally.
In February 1978, Norval Wardle authored a rather emotional letter to Marvin
Nicol, an NSC employee, who suffered from health problems. Wardle expressed the view
that he had suffered because he had aided individuals involved in lawsuits against
agricultural equipment manufacturers. Wardle stated, “I have always felt that my first
obligation as a safety worker was to the farm people and I have always tried to bring to
light the truth of these accident cases. It has come to be that I am about the only one that
554 Speech given by Norval Wardle at NIFS summer meeting as part of a panel discussion regarding
agricultural machinery manufacturers’ safety responsibilities, June 18-22, 1972, 1-2; Zink unlike Wardle
had spent most of his professional career in private industry including a short stint at Firestone, followed by
over eighteen years at John Deere. Randall Swanson was an agricultural engineer and farm safety specialist
retiree from the University of Wisconsin, Norval Wardle Collections, Iowa State University, Special
Collections, Ames, Iowa.
555 Norval Wardle, “A Safety Engineer’s Views on Accident Responsibility,” (paper presented at a
meeting of the Iowa Trial Lawyers in 1967, specific date not provided, 3), Norval Wardle Collection, Iowa
State University, Special Collections, Ames, Iowa.
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they can turn to since Randall has stated that he will work only for manufacturers in such
cases; and of course Edwin Tanquary and Carlton Zink, with their long association with
manufacturers also work for them. As a result I have surely raised the ire of the
manufacturers.” He went on to explain what he viewed to be the sanctions of the
professional community. Wardle stated, “They have succeeded in getting me kicked out
of ASAE and are still pushing me. What is one little guy doing opposing the great FIEI?
I never expected to do such a thing. The irony of life.”556 Although Wardle’s situation
appears not to have been exclusively related to his consulting work, his predicament does
reveal that a contentious air had infiltrated the movement.
Wardle’s correspondence with Wesley F. Buchele, a prominent Iowa State
University agricultural engineer, further illuminates Wardle’s problems. These
documents reveal that the prominent farm safety specialist believed that farm
manufacturers had been negligent in their duty to properly consider safety in their
product designs. Buchele had requested information because he was considering writing a
farm safety history. However, Wardle cautioned Buchele against his proposed endeavor
due to his perception that his work with those suing farm equipment manufacturers had
strained his relationship with the members of the farm equipment industry. Thus, Wardle
must have believed that such a history would have placed farm equipment manufacturers
in a bad light. On May 25, 1978, Wardle stated, “Last August you wrote me a letter in
regard to your project of writing a history of agricultural safety in the United States. Are
you sure you want to do this?” He went on to comment regarding his doubts about
composing such a book since Wardle appears that he had thought about it as well. He
556 Norval Wardle to Marvin Nichol, February 3, 1978, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections,
Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames; Wardle had been working for eight years as a
consultant and expert witness mostly for farm accident victims since his retirement from ISU.
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stated, “Who would publish such a story; not the ASAE, not the farm division of the
National Safety Council. However, I have had offers from some people who think they
know how to do it effectively. Personally I have had no feelings about this but what about
all of the farm people over America who are being sold out on their safety?”557 Wardle
described his recent troubles indicating that the Iowa Board of Engineering Examiners
had recently issued a lawsuit against him. He stated, “They were asking for a temporary
and then a permanent injunction against me presenting myself in the state of Iowa as a
registered professional engineer.” Wardle denied the allegation in his letter to Buchele
and expressed his view that both International Harvester Company officials and other
members of the FIEI had supported the Engineering Examiners’ efforts. Wardle also
believed the incident had hurt his relationship with the members of ISU’s agricultural
engineering department. He stated, “I have received the kiss of death as far as Ag.
Engineers are concerned. I have dared to speak out in regard to the safety of farm
machinery. I had rather thought the FIEI owned some, but not all.”558 Thus, unlike many
of his associates, Wardle believed that farm equipment manufacturers had been too slow
557 Norval Wardle to Dr. Wesley F. Buchele, May 25, 1978; on August 2 , 1977 Wesley F. Buchele had
sent a letter to Norval Wardle indicating that he was “attempting to write a history on the agricultural safety
in the United States,” and that he believed that Wardle was “eminently qualified to provide information.”
Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University,
Ames; see Norval Wardle to Dr. Wesley F. Buchele, 2 August, 1977, Norval Wardle Collection, Special
Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
558 Norval Wardle to Dr. Wesley F. Buchele, May 25, 1978; on August 2, 1977 Wardle did occasionally
use the term Agricultural Safety Engineer, although this does not necessarily providing definitive proof that
he had incorrectly represented himself, it nevertheless reveals that his professional title could potentially be
a source of confusion, see, Norval Wardle to William Fletcher, April 12, 1973, and Norval Wardle to
Office of Standards, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, October 15, 1973. In these documents
Wardle adopts the title of agricultural safety engineer. This is important since Wardle’s Ph.D. was in
Vocational Agricultural Education and he only possessed a minor in agricultural engineering. Norval
Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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to fully commit themselves to safety in their machine designs. Wardle also believed that
his consulting work against agricultural equipment manufactures had cost him.
Nevertheless, prior to his death, Wardle appears to have a least partially
reconciled such negative experiences for the larger safety cause. In 1986, he was invited
to attend the 25th anniversary NIFS meeting, which included a commemoration of the
organization’s establishment. Although he declined the request, his sentiments were
positive. Wardle stated, “I am thrilled with the great progress which has been made in
safety throughout rural America. Much progress has been made. We have safer homes,
workplaces, equipment highways and recreation places. The three great E’s of Safety
have all become more effective today, of Engineering, Enforcement and Education. Let
us put bickering and fault blaming behind us. Just work at all of these to see that each
area is given proper attention and we will make still further progress through the
years.”559
Wardle was not alone in his view that manufacturers were not giving proper
attention to accident prevention. In 1966, L.W. Knapp, a University of Iowa farm safety
expert, also believed that engineers had been too slow to sufficiently include safety into
their products. He thought that education in some cases had been overemphasized and
had served as a justification in delaying other accident prevention measures. He stated,
“It is possible that those of us involved in accident prevention efforts may be our own
worst enemies. The common license of us all is to attempt, through education, to make
individuals safer.” He elaborated by indicating, “We have created and are perpetuating
the idea in everyone’s mind that accidents are an individual’s own fault, thus neglecting
559 Norval Wardle to NIFS members, May 19, 1986, Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa
State University Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
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the things that can be done mechanically and physically.”560 T. David McFarland, an
NSC agricultural engineer, echoed Knapp’s statements stressing, “Incorporating a high
degree of safety into the product also lessens the need for extensive consumer
education.”561
Despite such disparaging comments, industry representatives often boasted of the
many measures they had been taken to integrate safety into their machine design. In
1963, J.D. Morris, a Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company sales manager, pointed to a
number of achievements his industry had made to the cause of safety. He pointed to
improvements made to the tractor such as “electric starters” as opposed to hand cranks,
“tail-lights” on tractor drawn implements, and a variety of features which made tractors
more “comfortable” to drive.562 An author who contributed to the Agricultural Engineers
1967 Yearbook, a annual ASAE publication, listed “eighteen recommendations or
standards” aimed at “operator safety.” These included proposals for manufacturers to
install safety features aimed at preventing falls, protecting operators from moving parts,
and features to prevent the misuse of operator controls.563
The individuals on the FIEI’s safety committee also defended the industry’s
attention to safety. In 1969, the group’s members authored a report indicating that farm
equipment manufacturers extensively tested their products for safety prior to their
560 Harry M. Philo, “Who’s Responsible for Machine Safety?,” National Safety News, March 1966, 38.
561 McFarland, “On-Farm Accidents… How to make the farm machine man-environment system function
as it should….,” 611.
562 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, 1963), 27-29; Morris also
listed PTO guarding, various features that improved the ease of climbing into the tractor’s seat, and more
operator friendly controls.
563 Carlton Zink, “Safety in Farm Equipment: The Manufacturers’ Concern,” Agricultural Engineering 8
(February 1968): 74-75.
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entrance into marketplace. The paper’s writers also indicated that the organization was
crucial in propagating safety standards. In addition, they highlighted how member
companies had consistently supported farm safety educational programs. They
emphasized a number of benefits that occurred from such sponsorship writing, “Through
this cooperation, valuable information for the design engineer is obtained and joint
programs are developed to provide safety information for the operator.” The writers also
stressed that the individuals who composed owner manuals included a thorough
consideration of safety while preparing such booklets,”564 Such contrasting sentiments
reveal that a more divisive environment had significantly fragmented the members of
both the agricultural engineering and farm safety community.
In 1973, Wesley F. Buchele expressed particularly insightful comments while
composing a rough draft for a conference paper regarding the issue. Although admitting
that manufacturers could have been faster in implementing safety features into their
equipment designs, his discussion was less visceral than Wardle’s view of such
companies. Buchele’s comments provide basic answers for those who believed progress
in designing machines with a greater safety emphasis had been too slow. He indicated
that in his view it was not because equipment makers were evil or enjoyed the prospect of
users becoming injured while using their machines, but could best be explained by the
demands of the marketplace. Buchele stated, “Machinery manufacturers are shrewd
businessmen; each has to balance the cost of manufacturing and marketing his product
against competitors. Each does things that will make his machine most attractive in the
marketplace. Low selling price is one of the more attractive items. Safety features may
564 Farm and Industrial Equipment Institute. Report of Safety Committee of the FIEI Engineering Group of
Committees (Safety Committee of the FIEI Engineering Group of Committee, 1969), 7.
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increase the cost and the complexity of the machine, increase maintenance problems, and
reduce the potential numbers sold.” He also indicated that despite the advent of safety
features, “Someone will inadvertently find a way of becoming injured while operating the
machine.” Perhaps Buchele’s view provides a more prudent middle ground between the
era’s two diverging camps of agricultural engineers.565
In 1970, the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the
subsequent creation of OSHA, proved to be another factor that contributed to a more
contentious climate. The agency’s establishment represented a significant expansion of
the federal government’s power in both instituting and enforcing safety regulations.
Scholar Charles Noble stresses that the creation of the organization represented a
significant shift in the history of U.S. regulation. Noble indicates “the new law
centralized existing factory legislation by establishing a single federal agency with
economy wide rulemaking powers. A federal inspectorate was established to monitor
firm compliance and empowered to fine employers who violated standards.”566
Despite its lofty aims, OSHA’s involvement in improving safety in agriculture
proved to be limited. In 1985, Glen H. Hetzel, who at that time was the NIFS president,
expressed his disappointment regarding what he viewed to be OSHA’s marginal impact.
He stated, “Most of us have the occasional success that keeps us going and makes us try
harder. Perhaps one of my biggest disappointments came when the OSHA regulations
565 Wesley F. Buchele, “Product Specifications and Product Liability Litigations,” 1. Wesley Buchele
Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University, Ames.
566 Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA, (Philadelphia Press: Temple
University Press, 1986), 46. OSHA’s regulatory activities were not only controversial in agriculture but
also attracted critics from a variety of segments of American society. For an example of a particularly
passionate critique of OSHA’s policies see Alan Stang, “OSHACRATS: Mr. Businessman, The Buck Stops
with You,” American Opinion (December, 1972): 1-13.
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were, for all practical purposes not applied to agriculture.”567 Hetzel’s assessment of
OSHA’s minor impact appears to have been valid. During the early 1970s, most of the
agency’s regulations pertained only to farmers who hired employees; thus, farmers who
depended on family members for labor continued to work largely outside its regulatory
purview. A careful reading of the various standards in the Federal Register repeatedly
emphasize the point that only farmers who hired workers were the ones who were
required to obey standards. In addition, agricultural standards were relatively few
including those pertaining to tractor roll-over protection, slow vehicle emblems,
machinery guarding, field sanitation, and the handling of anhydrous ammonia.568 Finally,
the agency not only issued few regulatory standards for agriculture but considerably
fewer resources were devoted to inspection. In 1976, Morton Corn, OSHA’s Assistant
Secretary, stressed that “very few of OSHA’s inspections have been on agricultural
sites.” He emphasized that “in 1975, OSHA conducted only 1,117 such inspections [in
agricultural settings] out of a total of 100,000. This was 1.5 percent of OSHA’s total
federal inspection effort last year.”569
567 Glen H. Hetzel, “President’s Address,” (speech given at the NIFS summer meeting held in St. Louis,
Missouri, summer meeting 1985), Norval Wardle Collection, Special Collections, Iowa State University
Library, Iowa State University, Ames.
568 For a brief but insightful summary of a public hearing regarding proposed OSHA machine guard
standards, see “OSHA in Agriculture: Machinery Guarding Hearing,” Implement and Tractor (October 7,
1974), 56-58. This piece and others reveal a number of controversies regarding OSHA standards including
the cost prohibitions of retrofitting older equipment with new safety features such as machine guards. For
specifics regarding some of OSHA’s agricultural standards in the early 1970s, see, the Federal Register
including important documents such as the Federal Register, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Agricultural Tractors: Roll-Over Protective Structures, 4536-4549
(Washington, D.C, February 4, 1974) and the Federal Register, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Guarding of Agricultural Equipment, 4925-4927, Washington, D.C., February
8, 1974).
569 Congress, House of Representatives, Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Agriculture.
OSHA Regulations Affecting Agriculture. Ninety-Fourth Congress, 2nd Session, July 27, 1976, 15-16. For a
brief but insightful summary of a public hearing regarding proposed OSHA machine guard standards, see
“OSHA in Agriculture: Machinery Guarding Hearing,” Implement and Tractor (October 7, 1974): 56-58.
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Nevertheless, government officials and politicians expressed a widespread view
that the agency had been overly intrusive in a congressional hearing regarding OSHA’s
involvement in agriculture held in 1976. The hearing’s participants leveled a range of
criticisms regarding the agency’s efforts to enforce its rather small set of agriculture
standards. USDA’s John Knebel, Undersecretary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
and Iowa Congressman Charles Grassley were particularly passionate in their assessment
of OSHA’s overall mis-management. Grassley complained that OSHA officials had
failed to clearly communicate safety information and they had also worked too
independently of other federal agencies. He also stated that most farmers viewed OSHA
officials primarily as “a roomful of lawyers drafting regulations which pertain to an area
about which they know nothing.” Knebel also believed that the agency had done a poor
job in explaining its standards and that it had not given farmers sufficient time to enact
regulations. He also pointed to the impracticality of regulating many rural work
environments since “the diversity and dispersion of farm/ranch operations points out the
need for a heavy emphasis on voluntary educational efforts.” Thus, Knebel recognized
this fundamental characteristic of agriculture that prohibited intensive regulation.570
The historical evidence also suggests that many others, who were more directly
involved in agriculture, including farmers and implement dealers, often feared or were
This piece and others reveal a number of controversies regarding OSHA standards including the cost
prohibitions of retrofitting older equipment with new safety features such as machine guards. For specifics
regarding some of OSHA’s agricultural standards in the early 1970s, see, the Federal Register including
important documents such as the Federal Register, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Agricultural Tractors: Roll-Over Protective Structures, 4536-4549 (Washington, D.C.,
February 4, 1974) and the Federal Register, Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, Guarding of Agricultural Equipment, 4925-4927, Washington, D.C., February 8, 1974).
570 Ibid., 2-5. For a discussion of the nature of OSHA regulatory activities in one Midwestern state and the
controversy the agency engendered amongst the state’s agricultural leaders, see, Plambeck, ed., Iowa Farm
Safety in the 20th Century, 143-148.
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hostile towards the agency. Such antagonism was probably related to the fact that the
agency placed additional responsibilities on individuals who were already in engaged in a
particularly demanding occupation. In 1971, OSHA officials mailed instructional packets
and paperwork to those “farmers and ranchers” who employed non-family members on
their farms. Employers were not only required to observe all the agency’s safety
standards but also “keep accurate records of work-related deaths, injuries, and illnesses,
except those requiring minor first aid.” Such record-keeping duties also included that
they take note of any significant exposures to potentially harmful substances as well as
making yearly accident reports easily available to their workers.571 Thus, it is easy to
imagine that already overworked farm and ranch owners would resist such
responsibilities, which demanded additional time and energy.
In 1976, the editors of IH Farm Forum, a periodical sponsored by the
International Harvester Company, surveyed their readers regarding their opinion of
OSHA. Although this investigation only involved the 829 Farm Forum subscribers who
returned the feedback form, it nevertheless indicated that they generally held an
unfavorable view of the agency. The study revealed that the majority believed that OSHA
officials were largely incompetent and that they were wrongly interfering with farmers’
work. The piece also exposed some rather casual attitudes regarding farm safety. Lloyd
Ziegler, an Illinois farmer, revealed that he assumed that it was appropriate for adolescent
boys to operate tractors He stated, “I’ve trained three sons to operate tractors, and I
started each one of them at 12. First, they learned to operate the tractor with no
equipment attached. Then I let them operate the tractor with light loads for an hour or two
571 “Farm Employers Must Keep OSHA Records,” Agri-Safety News 3 (1971): 2.
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at a time until they were ready to do bigger jobs. Any showing off and they were
grounded.” Ziegler also represented a majority of the respondents who did not appreciate
what they viewed to be OSHA’s misguided attempt to prevent accidents.572
In March 1972, Dave Lucy, a contributor to Farm & Power Equipment, wrote a
piece entitled, “May I see you in your office?” which also expressed an adverse view of
the agency. He described how intimidating it could be to have a U.S. Department of
Labor inspector make an unannounced visit to a farm implement dealership. Lucy
ominously told his readers that after a government employee tours your business, “Be
ready for the boom to fall.” He went on to describe an unpleasant experience that a
Pennsylvania equipment dealer had after an OSHA inspector had completed a visit. The
owner discovered that in order to comply with OSHA standards it would require an
outlay of 5,000 dollars. Changes included updating the establishment’s electrical system,
“installing guard rails on all stairs,” and renovating the shop’s painting area in order to
comply with ventilation standards.573 Such stories undoubtedly circulated throughout the
countryside and contributed to feelings of fear and distrust regarding the federal
government’s attempt to improve safety.
Although large numbers of people in the agricultural community appeared to view
OSHA’s actions as a misguided intrusion into their lives, such criticism was not entirely
fair. For instance, their belief that the agency was grossly ill informed was probably
overstated. OSHA officials arrived at their standards only after lengthy consultations with
572 In fact, eighty-eight percent of the respondents either chose “No, a farmer’s safety should be his own
responsibility and no law is going to make him more safe,” or “Under no circumstances does the
government have any business telling a farmer whether to practice safety” in response to the question
“Should OSHA or OSHA type regulations be extended to include the farmer and members of his family as
well,” see, “Reporting Back: on Farm Safety and OSHA,” IH Farm Forum 1 (Fall 1976): 26-29.
573 Dave Lucy, “May I See You in Your Office?,” Farm & Power Equipment 54 (March 1972): 40.
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members of the agricultural community. For example, in 1972, during the organization’s
formative years, OSHA officials depended upon an “advisory panel” to determine
appropriate agricultural standards. The advice-giving body consisted of 15 individuals
who represented a cross-section of the members of the nation’s agricultural sector. These
included leaders of commodity groups, agricultural laborers, farm safety experts, and
others who possessed considerable knowledge.574 Such panels collectively possessed
years of theoretical and practical experience with agricultural technology. Thus, despite
the fact that inexperienced or over-zealous inspectors might unfairly interpret such
standards, they were nevertheless carefully considered prior to adoption. In 1973, Rollin
D. Schnieder, who OSHA officials selected as one of the panel’s members stated, “One
of the early criticisms of the standards was that ‘they were poorly written and must have
been written by those people in Washington.’” Actually, these were consensus standards
that were adopted from associations or societies such as ASAE. In each instance the
American National Standards Institute or National Fire Protection Association has
adopted some of the industry standards and have recommended these to OSHA. This was
evident in the agricultural standards relating to the Slow Moving Vehicle Emblem and
anhydrous ammonia.”575 Schnieder’s comments serve to balance the many negative
reactions that the actions of OSHA officials appear to have elicited.
574 United States Department of Labor, Office Of Information, News: OSHA Names 15 to Agriculture
Standards Advisory Committee, (June 20, 1972), Washington, D.C., 1972. The committee also carefully
consulted such important organizations as the ASAE, FIEI, and the NIFS in determining their
recommendations to OSHA officials. OSHA standards also appear to have closely followed the
recommendations of these standard writing organizations, see also, Rollin D. Schnieder, “The Function and
Status of DOL’s Agricultural Standards Advisory Committee,” (paper presented at the 1973 American
Society of Agricultural Engineers Winter Meeting, Chicago, Illinois, December 11-14, 1973), 1-5.
575 Schnieder, “The Function and Status of DOL’s Agricultural Standards Advisory Committee,” 5.
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Thus, the OSHA debate reveals that the agency’s involvement in farming not only
infused a more combative tone into the safety movement, but it also reconfirmed a
persistent difficulty in improving farm safety through legislation. Farm safety leaders had
recognized farmers’ independent working environment for decades. In 1968, a mere two
years prior to the enactment of OSHA, Jack Burke, a NSC official, emphasized the
differences between the farmer and the factory worker stating that “no master mechanic
routinely checks out a farmer’s equipment for safety. There is nothing to keep him from
running the most beat-up equipment that binder twine and baling wire can keep together.
You can’t get a ticket for plowing with a tacky old tractor.” Since World War II, farm
safety leaders had responded to this challenge by fashioning a collaborative and
cooperative national effort. However, by the 1970s, the involvement of an ever-growing
number of groups possessing their own distinctive interests created a tone which was far
removed from the patriotic feelings and organizational cooperation which had given birth
to the movement.576
One might question the cumulative impact the paucity of regulation had upon
farm safety conditions. A brief review of the history of Roll-Over-Protective-Systems
(ROPS) is illustrative of the dramatic effects this situation had upon the working
conditions of the nation’s farm families. A discussion of ROPS is particularly
illuminating since a more prompt implementation of a relatively simple device could
have potentially saved the thousands of lives.577 The story of ROPS also reveals how
576 Farm Safety Review, March/April 1968, 14.
577 J.R. Myers and K.A. Snyder, “Roll-over Protective Structure Use and the cost of Retrofitting Tractors
in the United States, 1993” Journal of Agricultural Safety and Health 1 (June, 1995): 185. In 1967, David
H. Bucher, a high-ranking engineer for John Deere, indicated, “Tractor upsets cause 50 to 70 percent of the
fatal farm accidents in this country.” David H. Bucher, “A Protective Canopy for the Farm Tractor,”
Agricultural Engineering 48 (September, 1967): 496. For additional discussion regarding how tractor
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large numbers of farm families used tractors without ROPS well into the 1990s, despite
the fact that such devices had been in existence for decades. In addition, safety
organizations such as the NSC and safety specialists had advertised their benefits at least
as early as the late 1960s.578 Nevertheless, thousands of rural Americans continued to be
harmed in such accidents throughout the late twentieth century. For instance, as late as
1988, 331 people died as result of this type of accident on the nation’s farms.579
Observers had long indicated that deaths resulting from inadvertent overturns
represented a significant danger. In fact, as early as 1919, Edward R. Hewitt, a New York
auto designer, identified the considerable ease in which a tractor driver could become
harmed in a tractor rollover. A number of other researchers identified the problem over
the next twenty years.580 However, it was not until the 1960s that the problem was almost
universally identified as a major safety issue. In 1963, a Farm Safety Review writer stated
overturns were a leading cause of deaths on the nation’s farms, see, Ernest C. Carlson, “Frame the Operator
for Safety’s Sake,” Excavating Contractor 56 (October, 1968): 12.
578 Regarding NSC’s Tractor Over-Turn Prevention Program (TOPP), see, “NSC’s Farm Safety
Conference Approves TOPP Program’s Safety Objectives,” Farm Safety Review, July/August 1967, 7 and
“NSC Introduces TOPP,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1968, 9. NSC’s Tractor Over-Turn
Prevention Program (TOPP) The TOPP represented the NSC’s effort to publicize the benefits of using
ROPS, encourage tractor operators to purchase tractors that already possessed ROPS, or fit older tractors
with the device. For a discussion regarding the important role that University farm safety specialists had in
advertising ROPS’ advantages particularly in Nebraska, see, “Demonstrations Reveal Value of Tractor
Roll-Over-Protection,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1966, 14-15; “Crush Resistant Cab Shows
Muscle,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1968, 8; “The Egg that didn’t Break,” Farm Safety
Review, November/December 1969, 4.
579 Sidney M. Wolfe, ed. “Farm Families: an Endangered Species,” Health Letter, 10 March 1989, 1.
Although the lack of overturn protection was significant problem, it appears it was one of many regarding
the absence of safety features on machines. In December 1972, Robert E. Glidden, a high-ranking official
for Kewanee Machinery & Conveyor, revealed the lack of safety standards regarding auger design. He
stated, “Since there were no written auger safety standards, 13 manufacturers met in early 1971 with two
FIEI representatives and formed a committee…. Standards are not easy to write; a majority must agree to
them, and some firms might have trouble bringing their products into conformance….,” see, “Learning to
Cope with OSHA Product Liability,” Implement & Tractor, December 15 1972, 9.
580 Arnold B. Skromme, “The History of Rollover Protection for Farm Tractors,” (paper presented at the
meeting of the ASAE, Davis, California, January 19, 1988): 4.
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that “nearly two-thirds of the deaths” that involved tractors were these kinds of
accidents.581 In 1969, Jack Burke of the NSC, stated that, “Of the 1,000 annual tractor
accident fatalities, about 600 involve overturns. An estimated 5,000 persons incur
disabling injuries, often severe or crippling due to the nature of this type of accident.” He
went on to express his view that ROPS could prevent or minimize such catastrophic
effects.582 In the same year, Rollin D. Schnieder and Robert J. Florell, both of whom were
University of Nebraska farm safety experts, published a study which supported the use of
such protective structures. Schnieder discovered that all of the Nebraskans that had died
in such accidents were driving tractors that did not have ROPS.583 A number of important
health-related organizations also advocated ROPS use as a preventative measure. In
1967, the members of the American Medical Association (AMA) issued a statement that
decreed that all tractor makers should make such devices “standard equipment.” The
proclamation also included the declaration that, “the farm equipment industry be
encouraged to make available, as standard equipment, basic overturn protection of the
operator on farm tractors that will conform to these standards.”584
Both the technical expertise required for ROPS as well as specific designs were
present throughout most of the era. Inventors began submitting patents for tractor cabs
and protective frames as early the twentieth century’s second decade. However, how they
viewed the functionality of these safety devices is disputed. Conflicting opinions existed
regarding early cab designs as some writers believed that they were a means to improve
581 “Program Guide for Tractor Safety,” Farm Safety Review, November 1963, 4.
582 Jack Burke, “Why Wait for Tomorrow?,” Farm Safety Review, November/December 1969, 10.
583 Robert D. Schnieder and Robert J. Florell, “Farm Tractor upsets are Mankillers,” Farm Safety Review,
May/June 1969, 3.
584 “AMA Calls for Tractor Protection,” Farm Safety Review, September/October 1967, 15.
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comfort or to protect the tractor, while some researchers deduced that safety
considerations were present throughout the development of tractor cabs. In 1988, Arnold
B. Skromme, while presenting a paper on the development of such devices to an audience
of fellow agricultural engineers expressed the view that safety was understated. He stated,
“It should be noted that none of these early inventors, or none of the several millions of
farmers in the US ever suggested that the safety structure be made high enough or strong
enough to protect the operator.”585 Although Skromme’s confidence in knowing the
desires of the nation’s farmers regarding driver protection is overstated, it does appear his
point is valid on some level. For instance, in 1923 Henry W. Hanson of Cheney Center,
Colorado received a patent for a cab. Hansen stated that the main purpose of his device
was, “providing a sun shade and a rain protector for the driver of the tractor.”586
Despite these differences of opinion, it is indisputable that by the 1950s, both
independent creators and university researchers were developing devices to protect
tractor drivers from being harmed in tractor rollovers.587 By the 1960s, such important
tractor manufacturers as International Harvester and John Deere were also studying the
effectiveness of various types of operator protection devices.588 In 1967, David H.
585 Arnold B. Skromme, “The History of Rollover Protection for Farm Tractors,” 2.
586 United States Patent Office, “Top for tractors,” submitted by Henry W. Hanson on November 20, 1922
and received patent on August 21, 1923.
587 See United States Patent Office, “Safety Guard for a Tractor Operator,” submitted by Osborne Maybrier
on July 28, 1952 received patent on January 3, 1956; United States Patent Office, “Tractor Canopy Guard
and Combination,” submitted by Earnest E. Selby on February 10, 1956 and received patent on September
10, 1957; in 1953, researchers at the University of California at Davis designed and tested a roll-over
structure for a John Deere tractor, see, Arnold B. Skromme, “The History Of Rollover Protection For Farm
Tractors,” 7.
588 “International Harvester Tests Protective Frame,” Farm Safety Review, March/April 1967, 14; these
manufacturers collectively pooled the results of such studies to develop engineering standards for ROPS.
For a brief discussion regarding some of the efforts of John Deere researchers, see, David H. Bucher, “A
Protective Canopy For the Farm Tractor,” 48 Agricultural Engineering (September 1967): 496-499, 506;
Arnold B. Skromme indicated that as early as 1959 John Deere designers were working on potential ROPS
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Bucher, a prominent member of John Deere’s team of product designers, stressed that his
company tested ROPS devices. Although all new tractors were not yet being fitted with
ROPS, he indicated that they would be made available at a minimum price for the
consumer. Bucher stated, “It is sincerely hoped that all tractor manufacturers and persons
associated with potential users of protective canopies will make a combined effort to
provide and promote voluntary use of safety structures on agricultural vehicles in the
interest of decreasing the fatality rates associated with tractors.”589 Bucher’s inclusion of
the phrase “voluntary” is crucial in understanding the reasons behind the persistence of
the tractor rollover fatality issue. This is the case since throughout the late twentieth
century farmers who did not hire outside employees were not required to fit their tractors
with such devices.
Americans were not the only ones who were seeking solutions to the tractor
overturn problem, the governments of many nations mandated that all new tractors be
fitted with overturn protection devices. During the mid-1950s, both Swedish and British
engineers were thoroughly engaged in testing various overturn protection concepts. A
large number of European governments also passed laws requiring all tractors to be fitted
with rollover protective systems.590 In 1963, Carlton Zink commented on the regulatory
actions of the Swedish governments as well as their more standardized development of
such safety devices. He stated that, “In Sweden all new tractors must be equipped with
protection for the driver. The National Swedish Testing Institute for Agricultural
devices. For further information regarding activities such as Deere, see, Skromme, “The History of
Rollover Protection for Farm Tractors,” 15, l7-19.
589 Bucher, “A Protective Canopy for the Farm Tractor,” 506.
590 Carlson, “Frame the Operator for Safety’s Sake,” 14.
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Machinery has developed a procedure for testing protective frames and cabs.”591 Thus,
Northern European farmers generally benefited from the ROPS protection long before
their American counterparts. In 1968, E.C. Carlson, a high-ranking engineer for
International Harvester contrasted the European experience with that in America which
features voluntary compliance regarding manufacturers’ adoption of ROPS. He stated,
“Compliance with the recommendation is strictly voluntary insofar as the manufacturer
and the purchaser are concerned.”592
Although few farmers and their families received protection from ROPS devices
throughout the 1960s, this was not the case for many federal employees and some state
workers. For instance, in 1960, state officials in North Dakota responded to the overturn
problem by equipping all the state’s tractors with ROPS, which was soon followed by
similar actions in other states.593 State policy-makers in other states were taking similar
actions. For example, by 1965 most tractor drivers who worked for the state of Illinois
benefited from such protection.594 Such actions also arose in places where the lumber
industry represented an important business. In 1963, Carlton Zink, a John Deere engineer
and associate of the ASAE safety committee, stated, “In some states where logging for
lumber and pulpwood is important, there are legal requirements for a protective canopy
over the top of the tractor and over the driver. Its purpose is two-fold: to prevent falling
branches or trees from striking the operator, and to protect him in case of a tractor
591 Carlton L. Zink, “Anti-Roll Bars: Can They Reduce Tractor Fatalities?,” Agricultural Engineering 44
June 1963, 308.
592 E.C. Carlson, “Tractor Roll-Over Protection Frames,” National Safety News, March 1968, 66.
593 Carlson, “Frame the Operator for Safety’s Sake,” 14.
594 Carlson, “Tractor Roll-Over Protection Frames,” 70.
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overturn. The governing rules state that the canopy must be capable of supporting the
tractor.”595
The problem appears to have persisted for at least the next quarter century. In
1995, J.R. Myers and K.A. Snyder, both of whom were prominent safety experts,
revealed that as late as the early 1990s, large numbers of farmers were still operating
tractors that had not been fitted with ROPS. They stated, “In 1993, over 4.8 million
tractors were in use on U.S farms, of which 2.98 million lacked ROPS.” The authors also
indicated that large numbers of tractors did not have ROPS and that the reason for this
was because older tractors were still being used which had not been manufactured with
the safety device. However, they stressed that on average the tractors could be fitted with
a ROPS device for $947, a small amount when considering the emotional and financial
cost of a human life.596 For international comparison, in 1967, Sverker P.E. Persson,
published a piece in Agricultural Engineering, which reported, “More than half of all
tractors in Sweden now have safety frames or cabs.”597 This high figure was achieved due
to the fact that new tractors were required to have ROPS and the nation’s leaders also
instigated a vigorous retrofitting campaign. Such comparisons highlight the fact that
American farm families continued to use tractors without ROPS long after most of their
European counterparts were no longer subjected to such risks.
The lack of protection offered to American tractor drivers can be explained by the
fact that ROPS use was voluntary throughout the 1960s and that a large-scale retrofitting
595 Zink, “Anti- Roll Bars: Can They Reduce Tractor Fatalities?,” 308.
596 J.R. Myers and K.A. Snyder, “Roll-over Protective Structure Use and the Cost of Retrofitting Tractors
in the United States, 1993,” 185.
597 Sverker P.E Persson, “European Experiences with Protective Cabs and Frames,” Agricultural
Engineering 48 (October 1967): 557, 554.
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campaign was never instigated. Many agricultural engineers emphasized the concept that
implementing ROPS should be voluntary. In 1966, Merlin Hansen, a prominent ASAE
member, stated, “It is hoped that the combined efforts of everyone on a voluntary basis
will substantially reduce tractor accident and fatality rates. By voluntarily providing
effective protective devices and by intensively publicizing their use, the farm machinery
industry can effectively perform a vital humanitarian service.”598 In October of 1968,
Ernest C. Carlson, a high ranking engineer for the International Harvester Company, also
stated, “Compliance with the recommendations is strictly voluntary insofar as the
manufacturer and the purchaser are concerned. However, a safety frame designed,
fabricated, tested, and mounted on a tractor complying with the recommendations
developed by the cooperative industry effort will greatly reduce the fatalities and injuries
as the result of tractor roll-over accidents.”599 Such a voluntary approach undoubtedly
contributed to large numbers of deaths and injuries from tractor upsets.
The preceding narrative reveals that despite the fact that farm safety leaders had
initially emphasized cooperation and coordination, a different tone eventually dominated
the effort. Such an observation can be confirmed by the controversies surrounding the
creation of the NIFS, the arguments stemming from OSHA’s tepid efforts to improve
agricultural safety, and the growth of lawsuits stemming from farm equipment accidents.
Farm safety specialists’ desire to forge their own organization, control who entered their
profession, and market their expertise represented more self-interested than unifying
actions. The efforts of OSHA officials to improve farm safety met resistance and thus
revealed a suspicious attitude by many Americans regarding mandatory efforts to
598 Merlin Hansen, “Reducing Tractor Fatalities,” Agricultural Engineering 47 (September 1966): 472.
599 Carlson, “Frame the Operator for Safety’s Sake,”15.
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decrease agricultural related accidents. Finally, the expanding number of lawsuits meant
that farm equipment manufacturers who neglected safety features could incur severe
financial penalties. Despite the fact that members of the agribusiness community, farm
safety professionals, and farm families themselves cooperated in funding, initiating, and
participating in farm safety efforts showed a significant degree of fragmentation and
divisiveness had infected the movement by the late 1960s.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
This study reveals the uniqueness of farm families’ living and working conditions
since those who labored to produce the nation’s food supply faced safety challenges that
were distinctive from other workers. The fact that the farmstead often functioned both as
a home and a workplace is especially uncommon. This meant that the old, the young, and
the inexperienced were all exposed to a multitude of hazards in an increasingly
complicated occupation. This distinguishing feature of the issue is supported by the many
accidents involving children. The reality that farm families were not only exposed to
many of the same dangers which urban dwellers experienced, but also a dizzying variety
of others related to the agricultural work setting, also confirms their particular
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, less conspicuous factors validate the special health risks
associated with rural life. For instance, the fact that farm families usually resided farther
away from emergency care providers is another example that illustrates the unique safety
challenges of the agricultural way of life.
Farm residents also benefited little from federal or state regulatory protections, so
educational efforts were especially important in the attempt to reduce the accidents. This
was particularly the case since political leaders issued few legislative safeguards during
the era. Such law-making measures included limiting the types of work youth could
perform on farms and various OSHA standards. However, even when government
regulations were enacted, farm families were generally beyond the purview of such
actions since the regulations were usually aimed at farm owners who hired employees
and not those who depended on family members as a labor source. In addition, farmers
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possessed great responsibility regarding the safe use of agricultural chemicals which was
represented by the fact that they were not required to have chemical applicator
certificates until the early 1970s. Such realities meant that throughout the entire mid-
twentieth century, farm safety educational programs represented a crucial component in
the effort to improve agricultural safety.
Although farm families have always faced a plethora of dangers, their acquisition
of new technologies appears to have added to the potential dangers of living and working
on the nation’s farmsteads. Innovations such as new kinds of farm equipment, storage
equipment, and chemicals created a host of safety challenges for rural residents. Even
those technologies such as automobiles and electricity, which were adopted by all
Americans, appear to have held special risks for the farming populations. For instance,
those living in the countryside often used electricity both in their households and to assist
them in their farming operations. Their utilization of the power source for heat and
fencing, as well as the increasing presence of electric lines amidst ever-larger equipment
all posed exceptional risks. For instance, a farmer’s improperly installed heat lamps could
easily ignite dry hay, a carelessly installed electric fence exposed individuals the
possibility of electrocution, and farm equipment operators might accidentally contact
overhead electrical cables. Such hazards were largely unknown to urbanites, further
illustrating farm families heightened health risks.
Rural observers had identified many hazards on the farm throughout the early
twentieth century; however, it was not until the Second World War that a national farm
safety education effort materialized. Political leaders recognized the problem as a waste
of human resources at a time when adequate food production represented a crucial
element in winning the war. Farm safety boosters also frequently reminded rural residents
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of the emotional and financial costs of accidents. Although both governmental and
private organizations had devoted little to farm safety educational efforts prior to the war,
a cooperative, multi-faceted, and energetic response had fully emerged by the conflict’s
conclusion. The movement included a diverse group of governmental, non-profit, and
business organizations, each fulfilling an important role in a collective effort to decrease
accidents. For example, the NSC and the USDA provided administrative leadership on a
national level, while 4-H chapters and other entities delivered local educational
programming. A varied group including large corporations, small businesses, and other
private interests provided the financial support required for farm safety activities.
Although wartime exigencies contributed to the farm safety movement’s
emergence, other factors help contextualize its development. Agricultural observers and
writers expressed the view that farmers’ safety issues had changed drastically due to the
industrialization of agriculture. Thus, they argued that farm families required educational
programs to help them navigate their increasingly complicated environments. In
addition, the major organizations involved in the effort had matured greatly. The NSC,
USDA, and state extension agencies had continued to gain strength and vitality
throughout the early twentieth century. The leaders and employees of these organizations
appear to have continually expanded their roles as well as persistently sought ways to
market the expertise of their members. Thus, by the 1940s, both an increasing awareness
of the problem as well as the existence of an organizational network suited to disseminate
the safety message had fully developed. Such trends symbolized the increasing
bureaucratization and considerable influence experts had acquired in many areas of
American life.
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The farm safety movement also exhibited a relatively harmonious and cooperative
tone during the 1940s and 1950s. A diverse group of governmental, business, and non-
profit organizations worked together in creating an educational effort targeting an
impressive variety of rural safety issues. These concerns included the use of agricultural
machinery, chemicals, and a variety of other contributory factors in farm injuries and
fatalities. The fact that a diverse group of organizations successfully mounted such a
cooperative program such as National Farm Safety Week symbolizes the movement’s
cooperative tone. State farm safety committees’ rapid development throughout the nation
also at demonstrates the accommodating and inclusive atmosphere in the early years. The
rural population’s enthusiastic participation in farm safety programs and the private
sectors’ enthusiastic financial support of such efforts provide additional examples of this
relatively harmonious environment.
However, this relatively cooperative atmosphere had been greatly altered by the
late 1960s and early 1970s. Federal regulatory interventions such as OSHA’s relatively
timid but nonetheless largely unpopular actions showcased how large segments
agricultural community were antagonistic towards governmental intervention. The
appearance of the farm safety professional which had begun at the outset of the
movement had become fully realized by the early 1960s. The creation of a separate NIFS
organization symbolizes how this highly trained group of safety careerists desired to
improve their occupations professional reputation. Such efforts appear to have
contributed to a general fragmentation the movement which had been relatively unified
during the 1940s. The growing numbers of farm accident liability cases reveals how
Americans increasingly pointed to manufacturers as being partially to blame for their
accidents. The trend also seems to have created divisions amongst agricultural engineers,
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farm safety experts, equipment manufacturers, and other groups who had been involved
in the effort.
Although it is apparent that the farm safety movement became increasingly
characterized by a contentious atmosphere, it is more problematic to ascertain the overall
effect safety education had upon reducing farm accidents. Safety activists often measured
the success of their efforts by such superficial means as the number of safety committees
established, event attendance totals, or the numbers of safety materials distributed. Thus,
the fact that safety advocates engaged in few systematic appraisals of their activities does
much in explaining this ambiguity. This situation should not come as a surprise since
farm safety activists appear to have been sufficiently challenged in attempting to gain a
statistical understanding of the numbers, types, and causes of the accidents themselves. In
addition, much of the numerical support for educational programs often were anecdotal in
nature and did not represent the findings of carefully conceived studies. Nevertheless,
safety advocates did occasionally provide state-level data which demonstrated reductions
in some kinds of accidents following the enactment safety educational programs.
Although ascertaining the overall effectiveness of such educational programs
presented difficulties, other conclusions can be more easily determined. Such findings
include the fact that farm safety leaders successfully achieved high levels of participation,
developed a diverse range of activities, and expanded their programming throughout the
era. Safety advocates successfully gained the participation of thousands of rural
Americans in their activities. Youth organizations such as 4-H and FFA were committed
to such efforts throughout the era resulting in effectively reaching thousands of
individuals with the safety message. Safety leaders also proved to be particularly
effective at both identifying farm hazards and responding to such issues by quickly
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fashioning safety programs which were uniquely suited to specific areas of risk. This
accomplishment is verified by their successful development of programs aimed at
reducing accidents with various kinds of agricultural equipment, chemicals, as well a
myriad of electrical devices. Their efforts were also directed at preventing mishaps with
livestock, avoiding farm fires, as well as developing efforts meant to avoid recreational
hazards. They also utilized a variety of media including print media, radio, and television,
in an attempt to improve farm families’ health and welfare. Rural safety activists also
demonstrated a high degree of pedagogical experimentation throughout the era utilizing
full-scale demonstrations, models, and competitive events all in hopes of inspiring people
to live more carefully. Such observations demonstrate that farm safety leaders
successfully mounted a vibrant safety movement which effectively provided educational
experiences for the nation’s farm population.
Despite the farm safety movement’s accomplishments, the problems persisted. In
the 1980s, significant numbers of agricultural engineers, health professionals, and
journalists continually to express their view that excessive numbers of people were being
killed or injured. In 1988, Kelly J. Donham, a faculty member at the University of Iowa’s
Institute of Agricultural Medicine and Occupational Medicine, stressed that there was
much of left to be done to meet the tremendous challenge of improving agricultural
safety. He indicated those government farm agencies, ag-related businesses, and various
other farm-related groups needed to devote more resources to what he viewed to be a
highly important rural issue. Jim Leach, Republican Congressman from Iowa, echoed
Donham’s recognition of the seriousness of the problem stating, “Romantically, we think
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of agriculture as the finest way of life in the world—unfortunately we know it’s not the
safest.”600
Those who critiqued farm safety efforts provided convincing evidence regarding
the need to place greater priority on families’ well-being. For instance, in 1988, the Daily
Dispatch, a Moline, Illinois newspaper featured an article by Angella Herrin, a journalist
who had investigated the farm safety issue. Herrin wrote, “In 1983, the federal
government spent about $4.34 per U.S. worker for on the job safety programs but only 30
cents per farmer.” Such financial disparities were expressed by other individuals
throughout the era. Kelly J. Donham reacted to such evidence by stating, “There is a
double standard in terms of lack of programs and resources available to cope with what is
most dangerous occupation in the country.” He also added, “Other countries are way
ahead of us in dealing with the problem.”601 In 1989, Sidney M. Wolfe, editor of the
Health Letter, a publication of The Public Citizen Health Research Group further
supported such observations. He stated, “The reality that most farms are family units
makes the safety regulations which do exist irrelevant. Congress had forbidden OSHA
funds to inspect farms of less than 11 workers: this essentially means inspections for
dangerous machinery and practices are forbidden on U.S. Farms. Sadly, OSHA is not
using its authority to inspect large farms: in 1987 it inspected a total of 32 large farms—
only after a death in each case!”602
600 Angella Herrin, “Farming Safety Act Proposed,” Daily Dispatch, December 8, 1988, 1.
601 Ibid., 1.
602 Sidney M. Wolfe, “Farm Families: An Endangered Species,” Health Letter 5 (March 1989):1; the
Public Citizen Health Research Group is a non-profit organization aimed at researching and educating the
public about various public health issues.
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Furthermore, some agricultural engineers and safety specialists believed that the
farm equipment industry could have done more to safeguard farm families by more
quickly introducing safety features into their machinery designs. The relatively slow
progress regarding ROPS adoption in the United States is particularly illuminating
regarding this point. Additionally, seasoned safety experts such as Norval Wardle
repeatedly expressed their view that the nation’s agricultural manufacturers had not
sufficiently infused safety considerations into their equipment designs. In 1990, Arnold
B. Skromme revealed that such criticisms had persisted when he spoke on the subject at
the ASAE’s annual meeting. He revealed that American farm families experienced
considerably more deaths and injuries then their European counterparts. He summarized
the situation by stating, “An historian uncovers a strange situation in the United States-
although this country had led the rest of the World in new inventions, such as the first
pickup hay balers and forage choppers, the first all-purpose farm tractor, first vertical
silos, the invention of hybrid seed, etc, this country has failed to take a similar leading
action to design machines and building to prevent accidents.” Skromme’s comments
symbolize the manner in which the entire agricultural community, not just the farm
equipment industry, had often placed more perceptible economic considerations such as
an emphasis on production in much greater priority than safety.603
603 Arnold B. Skromme, “A Farm Safety Program Sponsored By Farmers,” (paper presented at the annual
meeting of The American Society of Agricultural Engineers, Chicago, Illinois, 18-21 December 1990), 1;
Skromme’s comments echoed the point that farm safety leaders had articulated since the movements very
inception. The opinion being that safety had been given a low priority. He also directed his criticisms at the
federal government stating, “All the agencies of our government, including the lawmakers themselves,
have a policy of pushing the farmer harder and harder to produce more and more, by using larger
equipment, buying more land, using more fertilizer and chemicals, increasing the vehicle ground speed…
doing everything to reduce the cost of our food, but at the expense of his health and life! Practically all of
the research funded by the federal and state governments covers how the farmer can raise more at a lower
cost!”
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The farm safety movement’s history also provides specific insights into the larger
transformation of rural life. Although sophisticated technology assisted farmers in
increasing their productivity, reducing the drudgery of agricultural work, and bringing
modern conveniences into farm homes, such modifications had also fundamentally
altered the farm family’s living and working environment. The era witnessed the
introduction of a host of new types of equipment and chemicals which if used improperly
could result in a catastrophic injury or even death. By the mid-twentieth century, rural
Americans had recognized the transformation and its relevance for the farm family. In
1955, Melvin Simmons of Jasper, Missouri, FFA chapter, indicated that there was a gulf
between the farmer’s potentially dangerous environment and the public’s idyllic image,
stating that “city people consider the farm a place of safety and quietness.” By the early
1970s, Americans occupying the highest government offices had also acknowledged how
technological innovation possessed consequences regarding safety. During his
Presidential Proclamation of Farm Safety Week in 1973, President Richard Nixon stated,
“The unfailing supply of food and fiber provided by the nation’s largest industry,
agriculture, has been the foundation of American prosperity since our country’s
beginnings. Abundance on the farm has, in turn, been stimulated by constant
technological progress. But the blessings of technology sometimes have been mixed, as
each advance has also brought a new potential for injury.”604
The farm safety story also reveals how farmers continued to exert considerable
independence due to their occupation’s entrepreneurial nature; however, this autonomy
made them more vulnerable to accidents than those who labored in other occupations.
604 Transactions-National Safety Congress (Chicago: National Safety Council, Transactions: 1955) 26;
Farm Safety Review, May/June 1973, 16.
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Farmers’ autonomy was also limited in regards to their dependence on outside individuals
to improve safety conditions. Farm safety careerists devoted their entire professional lives
to investigating the nature of the farm accident problem, proposing technical solutions,
and fashioning educational programming. Thus, farmers not only depended on their own
judgment regarding proper work practices, but also on the continued work of these
professionals. Agricultural engineers, farm safety experts, and extension personnel
labored to identify the specific dangers of an increasingly complex and changing rural
environment. They funneled their solutions through an organizational network of
governmental and private institutions. The farmer’s dependence on the expert for safety
echoes their reliance on outside groups such as financial institutions for credit,
government agencies for farm subsidies, and distant fertilizer companies to maintain the
soil fertility. Although agricultural policy-makers had promoted these agents of
agricultural change since the opening early decades of the twentieth century, the creation
of a farm safety movement required the stimulus of a wartime labor emergency to fully
launch an effort to improve safety.
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